SeekerBlog

George Friedman’s 12/30/04 Stratfor report Facing Realities in Iraq is not good news – if it is accurate. Tigerhawk wrote a good article on the Stratfor report on Jan 5, 2005, shortly after release.

On the positive side:

We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened without the invasion of Iraq.

On to the negative outlook – Friedman’s SOP is that he does not pussy-foot around. Here he plants the Stratfor flag on a quite specific prediction. In no more than five years, possibly only two, we will know if he called this one wrong. I sincerely hope that his outlook proves to be wrong. Friedman has two key ideas, which I will rush in and name The Intimidation and The Infiltration Factors:

The Intimidation Factor: I have worried about some of the issues he raises since Spring 2004, when the extent of the Baathist effort to retake control of Iraq was becoming evident. My primary concern was the intidmidation factor – that even a residual group of terrorists could prevent the best Iraqis from taking/keeping the critical leadership jobs. Or if they took a position, they would be corrupted by the intimidation. Directed assasinations and kidnappings are extremely hard to totally prevent when you are trying to protect several hundred officials and technocrats.

We know that intimidation is a serious problem. The power of intimidation has been clear in some of the articles by the Iraqi bloggers Zayed of Healing Iraq, Omar and Mohammed of Iraq the Model, and brother Ali of Free Iraqi. No doubt intimidation is slowing progress – from the willingness of key people to take government positions, to intelligence on the terrorists. But it is a diminishing threat as the terrorists are put down. I offer the Jan 30 election turnout as evidence that Iraqis are more and more willing to risk sticking their necks out.

The Infiltration Factor: But here, Friedman’s view is that the infiltrators (I prefer traitors) will checkmate the Bush goal of a democratic Iraq. I’m not convinced he is correct, and will offer some counter arguments.

But I want the last word, so first I’ll extract his key points, first on the Intimidation Factor:

Creating democracy in Iraq requires that democratic institutions be created. That is an abstract, bloodless way of putting it. The reality is that Iraqis must be recruited to serve in these institutions, from the army and police to social services. Obviously, these people become targets for the guerrillas and the level of intimidation is massive. These officials — caught between the power of U.S. forces and the guerrillas — are hardly in a position to engage in nation building. They are happy to survive, if they choose to remain at their posts.

Next, the Infiltration Factor:

Even this is not the central problem. In order to build these institutions, Iraqis will have to be recruited. It is impossible to distinguish between Iraqis committed to the American project, Iraqis who are opportunists and Iraqis who are jihadists sent by guerrilla intelligence services to penetrate the new institutions. Corruption aside, every one of the institutions is full of jihadist agents, who are there to spy and disrupt.

This has a direct military consequence. The goal of the Untied States in Vietnam was, and now in Iraq is, to shift the war-fighting burden — in this case from U.S. forces to the Iraqis. This can never happen. The Iraqi army, like the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, is filled with guerrilla operatives. If the United States mounts joint operations with the Iraqis, the guerrillas will know about it during the planning stages. If the United States fights alone, it will be more effective, but the Iraqi army will never develop. For the United States, it is a question of heads you win, tails I lose.

The Chain of Trust: I believe that if the Iraqis and US advisors will apply an appropriate selection and vetting process, then they can prove Friedman wrong on the hopelessness of the Infiltration Factor. Back on Sept 1, 2003 I wrote the following as part of an ongoing dialog with Grim Beorn of Grim’s Hall who is considerably more informed on matters military than I:

I keep circling back to the idea that the Iraqi Army (general army, not the Guards) is an untapped resource. E.g., I’ve gathered from both press reports and sources such as Interrogator Chief Wiggles, that we have profiled a number of ex-generals and other senior officers. That many of these guys are smart and want to help build the new Iraq. My thesis is simply to exploit what I’ll call the "chain of trust" as follows:

If those premises are valid, I infer that these officers could name enough trustworthy mid level officers to form the leadership – a leadership who could recruit the fellow officers and the next level, who would be reliable…

As I’ve followed the progress in Iraq I’ve continued to think about the Chain of Trust concept – is it valid? How should it be applied to (pick your problem, voter registration officials, power industry technocrats, …)?. I presume that today General Patreus and his command are doing something analogous as they build and train the new Iraq security forces.

Is it possible, even likely, that at the lower levels there are infiltrators? I don’t know, but given the incredible pressure to build those forces rapidly, it seems very likely that traitors have been recruited – especially during the chaotic command before Gen. Patreus took over. Is the general-officer class of the new force full of traitors? From my comfortable desk I can only speculate – I’ll bet $100 that any bad guys in top of the pyramid are known to the good guys.

So, SeekerBlog will take the contra on this one: we think George Friedman is wrong on this one, and George Bush is right. Specifically that a functioning Iraqi democracy will emerge, and by 2015 will be a serious candidate for merging into the "Functioning Core".

9 March Postscript: If you question the existence of trustworthy and honorable officers from Saddam’s military, one useful background source is the Chief Wiggles archives. The Chief was a senior interrogator working with a number of captured Iraqi general officers. Obviously what he could write in his blog is restricted by security, but I found it fascinating. Here is one example, from Sep 7, 2003:

You might be wondering why I care so much about these men. If you have been reading all of my journal entries you probably have a better understanding of this but let me say a few things to clear the water.

Prior to coming to the palace a month or so ago, I lived at the EPW camp in southern Iraqi with these men for about 3 months, interacting with them on a daily basis. I spoke with them day in and day out, sitting with them in their tents, eating their food, talking with them in groups and one on one, meeting their families, and seeing them in their highest and lowest moments. I have personally questioned each and every one of them extensively.

For the most part these men have been waiting for our arrival since 1991, hoping we would come to release them from the chains of Saddam Hussein. Yes they are career military men but not hand picked by Saddam, but just a handful  of some 10,000 Brigadier Generals who just happened to chose the military as their livelihood, over the years having moved up the ranks like anyone else. Many of these men had been retired, only to find themselves activated before the war. Many were in the Navy and Air Force, not highly regarded or trusted by Saddam. Many were sent to the southern part of Iraq to serve out the remainder of their terms, having fallen out of favor or by choosing not to participate with the doings of their leader. None of these men were serving in the Republican Guards or the Special Republican Guards, where allegiance to Saddam is required.

As some might suggest this is not a case of the "Stockholm Syndrome", where the captor begins to like or side with his prisoner.  This is a matter of knowing deep in my heart that these men, for the most part, are good, honorable, upstanding- men, desiring to do what is right for their country, having understood the freedom we were bringing them. These are highly educated men, with special skills and abilities, prime candidates for positions in the new government and the new military. Men that I have grown to respect and admire, hoping that they would be allowed to participate in this reconstructing process.