"Hope is not a policy" write Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack in this Policy Review article from Oct 2002 at the Hoover Institution.
This is a ‘must read’ article - for me it defines very clearly the leadership challenges faced on both sides of the Atlantic. Leadership is rarely observed - but this challenge certainly is demanding it.
"Can this generation of Western leaders perform the modern-day equivalent of what Truman and European leaders did in 1949 ? The tone of recent transatlantic discourse suggests that the answer may be no. Although September 11 initially produced a tremendous outpouring of solidarity across the Atlantic, the mood has since soured into one of the ugliest U.S.-European spats in recent memory. It has become fashionable on both sides to argue that the differences today are deeper than ever, and that the values and interests that held this relationship together may be in danger of fraying or even breaking. Euro-trashing is as much in vogue in some right-wing circles in Washington as America-bashing is in left-wing circles in Europe.
Current transatlantic differences are real. But it is also important to look beyond the current intellectual fads and see what underlies them — and what doesn’t. U.S.-European differences fall into two categories. The first are those disputes that arise from the fact that our societies are more integrated than any two parts of the planet. Clashes over the environment, child custody, the death penalty, and genetically modified food are important and make for great headlines. But they are not strategic in nature. The fact that we are debating them so intensely is a sign of how closely integrated our societies have become. They are the problems of success, not failure. Such differences were far greater in 1949 . They did not prevent us from creating a strategic alliance then. They should not prevent us from working together on a new strategic agenda today.
But there is also a second category of differences. These disputes revolve around how the U.S. and Europe view the outside world, assess threats, and seek to meet them. They are rooted not only in our respective interests but are shaped by our size, historical experiences, strategic cultures, and the asymmetry in power and responsibility that both sides of the Atlantic bring to the table. [2] Such differences directly affect our ability, or lack thereof, to cooperate on questions of war and peace. They can become strategic in nature. The central question in the transatlantic relationship today is whether the U.S. and Europe can still harmonize these differences and coalesce around a new strategic purpose and paradigm to guide future cooperation across the Atlantic."
Footnote [2] refers to Robert Kagan’s “Power and Weakness” from Policy Review 113 (June-July 2002).
Well, pretty prescient for 2002, I’d say. But I note the following quote: “Some Americans may prefer that the U.S. fight Saddam Hussein on its own, but a common U.S.-European front would make the job much easier.3 And when it comes to the thorny question of securing and rebuilding Iraq after Saddam is gone, we will be even more dependent on the assistance and support of our European allies.”
Hopefully not. Otherwise the Iraqis are F’d. Euro-tokenism will be the death of them.