By Michael O’Hanlon’s op-ed, How to Stop a Civil War, makes sense to me:
But if the political process continues to falter and the risk of civil war looms larger, we will also need a military plan for quelling it. Much of the American debate has been asking how to handle an all-out conflict in which Iraq has already fractured and violence is rampant. But the more important question is how to quell violence in the early stages, before such a scenario develops fully. And this is not the typical debate over how fast and soon we can draw down U.S. troops in Iraq; rather, it is a debate about what they do while they are there.
On this point, initial indications are that American thinking is on the wrong track. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has stated that U.S. forces would not become heavily involved in any civil strife, leaving it instead to Iraqis to sort out the problem. This approach, which mirrors the relatively passive approach U.S. troops took to the reprisal violence after the Feb. 22 bombing, has an understandable appeal. But it is akin to our decision to stand aside and allow wanton looting after Saddam Hussein fell in April 2003, and it could have comparably disastrous consequences.
The comparison to the early looting and the conclusion of the op-ed are disputed here:
http://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2006/03/he-really-tries-so-hard-its-sad-really.html
One of their key disagreements that O’Hanlon calls the Iraqi security forces ‘politically untested’ whereas Dunn credits them with preventing a civil war to this point despite political pressures.
Jim L,
Thanks for your comment and the URL for Brian Dunn’s blog [I read his complete post, but haven’t had time yet to read more of the blog]. While I won’t argue a general defense for O’Hanlon, I do see some problems with Dunn’s critique:
1 First, it is set forth by Michael O’Hanlon … But he is just always a bit off and so misses the mark.
[to Brian Dunn]: don’t lead off with an ad hominem attack if you’re seeking credibility.
2. That we did not stop the looting is no reason to imply that we failed because we turned the job over to non-existent Iraqi security forces.
O’Hanlon’s making an analogy to what was one of the early blunders of the war leadership - that of allowing the looting.
There was no decision to “turn the job over to non-existent Iraqi security forces”. But there was a decision [speculation- at the Franks, Rumsfeld level], to assign forces to many tasks other than policing the looting. A contributor to that decision was having far too few resources in Iraq, especially policing. Even so, there were resources that were not used.
3. Third, nobody has written anything to convince me that the insurgency was caused by our failure to stop the looting…
That’s another rhetorical redirection! O’Hanlon didn’t argue that the insurgency was caused by… What he argued was that adopting a passive strategy, similar to that of allowing the looting, “could have comparably disastrous consequences”.
I would be keen to see a strong argument that allowing the looting was a smart call.
As to reading, start with, Michael Gordon’s just released book
Cobra II : The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq [and these articles]
and check out the podcast of the CSIS book launch debate and Q&A.
4. And fourth, it ignores the fact that in the aftermath of the Sammara bombing, Iraqi security forces did indeed successfully hold the ring
That’s true - but it has little to do with O’Hanlon’s argumentation. If the trend to civil war heats up, then of the many challenges we face, one of the biggest will be keeping the army [MOD] and police [MOI] on their assigned job - stopping violence. The bigger of the forces [MOI] is unfortunately the one that is heavily militia based. I couldn’t guess how many of the MOI forces might be police on Monday, and shia death squads on Tuesday [more likely not death squads, but fighters protecting their on tribal territory].
5. …O’Hanlon calls the Iraqi security forces ‘politically untested’ whereas
I don’t think that’s controversial (?) O’Hanlon is focused on the central question of civil war in the Iraq context: will the army and police be the solution or the problem? Specifically, because both are politically untested, we simply do not know.
Steve:
I don’t believe I made an ad hominem attack since I did not attack O’Hanlon’s character. Indeed, I simply set forth my bias against his analytical abilities. And even admitted good qualities. I thought I was being up front with my bias about him as an analyst. If that kills my credibility, I can live with that. But at least you know.
Second, I did not make a fifth point so I’m not sure what to say there in defense of my post. Although the post-Samarra period was certainly a test was it not?
As for the rest, I stand by it. O’Hanlon states we stood aside in ‘03 and to me implies that a similar decision now results in disorder. That we must intervene early. In fact, today unlike ‘03 there are Iraqi forces to handle disorder, and in what the press described as a brewing civil war after the Samarra bombing, the Iraqi army handled the job. Or did the press over-state the civil war talk a bit much? (I guess that does address the “fifth”point)
As for a well reasoned argument about the bad effects of imposing order, I simply rest on the Shia suspicion of America after we let the Shias be slaughtered after calling them to rise up in ‘91. Just how would using violence to quell widespread Shia looting going to improve their view of us. Had we lost the Shias in April 03 I shudder to think of how the Shias would have reacted in April ‘04 when Sadr rose up. I can’t rewind history and replay it with a few hundred dead rioters and see what happens–just note who was rioting and their history with us. I think my argument is at least as good as the argument that a harsh response would have killed the Baathist insurgency at its birth.
We clearly have a role in Iraq and I’m not sure where to draw the line if things go south, but O’Hanlon seems to have set the bar too low for direct intervention and his historical comparison appears incorrect. Still, O’Hanlon does raise a good argument to have about what our role should be if civil strife does snowball into open sectarian battles.
And ok, my last two sentences were uncalled for–I was playing off of O’Hanlon’s last line.
Brian,
Many thanks for your reply. From reading your excellent blog, I suspect we are often on the same page w/r/t Iraq strategy. Though it appears we responded differently to O’Hanlon’s “How to Stop a Civil War”. For reference, I’ll try to highlight the paragraphs from your comment in italics below.
I agree that the post-Samarra period was a test, where it appears the Army did pretty well, the Police less well. We have to give the training effort good marks, considering both what the training command started with, and the abbreviated training period - less than two years of focused training [as of the Samarra bombing]. I count training from June 2004, when Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus took on Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
I agree with most everything Gen. Patraeus wrote in his latest Military Review piece “Observations from Soldering in Iraq” - see my post for a brief overview of his lessons-learned. Re my take on O’Hanlon’s theme, see e.g., Patraeus’s section 2 “Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life”.
Our leaders can choose between two broad options today:
Ensure we do not fail for lack of focus and resources.
Continue the “light footprint” strategy, investing the minimum that might work if all goes per plan.
I favor #1 as I can’t bear the outcome if we fail due to bad decisions. The post-Samarra period was not the challenging political test that the ISF will be facing if real symptoms of real civil war emerge. In that event, I expect [large?] numbers of MOI Iraqi police to join in the fighting, beginning ethnic cleansing of Sunni neighborhoods. We should expect at least scattered discipline problems in the Army. I hope I’m correct that all of the Army units that contain US advisory/training forces will do their job. I don’t know which units have no such “adult supervision”, nor whether such units are in sensitive positions. I.e., an Army unit in Najaf doesn’t worry me. I for-sure hope the Army units in the Al Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad do have US Military supervision.
My wish is that we establish a clear objective for MNF-Iraq: Secure Baghdad. I strongly suspect if Rumsfeld listened to his local US commanders, they would have well-considered options to recommend. E.g., Lt. Gen. Chiarelli [commander MNF-Iraq], Maj. Gen. Thurman [commander Multinational Division in Baghdad]. Those options are sure to include increasing the manning assigned to advise or lead Iraqi forces.
As for the rest, I stand by it. O’Hanlon states we stood aside in ‘03 and to me implies that a similar decision now results in disorder. That we must intervene early. In fact, today unlike ‘03 there are Iraqi forces to handle disorder, and in what the press described as a brewing civil war after the Samarra bombing, the Iraqi army handled the job. Or did the press over-state the civil war talk a bit much? (I guess that does address the “fifth”point)
The press has been predicting imminent civil war for two years. The difference today is I think the risk is real. Even if we get serious about securing Baghdad we may have run out of time - which includes having insufficient resource to bring to bear. We do have a reserve in Kuwait that should be deployed, and we may be able to shift resources from, say, Anbar. And I appreciate how difficult it is to reallocate resources quickly.
the Iraqi army handled the job - the ISF did not handle the job alone. It’s anybody’s guess how the Army would have performed without the “embedded” US troops. We also don’t know today how much of the Army’s response was planned by US officers.
As for a well reasoned argument about the bad effects of imposing order, I simply rest on the Shia suspicion of America after we let the Shias be slaughtered after calling them to rise up in ‘91. Just how would using violence to quell widespread Shia looting going to improve their view of us. Had we lost the Shias in April 03 I shudder to think of how the Shias would have reacted in April ‘04 when Sadr rose up. I can’t rewind history and replay it with a few hundred dead rioters and see what happens–just note who was rioting and their history with us. I think my argument is at least as good as the argument that a harsh response would have killed the Baathist insurgency at its birth.
I was definitely not advocating “violence to quell widespread Shia looting.” Good policing doesn’t imply violence. It does require sufficient numbers of forces trained & equipped for policing. And if prior policy deprives commanders of adequate policing manpower [our case], they will make do with war fighters and good leadership. Isn’t it the first principle of counter-insurgency to provide security to the citizens? Have we done that - especially for the pivotal area, Baghdad?
We clearly have a role in Iraq and I’m not sure where to draw the line if things go south, but O’Hanlon seems to have set the bar too low for direct intervention and his historical comparison appears incorrect. Still, O’Hanlon does raise a good argument to have about what our role should be if civil strife does snowball into open sectarian battles.
Well, I didn’t see O’Hanlon advocating “direct intervention”, which I interpret to mean increasing direct action by US units. He proposed what I outlined above - “deploying with Iraqi police and army troops on the streets”. He wrote:
Lastly, I’ll try to clarify a couple of your other concerns.
I don’t believe I made an ad hominem attack since I did not attack O’Hanlon’s character…
My dictionary defines ad hominem (1st) as “arising from or appealing to the emotions and not reason or logic”, which is what I see when the introductory paragraph begins “God love him but he is so clueless sometimes that it is frightening.” 2nd definition refers to “motives or character”. That said, I take your point.
Second, I did not make a fifth point so I’m not sure what to say there in defense of my post. Although the post-Samarra period was certainly a test was it not?
Sorry, #5 didn’t refer to your post, but to Jim L’s comment which I quoted for clarity - I was just grouping sections of my comment - I didn’t notice that my section numbers 1…4 happened to correspond to your first…fourth headings.