N Nadir on bubonic plague — we picked the wrong policy there too

N Nadir said this so well I would like to quote an excerpt:

A nuclear power plant is an investment in the future, the main benefits will accrue to our children, our grandchildren and great grandchildren.

It's very clear that as a culture, we couldn't care less about the future.

I believe nuclear energy is the only form of truly sustainable energy and I would argue that a complaint about what might happen should the world economy collapse when the observed effects of dangerous fossil fuels without the collapse of the economy are disasterous, is inherently absurd.

But as much as I know nuclear energy is the only moral form of energy that exists, I do not expect it to be allowed to succeed as it might do, any more than it wasallowed to do what it might have done. One is a fool if one underestimates the power of fear, the power of ignorance.

I use this analogy a lot, because it sticks in my mind is seems dead on: Many lives might have been saved from the bubonic plague if people merely cleaned up the garbage on which rats fed. The actual means to address the crisis was not that however; it was prayer.

With nuclear energy we might clean up the garbage. But that won't happen. What will happen is just more prayers to the sun God while the devil within all of us burns ever more quantities of coal, oil, and gas, until the last molecule of CO2 that can be squeezed into the atmosphere issqueezed into it.

Source: a comment on Energy Collective.

 

China Studying Carbon and Coal Caps for Next Five-Year Plan

I’m seeing increasing optimism that China’s leaders are incrementally implementing climate-positive policies. These are policies that violate Roger Pielke Jr.’s “Iron Law”. While I’m reading the current 5 Year Plan, and going through my notes on policy hints, I found this June Bloomberg piece which closes with these comments on possible carbon taxes as well as coal and carbon caps.

At the moment, while the ETS is being piloted, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is also studying the possible implementation of carbon taxes. Yang Fuqiang said the National Development and Reform Commission favors the ETS system and the MOF the tax system, but it is uncertain which will be the leading policy in the end.

According to the CNS report, He also said nonfossil-fuel-based sources are expected to reach 15 percent in 2020, to reach 20 percent to 25 percent in 2030, and to hit 33 percent to 50 percent of the energy mix by 2050 in China.

Text of a speech by He given at a Low Carbon Development Forum at Tsinghua University in March shows he is in favor of setting caps on coal consumption and carbon emissions beyond the carbon intensity targets that have already been set, to “give stronger binding targets to promote the transformation of the current economic growth model,” but He did not suggest any policies had officially been set by the central government for the next planning period.

Transforming the Electricity Portfolio: Lessons from Germany and Japan in Deploying Renewable Energy

Brookings held the captioned event to launch a new policy brief (download PDF). I listened to the audio podcast while cycling Saturday. There is also a transcript available.

When I study the Brookings graphic showing the fossil increases in Germany and Japan it makes me really sad. But the majority of citizens are happy that the hated nuclear is dead or dying.

I think Germany is driving their economy off a cliff. As RE penetration increases their generation costs will go convex. Germany is already around 27% RE, with “greens” talking about going to 100% as fast as possible. But the man on the street thinks this is all grand. It is political suicide for a politician to propose reversing the anti-nuclear Energiewende.

To my surprise the Brookings scholars speaking at the event do not seem concerned. E.g., they quote a new NREL study proposing a pathway to 80% RE. Among the “lessons learned”:

Implications for the United States:

Policymakers must work to build a baseline consensus on national energy objectives and then develop and implement consistent, durable and clear policy mechanisms to achieve those objectives

The U.S. needs to elevate environmental goals as part of its overall energy objectives—in particular addressing climate change through reduction of greenhouse gases—and link these environmental goals to economic and national security issues

Renewable energy needs to be considered a national asset, with the capacity to balance multiple objectives

Brookings is a big place. Evidently it's possible for the RE group to be unaware of other Brookings research just published in May this year “The Net Benefits of Low and No-Carbon Electricity Technologies” Charles Frank, summarized in the blog Why the Best Path to a Low-Carbon Future is Not Wind or Solar Power.

This is a placeholder for a longer post when I have time to write it. Check out the audio or transcript and the brief. What do you think?

 

China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011- 2015) English language

In mid-March 2011, the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislature, approved the new Five-Year Plan (FYP). China’s FYPs are blueprints which outline key economic and development targets for the country for the next five-year period. The Plan is essential reading for businesses seeking to either expand their existing Chinaoperations or position themselves in the market for the first time.

Source: China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011- 2015)

 

How did Climate Change become a US partisan fight?

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I don’t have a solid answer to the captioned question. Survey data I’ve examined indicates the liberal/conservative split on climate is something new — since roughly the 1997 Kyoto Treaty.

My simplistic answer is:

  1. Kyoto was divisive because implementation fit very naturally with Democrat values emphasizing top-down control of the economy and international cooperation. Opposition fit naturally with Republican small-government values where Kyoto was seen as a path to larger, more intrusive government; and probably to slower growth.
  2. Kyoto was promoted by Al Gore. That was not a good choice for winning bipartisan support.
  3. Because Gore was pro-Kyoto, GW Bush had to be anti-Kyoto. Both those men affected the opposing party like fingernails on a chalkboard.
  4. The deflection around 2007 in above chart seems to support my last speculation: while both Obama and McCain proposed positive GHG action, the Kyoto concept was identified with Obama. That association was similar to the “Al Gore effect”.
  5. Gradually values-based disagreement over what-to-do-about-GHG was turned into a division over “The Science” and denialism was born. I don’t know why that happened.

For a more thoughtful analysis, there is the 2012 piece by Andrew Hoffman in Stanford Social Innovation Review Climate Science as Culture War. Andrew also examines ways to reach a negotiated social consensus. 

(…snip…)Climate change has become enmeshed in the so-called culture wars. Acceptance of the scientific consensus is now seen as an alignment with liberal views consistent with other “cultural” issues that divide the country (abortion, gun control, health care, and evolution). This partisan divide on climate change was not the case in the 1990s. It is a recent phenomenon, following in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Treaty that threatened the material interests of powerful economic and political interests, particularly members of the fossil fuel industry.3 The great danger of a protracted partisan divide is that the debate will take the form of what I call a “logic schism,” a breakdown in debate in which opposing sides are talking about completely different cultural issues.4

This article seeks to delve into the climate change debate through the lens of the social sciences. I take this approach not because the physical sciences have become less relevant, but because we need to understand the social and psychological processes by which people receive and understand the science of global warming. I explain the cultural dimensions of the climate debate as it is currently configured, outline three possible paths by which the debate can progress, and describe specific techniques that can drive that debate toward broader consensus. This goal is imperative, for without a broader consensus on climate change in the United States, Americans and people around the globe will be unable to formulate effective social, political, and economic solutions to the changing circumstances of our planet.

One of the best qualified to comment on the partisan development is Roger Pielke Jr — for example, his 2007 blog post Why is Climate Change a Partisan Issue in the United States? I don’t wish to simplify Roger’s analysis, but will just note that he begins with the conflict between Al Gore and George W. Bush.

Climate Group Lecture keynote address from Professor Joseph B Lassiter

Prof. Lassiter delivered a 40 minute lecture in Scotland to an event sponsored by the 2020ClimateGroup. The video is in two parts

Keynote part 1

Keynote part 2

We found the lecture to be a useful and sometimes fascinating global perspective of what is happening in the energy markets. An “insider’s perspective” in some parts. What you think?

Discounting and costs (Part 2): IPCC WGIII report on mitigation

This is a guest post by physicist Jani-Petri Martikainen @jpjmarti, proprietor of PassiiviIdentiteetti
(This post first appeared on Passiiviidentiteetti April 22, 2014)
 

rightwrongIn an earlier post I briefly discussed the scale of the challenge. In this one I discuss briefly how the report discusses ethical issues surrounding responsibilities towards future generations, with a special focus on discounting and how it relates to cost estimates of various energy options.

The use of a temporal discount rate has a crucial impact on the evaluation of mitigation policies and measures. The social discount rate is the minimum rate of expected social return that compensates for the increased intergenerational inequalities and the potential increased collective risk that an action generates. Even with disagreement on the level of the discount rate, a consensus favours using declining risk‐free discount rates over longer time horizons (high confidence).

An appropriate social risk‐free discount rate for consumption is between one and three times the anticipated growth rate in real per capita consumption (medium confidence). This judgement is based on an application of the Ramsey rule using typical values in the literature of normative parameters in the rule. Ultimately, however, these are normative choices.” IPCC WGIII Chapter 3

 “A simple arbitrage argument favours using the interest rate as the discount rate for climate policy decisions: if one reallocates capital from a safe but marginal project (whose return must be equal to the interest rate) to a safe project with the same maturity whose return is smaller than the interest rate, the net impact is null for the current generation, and is negative for future generations. Thus, when projects are financed by a reallocation of capital rather than an increase in aggregate saving (reducing consumption), the discount rate should be equal to the shadow cost of capital.

This descriptive approach to the discount rate has many drawbacks. First, we should not expect markets to aggregate preferences efficiently when some agents are not able to trade, as is the case for future generations (Diamond, 1977). Second, current interest rates are driven by the potentially impatient attitude of current consumers towards transferring their own consumption to the future. But climate change is about transferring consumption across different people and generations, so that determining the appropriate social discount rate is mostly a normative problem. Thirdly, we do not observe safe assets with maturities similar to those of climate impacts, so the arbitrage argument cannot be applied.”  IPCC WGIII Chapter 3

This discussion on discount rates is in my opinion very important since discount rates capture lots of the ethical underpinnings of our responsibilities to future generations. Discount rates tell about our time horizons and about how patient we are in waiting for gains. If you are offered money right now and twice as much at a later date, how long are you willing to wait? If the discount rate is 10%, you might be ready to wait for about 7 years and if it is 5% you wait for 14 years. Stern review used a rate of 1.4% for climate change damages in which case you are ready to wait for 50 years. In this case the time horizon is truly inter-generational. As explained by the WGIII, how to discount is in the end of the day a normative choice. However, it is a choice whose impact should be openly discussed and a choice that should be reasonably defended. In general I found the Chapter 3 Social, Economic and Ethical Concepts and Methods” interesting and I have to read it more carefully later. I recommend that authors of WGIII Chapter 7  “Energy Systems” also read it.

WGIII gives the levelized cost of energy for different energy sources in Figure 7.7 of Chapter 7. If you look at figure 7.7 (below) carefully you will perhaps notice something funny. In the 4th assessment report at 2007 the costs were given as shown in Figure 4.27 (see copy here). It is not the most beautiful of figures, but clear enough.

Figure 7.7 from IPCC WGIII Chapter 7 (2014)

Figure 7.7 from IPCC WGIII Chapter 7 (2014)

Fig 4.27 from WGIII 2007

Fig 4.27 from WGIII 2007

It shows the results at two different discount rates with coal, gas, and nuclear as the lowest cost options. Somebody was clearly not happy with this and wanted to change the figure into Fig. 7.7 of the new report. As I glanced at the figure first I naturally choose to compare “red” bars with red bars and blue ones with blue. After all we shouldn’t compare apples and oranges. Maybe you did the same? However, I then noticed that red color assumed “high full load hours”. What does that actually mean? In order to figure out, one has to read the annex III for detailed assumptions (how many are going to do that?). For nuclear power “high full load hours” meant a capacity factor of 84 %, for onshore wind 40%, and 27% for solar PV. For nuclear power this a typical capacity factor (although many reactors do better), but for wind and solar power those capacity factors are very atypical. So the figure is constructed in such away that uninformed reader is likely to make incorrect comparisons. In fact, WGIII concludes the caption of Fig. 7.7 (its on the next page and likely to be missed) by saying “Note: The inter-comparability of LCOE is limited. For details on general methodological issues and interpretation see Annexes as mentioned above. ” Indeed. Given that comparisons cannot really be made, why was this approach chosen in the first place? If you can come up with a charitable explanation I am all ears, but to me this seems like authors of Chapter 7 were actively working to make comparisons hard.

How did the authors of Chapter 7 approach the discounting? Let us guess that economic growth in the future is around 2%. In this case the Ramsey rule mentioned by the IPCC in Chapter 3 suggests a discount rate in the range of 2-6%. What discount rate is used in chapter 7 to compare levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for different energy sources? That would be 10%! Authors of WGIII decided not only to use very high discount rate, but also not to give their results at different discount rates so that the effects of this assumption could be observed. Considering that authors of Chapter 3 specifically emphasized how crucial this issue is in evaluating mitigation policies, the approach in Chapter 7 seems indefensible. At minimum one would expect them to show results over broad range of discount rates, but this they decided not to do. Since they refused to do it,  I will quickly do it here and see what difference it makes. (Note that some results with 5% discount rate are hidden in annex III, but these are only for the high FLH case so no honest comparison is possible.) In order to make sure that I know what I am doing I try to reproduce typical LCOE figures for WGIII high FLH case. I copy typical numbers from the annex III and this is what I get.

LCOE $(2010)/MWh comparison based on WGIII high FLH case (warning: misleading comparison!):

 Technology LCOE 10% high FLH (IPCC median) My result
Nuclear 99 97
Coal PC 78 78
Wind onshore 84 85
Solar PV (rooftop) 220 220
CCS-coal-PC 130 123

OK, the numbers are not exactly the same, but close enough for me. I am not sure how WGIII defined the median here. Also, maybe there is some index inconsistency somewhere in the summations…who knows. Basic point is that I can reproduce the WGIII values reasonably well and I am on the same map as WGIII. We are ready to go! So let me then look at the things WGIII decided not to show. I will now compute typical LCOE for few technologies at 10%, 5% and 1.4% discount rates. It turns out that as discount rate is lowered the LCOE for nuclear power drops from 97$/MWh to 62$/MWh, and finally to 42$/MWh. I will summarize the rest of the results by giving the costs relative to nuclear power. The values colored green are higher than the LCOE of nuclear while red is lower.

Difference to the cost of nuclear (go right if you prefer responsible long term thinking): 

 Technology 10% discount rate 5% discount rate 1.4% discount rate
Nuclear 0% 0% 0%
Coal PC -18% +5% +34%
Wind onshore +40% +57% +77%
Solar PV (rooftop) +190% +210% +230%
CCS-coal-PC +27% +63% +110%
(Main assumptions: Most numbers are copied from annex III of WGIII and I just list the differences here.I choose the capacity factor for wind power as 25% which is higher than European or Chinese average, but somewhat less than US average. Most of the wind power capacity in the world does worse than this. I choose the wind turbine lifetime as 20 years as opposed to WGIII value of 25 years, since 20 year lifetime is given by wind turbine manufacturers. This doesn’t change anything of relevance though. I choose PV capacity factor as 15%. In good locations capacity factor can be higher than this, but for example in Germany it is around 10%. Therefore 15% seems fair. I assumed PV capital costs as 3000 $/kW which is substantially less than the WGIII median value of 4400 $/kW. You can check the calculations and assumptions from these Matlab files LCOE_IPCC.mIPCC_Compare.m, and CompareForReal.m. In combination with annex III files should be quite self-explanatory and not too difficult to translate to other number crunching tools.)

As you can see green dominates and with the possible exception of hydro power in good locations, nuclear power is the lowest cost zero carbon source of electricity no matter what discount rate was used.  At 10% discount rate it has difficulty at competing with coal, but at 5% it becomes cheaper than coal. As discount rate is lowered the cost advantage of nuclear relative to other low carbon energy sources is rapidly increased. With 1.4% discount rate and a time horizon extending across generations nuclear power is cheaper than other options by a very large margin.  These results are based on the WGIII numbers and the only changes are those listed above to mainly account for differences in capacity factors. We could make the above table all green by adding a carbon price of only around 20 $/tCO2.

Maybe this discussion on the role of discount rates is simply too radical and WGIII is just following conventions? Well, not really. It is certainly not too radical for WGIII since in its 2011 SSREN report focusing on renewables WGIII gave precisely this type of comparison with 10%, 7%, and 3% discount rates (Fig 10.29 p. 844 in Chapter 10). Some of its authors were even authors of this report. Of course from SSREN report nuclear power was purged at the outset and results which might give readers funny ideas did not have to be shown. Absurdly the discussion on discount rates in this context is far more extensive in SSREN while in this report it has been brushed aside contrary to the emphasis by the authors of Chapter 3 of WGIII. We can only speculate as to why.

To me it seems that on this issue the authors of Chapter 7 were working hard to make sure that uninformed would remain uninformed while giving a chance to say to informed ones: “We are not lying! We are open about the methodology…see annex III etc. Yeah, maybe figure 7.7 is not as clear as it could be. Thanks for the tip! Clear communication is super important and we will keep it in mind for the next assessment report! Blaah blaah blaah…” IPCC should be an expert body giving accurate evidence based material for policy discussions. Sadly in this case WGIII decided not to give this material and compromised its supposed “policy-neutrality”. In plain english, authors of Chapter 7 decided not to do their jobs since doing it would have provided facts suggesting that some mitigation policies are likely to be more effective than others. But this is what they should do! If people decide to brush the cost differences aside, that is their choice, but it is not the role of an expert to fudge figures in such a way that implications of different policy choices are hidden.

Authors of Chapter 7 did what?

Authors of Chapter 7 did what?

While the WGIII messed up the presentation of the costs that we are in a position to know fairly well, it spends a lot of time in speculating about long term costs using integrated assessment models. Since we are not able to predict the future of mankind, I do not think that these games are much more than computer generated guesses based on the preferences of whoever is doing the modeling. I think we are better of in focusing on issues that we can actually control at least to some degree. The Economists was also not very impressed about this:

The IPCC still thinks it might be possible to hit the emissions target by tripling, to 80%, the share of low-carbon energy sources, such as solar, wind and nuclear power, used in electricity generation. It reckons this would require investment in such energy to go up by $147 billion a year until 2030 (and for investment in conventional carbon-producing power generation to be cut by $30 billion a year). In total, the panel says, the world could keep carbon concentrations to the requisite level by actions that would reduce annual economic growth by a mere 0.06 percentage points in 2100.

These numbers look preposterous. Germany and Spain have gone further than most in using public subsidies to boost the share of renewable energy (though to nothing like 80%) and their bills have been enormous: 0.6% of GDP a year in Germany and 0.8% in Spain. The costs of emission-reduction measures have routinely proved much higher than expected.

Moreover, the assumptions used to calculate long-term costs in the models are, as Robert Pindyck of the National Bureau of Economic Research, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, put it, “completely made up”. In such circumstances, estimates of the costs and benefits of climate change in 2100 are next to useless. Of the IPCC’s three recent reports, the first two (on the natural science and on adapting to global warming) were valuable. This one isn’t.The Economist. While I think the report has some interesting things as well, when it comes to cost estimates I tend to agree with The Economists.

Finally, in my opinion the fact that companies use the short time horizons implied by 10% (or higher) discount rates is a clear indication of a market failure. Climate change requires longer term decisions and if such decisions cannot be delivered by current markets, those markets need to change. Either the state with a longer time horizon must become more active or appropriate sticks and carrots should be developed to discourage short term profit taking and promote longer term visions.

How Russell Wilcox moved from E Ink to CEO of nuclear startup Transatomic Power

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Following the sale of E Ink Russ took his family on a world-travel adventure for a year. Then serendipity

They were at a Disney resort in Tokyo—riding through a simulated volcano attraction of all things—when the catastrophic 2011 earthquake and tsunami struck. Wilcox says the terror of the moment, the nearby disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and the stresses on the planet’s environment he saw in places like India and Africa, helped to shape his next move.

Fast forward to a TEDx New England Conference, when he first saw grad students Mark Massie and Leslie Dewan.

“One of the presentations happened to be these two scientists from MIT who stood up and talked about this new kind of nuclear reactor,” he says. “And at the end I watched 300 people cheering nuclear energy, and I thought, ‘Wow, this is different.'”

The crowd was cheering the WAMSR (Waste Annihilating Molten Salt Reactor). Unlike conventional light-water nuclear plants, the young scientists’ reactor runs on radioactive fuel dissolved into liquid molten salt. In theory at least, that means it can use nuclear waste from conventional plants as fuel and that it needs no active, electricity-dependent safety measures of the type that failed so catastrophically in Japan. Once fully deployed, Transatomic says its reactors could use existing stockpiles of nuclear waste to satisfy the world’s electricity needs through 2083.

HBS Case: Terrapower financing

This HBS case gives some background on the 2012 status of Terrapower financing.

Abstract

John Gilleland, CEO of TerraPower, returned to his office after a lengthy meeting with potential investors. It was October 2012, and TerraPower was in the process of raising a $200M Series C round to finance the ongoing development of its next-generation nuclear reactor. Though early in the fundraising process, Gilleland noted that this most recent conversation was similar to conversations with other interested cleantech growth equity investors. The conversations circled around a common theme: “This is the biggest idea that’s ever been presented at our partners’ meeting. We love what you’re doing, but it’s not right for us as an investment.” Outside of raising money from typical growth equity and infrastructure funds, Gilleland could partner with a government and/or form a joint venture with an existing nuclear power player. Reliance Industries as an investor in TerraPower could provide an entry point into the fast growing Indian market. At the same time, Gilleland and Gates had talked with China National Nuclear Corp. about a possible cooperation with TerraPower. Whom should Gilleland call next?

Sahlman, William A., Ramana Nanda, Joseph B. Lassiter III, and James McQuade. “TerraPower.” Harvard Business School Case 813-108, November 2012. (Revised December 2013.)

Response to Readers: Combating Climate Change with Nuclear Power and Fracking

Prof. Joe Lassiter responds to the commentary firefight prompted by his Harvard Business School Working Knowledge article. His comments are self-explanatory – I’m highlighting here a few that resonate especially with me [emphasis is mine].

With more than 7,500 views and 180-plus tweets, I want to thank everyone for taking the time to read the original HBS Working Knowledge piece, The Case for Combating Climate Change with Nuclear Power and Fracking, and, in particular, for sharing your thoughts with one another. I don’t expect the article has changed minds, but I do hope it encourages people to open their minds to consider new possibilities.

My own concerns about climate change have led me to put “new” nuclear back on my table of alternatives that must be actively explored as well as to clarify my own attitudes toward fracking and its role towards any global solution. We must have a global solution—a set of new choices that change plans not only in the West but also in China and India—or we will have no solution at all.

(…snip…)

Things that were once seen as relatively safe are now understood as likely to be quite dangerous, such as coal burning’s contribution to global warming driven by worldwide cumulative CO2 emissions. Perhaps, the opposite is also true. Are things that were once seen as quite dangerous now potentially relatively safe as result of new understandings and innovations? 

While rich countries can afford to do whatever they wish to do, policymakers in poorer countries consistently make the trade-off in favor of the certain benefits of electricity to their citizens today over the uncertain costs of global warming to their citizens in the future. To change that trade-off significantly, I believe we need to get new dispatchable, zero-carbon technologies on the table within the next 10 years that can beat coal on price in India and China in order to change Indian and Chinese national energy policies.

In my opinion, the newly approved Gen III+ nuclear reactors (e.g., AP-1000 variants or even the still-to-be-approved, but largely derivative Small Modular Reactors) are not likely to produce power cheaply enough to change the currently forecast build out of fossil fuel power systems in India and China. While China will make significant commitments to nuclear power internally and aggressively export nuclear power plant components, the bulk of its power generation will remain with coal, serving markets—domestic and foreign—where demand for low-cost will in all likelihood overwhelm the drive for low-carbon emissions. Without establishing the availability of much cheaper (coal-competitive) zero-carbon alternatives within the next 10 years, I just don’t think “the world” can do enough, fast enough to keep cumulative CO2 emissions below the levels that—again in my estimate—threaten us all with “unknowable” risks.

My concern with nuclear—even “new” nuclear—is the issue of catastrophic core failures, à la Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Historically, those core failures have been “Hindenburg disaster” events with immediate loss of life and property as well as the additional uncertainty of lingering contamination. While gripping, the actual loss of life from these events has been similar in magnitude to the loss of life of relatively more common disasters—BP Deep Horizon blowout, Exxon Valdez grounding, BP Texas City Refinery explosion, Gyama Mine landslide—which take place relatively often within the world’s existing energy systems. As part of a Bayesian analysis, Jack Devanney of Martingale estimates that on average we will have one such nuclear core casualty every 3,000 reactor years. For the current fleet, that’s about one every 10 years. If the world were to go all-out nuclear for electricity, we would eventually be talking about one core damage event every calendar year, unless we can substantially reduce the failure rate with new designs.

In spite of all of nuclear’s issues, private capital is relatively abundant. There is even a privately financed, venture-backed fusion reactor program today, Tri-Alpha Energy, of Rancho Santa Margarita, California. There is a whole crop of privately financed “new” Gen IV nuclear power technologies—like those at Martingale or Transatomic or TerraPower as well as others—that have the potential to be significantly cheaper than the current Gen III+ plants or the proposed Small Modular Reactors, even though much work needs to be done before we know that these Gen IV designs will actually be cheap enough to beat coal in India and China and safe enough for regulators to permit for deployment. It is the inability to get access to sites for stress testing of prototype designs, as well as high upfront cost and uncertain timeliness of the regulatory process, that are the primary barriers to raising private capital today.

(…snip…)

There is a clear opportunity to hold ARPA-E style design challenges around the world focused on nuclear power that call for entrepreneurs to submit designs that meet the cost, safety, construction, and operational scaling required to beat coal in India and China in less than 10 years. It will take new ideas to break coal’s momentum and to open up the minds of policymakers. This is a time when small teams can often uncover brand new or even forgotten paths to new solutions while large teams get trapped into non-solutions by incrementalism and convention. But to convert these new ideas into real alternatives, the world’s governments need to go even farther. They must provide the nuclear regulatory redesign and physical facilities for prototype evaluation that will let private capital take on the tasks of technical innovation, experimentation, and rigorous stress testing, even as the eventual permitting authority remains with public regulators. Innovation and regulation must proceed hand-in-hand, but regulators must allow entrepreneurs to pursue those innovations with a relentless urgency that matches the severity of the “unknowable” threat which the world faces from global warming.

Finally, if you have the time, you might look at the online Forbes comments section as well as the HBS Working Knowledge comments section at the bottom of the article. The exchange between Forbes commenters ‘daviddelosangeles’ and Jeff Walther is well worth reading, as is the discussion among Walter, Mohammed Athari, and Paxus Calta. Also, Robert Hargraves dropped by and mentioned his book, THORIUM: energy cheaper than coal, which I found to be a useful compendium of energy information of all kinds.

(…snip…)  I think we all need to keep our minds open to change, while urgently pushing for achievable, effective, and truly global solutions to the challenges of global warming.