SeekerBlog

This is the Oct 5th DOD briefing by Gen. Patraeus, thanks to Bill Roggio, that I referred to in the previous post. Ignore the press flailing around on this issue – Patraeus is the guy who really knows what is important.

The bottom line up front that I’d like to leave with you today is that there has been enormous progress with the Iraqi security forces over the course of the past 16 months in the face of a brutal insurgency, and there is considerable work still to be done. Iraqi security force readiness has continued to grow with each passing week. You can take a percentage off every metric that’s out there, whatever you want — training, equipping, infrastructure reconstruction, units in the fight; schools, academies reestablished — you name it — and what has been accomplished since the transition to sovereignty late last June would still be remarkable.

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To be sure, few of these units are candidates for the 1st Marine Division or the 101st Airborne right now. However, they have come a very long way in a relatively short period of time in the face of a brutal enemy who has tried everything to disrupt and derail the reestablishment of Iraqi security forces, reconstruction of their infrastructure, and the delivery of their equipment. And despite taking casualties that are at least twice those of U.S. forces, Iraqis continue to volunteer in droves for the Iraqi security forces.

Again, it is not surprising that very, very few Iraqi battalions are assessed at level one, which means, again, fully independent, not just capable of fully independent operations, because many level two units operate independently, such as those that I mentioned, the seven in Baghdad alone that have their own areas of operation and in which, therefore, U.S. forces or coalition forces, other than their transition teams and perhaps some other small elements, are not required. So again, fully independent, requiring no coalition assistance in any form.

Given the need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures and command and control, all of which we’ve been working on with our Iraqi counterparts, it will understandably take quite some time before substantial numbers of units are assessed as being fully independent — i.e., level one — and requiring no assistance.

But again, units at level two can control their own areas of responsibility and therefore allow coalition units to focus elsewhere or eventually to go home. And even units at level three, the fighting-alongside category, are very, very important and are very helpful in thickening the capabilities of coalition forces, adding native language capability, appreciation of the culture, and so forth. And many of them, for example, man checkpoints and a variety of other less-demanding, although still dangerous, tasks.

On the emergency response unit

… the emergency response unit, which is yet another battalion.

By the way, let me talk about that unit, because that is a very substantial unit, similar to — in intent to the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, just as the Iraqi counterterrorist unit is similar in intent to the Special Mission Unit of the U.S. Army, except more than twice the size — very, very highly trained. They absolutely conduct independent operations, but they are still level two units, by the way. And the reason is because their logistics support — and the biggest contribution we make to an operation of the emergency response unit, by the way, is, we help them get through the checkpoint that enters the area where they — they’re inside a coalition — a huge coalition compound, and we help them get through the checkpoint, say, “Have a nice operation,” and they then don’t — we don’t see them again until they report back to the checkpoint and they’ve already done the operation, dropped off any detainees with the major crimes unit or whoever is taking them, and then come back, operating on Iraqi intelligence, by the way, developed by the Ministry of Interior, with the legal aspects taken care of by Ministry of Interior or Justice and so forth.

So that gives you an example why this level one is such a very, very tough standard and why, again, we should not expect large numbers of level one for quite some time.

On leadership:

Q (Off mike) — how long it takes to go from level two to level one?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It’s a tough one, actually, because it is very, very dependent on the quality of the Iraqi leaders. I think you know that this is a society that is very responsive to leadership, good leadership, and frankly, also bad leadership. I mean, it is a culture that listens to loudspeakers. It is — and so, it has been a culture that has been on the receive mode, by the way, a great deal, you know, over the past 20 or 30 years. So leaders are hugely important, and in fact, there’s been a fair investment in them in addition to those transition teams that I described — every battalion, brigade, division, ground forces, and et cetera, et cetera.

On infiltration:

…the way I would answer that is to say that the best people that — the best vetters in this whole process are those beside whom they will fight. And they will figure out who is not — trustworthy and who isn’t. And they often times will vet them out themselves. And that is, I think, critically important. And then, of course, the transition teams that are embedded with these units have a sense, again of the situation in their units.