Seeker Blog

Rafi Ron was retained by Boston’s Logan Airport as security advisor. He testified before the Aviation Subcommittee, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on February 27, 2002.

Ron explains succinctly why the Israeli methods are effective. He does not explain in detail the Israeli interviewing techniques. His testimony is a short read, and highly instructive of what US procedures should look like.

What will curl your hair is the next speaker Rachel King, Legislative Counsel of ACLU, and the question period. The ACLU is not on the Al Qaeda payroll, but they might as well be. The good news is the testimony by Professor Jonathan Turley from George Washington University Law School. Not all legal academics are dummies (see Turley excerpts at the end of this post).

For the record I am Rafi Ron and up until October 1st 2001 and for the last 5 years, I was chief in charge of security in the Israeli Airport Authority (I.A.A.). Within this role, I was in charge of all aspects of Israeli airport and aviation security including (but not only), security assessments and risk analysis, security planning and development, commanding all security operational units, identifying, negotiating, purchasing, and implementing new technologies etc. Within this role, I was in charge of more then 2000 security personal who were working in the Ben-Gurion airport. …

In 1968 an EL-AL aircraft was hijacked by Palestinian terrorist to Algeria. As a result the state of Israel decided that protecting Israeli aviation is a national security matter of high priority and established the "air marshal" program. It became obvious that there is a need to develop a ground security operation in order to minimize the risk on board the aircraft.

The operational analysis was based on the assumption that in order for an attack to take place, two conditions must be met:

1. There has to be a person with a hostile intention.

2. A weapon has to be used.

The natural tendency was to choose the discovery of the weapon as the preventive method. Through the attempt to develop an effective method for this purpose, it became clear that while it is possible, it must involve some very thorough checks, some at forensic level. The reason for the great difficulties is the fact that weapons and especially explosive charges take almost every possible shape, color or smell and they can be produced from a great variety of materials. Simple manual search is not effective enough. These checks consume a long time (about one hour for a single passenger with one checked bag), they are very intrusive and considered by most passengers as a very substantial hassle. It became clear that it will be impossible to provide this type of procedure to all passengers and therefore a need to develop a method that will allow an intelligent decision as to who is more eligible for this thorough search.

The answer to this need came in the development of a systematic, real time, investigation of the passenger profile. This well designed procedure allows the security officer to make a decision, based on identifying the level of risk, as to the level of checks to be performed before the passenger is allowed to board the aircraft.

This real time investigation can be as short as 90 seconds or last as long as 20 minutes. It involves the checking of documents (I.D. , flight tickets etc.) and questions that relate to the passengers journey and background.

This profiling method has been used very successfully for the last 32 years by the state of Israel. It led to the discovery of an explosive device in an attempted terrorist attack on EL-AL flight from London to Tel-Aviv in 1986, using a naïve Irish girl by the name Ann Marry Murphy. It was through questioning that the EL-AL security officer realized that the pregnant young woman was carrying a bag she received from her Palestinian, father to-be, boyfriend. The thorough check of the bag exposed a 1.5kg of Cemtex and a sophisticated altimeter initiation device disguised as an electronic calculator.

The lack of further attacks gives credence to the assumption that this method is a strong deterring factor, since it is difficult to assume that Palestinian terrorism lost its interest in Israel’s aviation.

There has been criticism against the use of this method on the ground of racial discrimination. Most if not all of this criticism is unfounded. The fact that there are many Palestinian "selectees" in Israel’s aviation security procedures merely reflects the fact that most of the terrorists acting against it are Palestinian. It is also a fact that there are more "selectees" of other nationalities rather than Palestinians.

I would even argue that without a professional procedure the space if taken by intuition of the security person and in many cases will involve some level of prejudice personal views.

After the 9/11 tragedy the public discussion focused on the low performance level of the screeners as if the attack could have been avoided by better screening! To my best judgment this is not the case and focusing the discussion in this direction leads to future exposure to the same type attacks.

Even the great effort to develop quickly a 100%  hold baggage screening standard cannot prevent the 9/11 type attack. I do not suggest that these technological measures are not important, on the contrary, their importance is paramount – but they are not enough!    The missing element is the human factor and without relating to it we leave the room for future attacks.

It should also be argued that without the ability to take an intelligent decision on where to invest our effort we end wasting our attention on the "low risk" passengers and not being able to invest enough in the "high risk" passengers.

The situation is particularly worrying because the technology used in security check-points (x-ray screening and metal detection) is not enough to stop even the Richard Reid type attack and I would not suggest that we rely only on a  1-10 random  ETD (explosive trace detection) check.

Ideas like "Trusted passenger program" that allows people to register in advance, by submitting personal information voluntarily in the manner they do when applying for a credit card combined with the use of biometric technology for ID verification will make the use of pattern recognition (professional profiling) very feasible and very effective. The advantage of this program is not the exemption of any passenger from the bag screening, but by adding a human factor element we create the ability to invest more effort in the "high risk" passengers.

Finally it can be said that the civil rights issue can be controlled and the creation of an operational method for pattern recognition is feasible. Without it we will not be relating effectively to the threat as it materialized in the latest Al-qaida attacks.

Thank you and I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

That was the good part, now the useful idiots testify, with some rebuttals by Rafi Ron:

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony. We will withhold questions until we have heard from our final witness. The last witness is Ms. Katie Corrigan. She is Legislative Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union in the Washington National Office. I think she is also accompanied by Ms. Rachel King, Legislative Counsel of ACLU.

Ms. KING. Good morning. Blah, blah …

There’s significant anecdotal information, however, that discriminatory profiling is taking place at our nation’s airports. We attached just a sampling of complaints from CAIR showing literally dozens and dozens of complaints. Of particular concern are the cases where people are prevented from traveling, a constitutionally protected right, because the pilot did not like the way the person looked, even after the person had voluntarily been subjected to heightened scrutiny and cleared by security.

This is blatant discrimination and the federal government must act to end it. Congress has far superior security options than profiling. Everyone would like to have a system that says, ”It is not me.” But profiling will merely provide individuals with an illusion of protection. If profiling continues, however, Congress must, at a minimum, provide greater oversight of a system to ensure that no individual rights are violated. Blah, blah …

Mr. MICA. But part of the effectiveness of any security screening system is to go after your greatest potential risks. How do you do that when you are spreading your resources so thin? Ms. KING. Well, I think that’s the underlying presumption here, that we don’t have enough resources to do proper thorough screening of everyone. I think even Mr. Ron would agree that if he could do that, that would be preferable then to just selecting a profile. It is our position that what we should be focusing on is developing the methods of security that provide, really, the opportunity to look at everybody and screen them for weapons and not be focusing on trying to figure out what is the best profile.

We are never going to be able to predict who the criminals are. So, why not put our resources into providing a type of security that will be applied equally to everyone and be effective?

Mr. MICA. One of the problems is we are presuming everyone is potentially guilty, which also goes against the grain of the constitution.

Mr. Ron, you look like you were in opposition or had some concerns about what was being said.

Mr. RON. First of all, referring to profiling as a non-effective method is completely wrong in my view and my experience. On the contrary, I think that profiling has proven to be, through the last 30 years, the only method that managed to stop an actual bomb on its way to the aircraft. I don’t know of any bomb that was discovered just by screening, again, to the best of my you have.

At the same time, referring to the possibility that we will develop our tools and skills to provide everybody with a 100 percent physical check, whether they carry a weapon or not, is not good enough for two reasons. One, with the present technology available it is still not a good enough criteria to make sure that a weapon will not get on board.

When we take a decision, at least this is our approach in Israel, when we take a decision that somebody is a potential suspect and you do search him, you search him further than you search the rest of the public.

Richard Reid flew to Israel by El-Al seven months ago, before he boarded the American Airline flight from Paris. Through profiling he was singled out and checked from hair to sole. He was found out clean and was allowed to board the aircraft. That information was conveyed to the air marshal on board and he was properly seated, not very far from the air marshal so the air marshal could keep an eye on him during the flight.

9/11 was carried out by people without weapons. So, again, if you are only looking for the weapon, you do not answer to the 9/11 method. Finally, the efforts that have to be invested in searching the person in a way that will make sure that he is not carrying a weapon or a bomb, at Ben-Gurion Airport, it takes an average time of 57 minutes.

Now, I don’t think that anybody assumes that an American airport can be run on a 57 check for every single passenger. Further, these checks are very intrusive. They actually deal with every item in a person’s bag or in what he carries on his body. I think that if we are looking at the intrusion of privacy and the rights that passengers have, then probably this thorough check is a much more difficult an a much more disturbing process.

Mr. MICA. Well, to summarize, you said, I believe your quote was, ”We waste attention on low-risk passengers, potential threats to aviation security.” How do you get away from using the current lottery system as we have heard described where one out of X number are thoroughly screen without some sort of discrimination? What is the best method of this?

Mr. RON. I oppose the idea of random checks as a main method. As an additional method they are okay. But as the main method they are completely wrong because as it was described earlier, they lead to cases like this morning’s case, where a decorated second world war General, 84-years old, which I think we all agree is not only a waste of time, but if I look at this incident this morning, I would assume that probably between seven to ten people were involved in this incident, in dealing with all the implications of this incident.

These ten people should have been looking for the Richard Reids of this world, and not wasting their time in dealing with an unintelligent decision to confiscate the Congressional Medal from a Second World War hero.

So, what I am suggesting is that the idea of random checks should not be considered and an intelligent, professional profiling process that judges the passenger on behavioral basis and not on a racial basis will be constructed. This will lead to a decision as to the level of checks that you want to conduct afterward.

The Richard Reid incident that was mentioned earlier indicates the fact that again, profiling is not enough. At the end of the profiling process, you have to take further measures.

…

Mr. TURLEY. Well, as an academic I avoid real life as much as possible. I can comment on the security realities of the Israeli airport. But I would say as a constitutional law scholar that I would be bothered if it was a single profile, if you are a Palestinian, you are always searched.

Ms. NORTON. He has already testified that that is never the case in Israel. Of course, he will speak. But he has already testified to a far more complicated analytical system than using only the ethnicity. So, essentially I am asking should it be in there at all if analytically you have other factors.

Mr. TURLEY. I am making a guess without empirical knowledge. It is not the first time. But I would probably say if you look at this that it probably should be one of the criteria because I think it will yield a significant difference above a baseline in terms of its statistical yield. But I would emphasize that I would be very uncomfortable with that being on a profile unless it was part of a multi-variable profile.

Ms. NORTON. But that is exactly what I am asking. I am using this real live example. And I share with you, Mr. Turley, the preference for hypotheticals. But I am using this example because that is a real live example and anybody who thinks that that can’t come here needs to go back to September 11th.

Perhaps I should move on to Mr. Ron. You have described a far more analytical system than anything that is even being considered here that I know anything about. What besides the fact that they are Palestinians is on the system or the profile that would get a Palestinian stopped and are large numbers of Palestinians not stopped?

Mr. RON. I find it inappropriate to discuss the exact criteria in this open environment for obvious reasons. But I would just say that the fact that somebody is of Palestinian origin is not enough to make him a selectee. There has to be more to it.

Along the lines of Professor Turley, I would add a comment that relating to the reality here in the United States airports now that if you have information that somebody’s home address is a cave in Afghanistan, I would suggest not to ignore it in terms of how do you want to look into this person. When I say, ”look deeply into this person,” at the end of the day it doesn’t mean arresting the people national or taking any of his basic rights.

What I do suggest is that you invest more in checking him. That is the result of profiling. The result of profiling doesn’t lead to a rejection or to an arrest or to anything that is more than the use of the information in terms of providing a much more thorough check. As I said earlier, it is very difficult, I would even say impossible, to run a good quality check for everybody.

Sigh - we are not going to win this war in this way. In closing I’ll draw from Stephen Flynn’s testimony before the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Mar 2003:

… an age-old axiom in the security field that "if you have to look at everything, you will see nothing." Skilled inspectors look for anomalies and invest their finite time and attention on that which arouses their concern. This is because they know that capable criminals and terrorists often try to blend into the normal flow of commerce, but they invariably get some things wrong because they are not real market actors. But, an aggressive inspection regime that introduces substantial delays and causes serious disruption to the commercial environment can actually undermine an enforcement officer’s means to conduct anomaly detection.

More Resources:

(1) A Balanced “Profiling” System Could Improve Aviation Security In United States, According To Security Expert & Law Professor. This is the committee press release on the captioned testimony, which includes these excerpts from Prof. Turley’s presentation that was too long to include in this post.

“United States Constitution Is Not A Suicide Pact”:  Prof. Jonathan Turley, law professor at George Washington University Law School and the Maurice C. Shapiro Chair for Public Interest Law, told the Subcommittee that the issue of profiling was “so heavily laden with deep societal conflicts that it is often difficult to hold a meaningful conversation about the merits and dangers of profiling.”

“To put it simply, we need to move beyond our inhibitions in the discussion of race and speak frankly about the value and dangers of passenger profiling during these precarious times,” Turley said.

“It has been said that the United States Constitution is not a suicide pact,” Turley said.  “While protecting core liberties, it is a document that also allows for the accommodation of transient government needs or exigent circumstance.”

Turley added:  “Profiling may be an inevitable response to the dangers evident at airports.  Every month, over 40 million people travel by air in this country.  It is simply practically impossible to closely scrutinize every passenger while maintaining a functioning air travel system . . . As a result, airlines must make choices and select which passengers to subject to closer scrutiny.”

“Due to the erroneous inclination of the public to consider ‘profiling’ and ‘racial profiling’ as synonymous, there has been an unwillingness of airlines to implement any formal profiling systems.  Instead, the primary identification process remains the random selection process.”

(2) Thomas J. Kinton, Jr., Aviation Director of Boston’s Logan International Airport, testifies before same committee.

(3) Air marshals may use ‘behavior pattern recognition’ to spot potential terrorists, USA Today 04/16/2004. A short piece on the Logan Airport BPR pilot program. BPR is the Israeli-developed methodology. Rep. John Mica is one of the good guys:

Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.), chairman of the House aviation subcommittee, said he’s been pushing the government to adopt behavior pattern recognition because it helps fill gaps in airport security.

Mica said the current focus on taking dangerous objects from passengers is limited by technology. Too much attention has been focused on keeping items, rather than potentially dangerous people, off planes, he said.