Does any reasonably informed observer think that approval of the draft constitution means the jihadis are packing their bags today to return to Saudi, Syria, …? Of course not. Neither will successful achievement of the next milestone, the December 15 election of the new parliament. These are but data points on the accelerating curve of Iraqi self-security and self-government.
There also will almost certainly be at least another year of intensive fighting against Islamist and extremist elements that will reject inclusion in the political process almost regardless of what political system emerges during the coming elections. There are only three ways to deal with Iraq’s most hard-line elements: Kill them, imprison them, or drive them out of the country. There is a very real war to fight, and it is still unclear when or if Iraqi forces will really be ready to fight it with anything like the total numbers required.
In his analysis of the referendum Dan Darling selected the above quote from Anthony Cordesman’s Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, the working draft of an upcoming book. I recommend Cordesman for in depth background on the dark forces in Iraq.
What you won’t find even in Cordesman’s excellent survey is an appreciation for the geometrically increasing rate of progress in the development of:
1) The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
2) The practice of politics and governance
3) Iraqi confidence in both Security and Governance
Big Media has completely missed the story (1) of what the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq and NATO Training Mission Iraq have accomplished since Lt. General David Petraeus took command a year ago. Building from scratch an effective security force is an incredibly complex process. When the effort is successful, as this one has been, the measure of overall effectiveness of the security force is intrinsically geometric. There is a critical mass point on the effectiveness curve – once reached the rate of growth is dramatic, even surprising. The critical mass point was passed sometime in the past six months – probably mid summer, when the leadership began to gel (both officers and non-coms) .
Geometric progress in the growth of the ISF improves anti-terror operations, but is not sufficient to defeat the dark force. Elements of the dark force can only survive where the locals are sufficiently intimidated that they fear to report on the terrorists. Factor (3) defeats the intimidation weapon. It is dependent upon confidence in (personal, neighborhood) security, but also requires confidence that the developing Iraqi government can sustain itself.
The conflict in Iraq has been a competition between two curves: the curve of (3) versus the anti-curve measuring the combined effectiveness of the salafists and ex-Baathists. Those curves crossed sometime in the past six months, perhaps as recently as early September. The gap in favor of the democracy forces will continue to widen at an accelerating rate.
I would not be an investor in the terrorist dark force. While I expect self-governance to progress, I doubt that progress will be steady. I do expect continuing acts by the dark force for a very long time. The ex-Baathist component should wither to insignificance as they shift their energies to the political front (and find employment). The two other components: the salafists and their paid hands, the criminal gangs, will continue to kill and maim so long as they have funds and explosives.
When could we safely declare “success”? Perhaps when Saudi, Syria, Lebanon and Iran have also completed the transition to self-government? Ultimately, that will dry up the funding and the supply of young, unemployed males with only a non-employable religious education. That, I think, is what the Bush Doctrine is all about. It is certainly what Thomas P. M. Barnett calls “Shrinking the Gap“.
Recent Comments