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	<title>Comments on: Iraq Reconstruction Report</title>
	<link>http://seekerblog.com/archives/20060519/iraq-reconstruction-report/</link>
	<description>Seeking reliable, objective sources on economics, foreign-policy and energy-policy issues.</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 11:15:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Steve D.</title>
		<link>http://seekerblog.com/archives/20060519/iraq-reconstruction-report/#comment-2878</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve D.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jun 2006 03:14:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://seekerblog.com/archives/20060519/iraq-reconstruction-report/#comment-2878</guid>
		<description>Craig,

Thanks for your comments.   “Money follows blood” indeed. I expected corruption on the Iraqi side - but I was particularly disappointed to see so much careless contracting to US firms. And that very few Iraqis were employed on those contracts. Wasn't it obvious that we needed to employ Iraqis and involve Iraqis wherever possible?

I certainly agree that "the key to Iraq is self sufficiency". And a necessary condition to self sufficiency is security - i.e., the freedom to work for the Iraqi government without fear that your family will be murdered.

I don't agree with the theory of some analysts that the Coalition presence is causing the terror and intimidation. I do believe that the Iraqis will find it very difficult to put down the terror without help - which many democrats seem determined to withdraw.

I've been reading your excellent Strategic Outlook Institute blog - and have added to my daily read.

Steve Darden</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Craig,</p>
<p>Thanks for your comments.   “Money follows blood” indeed. I expected corruption on the Iraqi side - but I was particularly disappointed to see so much careless contracting to US firms. And that very few Iraqis were employed on those contracts. Wasn&#8217;t it obvious that we needed to employ Iraqis and involve Iraqis wherever possible?</p>
<p>I certainly agree that &#8220;the key to Iraq is self sufficiency&#8221;. And a necessary condition to self sufficiency is security - i.e., the freedom to work for the Iraqi government without fear that your family will be murdered.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t agree with the theory of some analysts that the Coalition presence is causing the terror and intimidation. I do believe that the Iraqis will find it very difficult to put down the terror without help - which many democrats seem determined to withdraw.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been reading your excellent Strategic Outlook Institute blog - and have added to my daily read.</p>
<p>Steve Darden</p>
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		<title>By: Craig Martelle</title>
		<link>http://seekerblog.com/archives/20060519/iraq-reconstruction-report/#comment-2742</link>
		<dc:creator>Craig Martelle</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 May 2006 00:33:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://seekerblog.com/archives/20060519/iraq-reconstruction-report/#comment-2742</guid>
		<description>This is a good report that deserves Congressional attention.  The key points revolve around the failure to control contracts - "money follows blood" is an all too apropos metaphor.  IDIQ and Cost Plus contracts are the bane of the cost controllers existence.  When I worked contracting issues out of Ukraine, the first thing American contractors did after winning a contract was to start working on how to "grow the contract" (a process that adds in just enough new requirements to incrementally increase costs without exceeding the threshold requiring the contract to be re-bid).  

Personnel issues of three month tours are counterproductive, although good for morale and good for huge numbers of federal employees to do their time in theater (although credibility is questionable with three months in theater if all that time is spent inside the green zone).  Tours of one year hurt readiness on the Korean Peninsula, except that their is a base cadre of personnel on longer tours, providing the continuity necessary to maintain effectiveness.  

Back to Iraq - the key to Iraq is self sufficiency.  The populace must buy into the new freedoms in order to minimize insurgents.  The Iraqi economy must get back on its feet and that can be done through improved oil pumping and refining.  The terrorists attack the pipelines, well, bury the pipelines in sand and maintain a monitoring system.  Iraqis can do the construction work at a bargain price.  Let's apply Iraqi standards of valuation vice the U.S. pay structure.  And let's get those contracts that were issued during war time under control.  We can get there and yes, it will take time, but no time like the present to start implementing a coordinated plan with Iraqis taking on more of everything.  

This is not a call for U.S. withdrawal - we are needed there for as long as we are needed there and we are still needed.  We'll have a presence there for quite some time - we have a tendency to stay in every country we've liberated.  That's a small price to pay for liberty.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a good report that deserves Congressional attention.  The key points revolve around the failure to control contracts - &#8220;money follows blood&#8221; is an all too apropos metaphor.  IDIQ and Cost Plus contracts are the bane of the cost controllers existence.  When I worked contracting issues out of Ukraine, the first thing American contractors did after winning a contract was to start working on how to &#8220;grow the contract&#8221; (a process that adds in just enough new requirements to incrementally increase costs without exceeding the threshold requiring the contract to be re-bid).  </p>
<p>Personnel issues of three month tours are counterproductive, although good for morale and good for huge numbers of federal employees to do their time in theater (although credibility is questionable with three months in theater if all that time is spent inside the green zone).  Tours of one year hurt readiness on the Korean Peninsula, except that their is a base cadre of personnel on longer tours, providing the continuity necessary to maintain effectiveness.  </p>
<p>Back to Iraq - the key to Iraq is self sufficiency.  The populace must buy into the new freedoms in order to minimize insurgents.  The Iraqi economy must get back on its feet and that can be done through improved oil pumping and refining.  The terrorists attack the pipelines, well, bury the pipelines in sand and maintain a monitoring system.  Iraqis can do the construction work at a bargain price.  Let&#8217;s apply Iraqi standards of valuation vice the U.S. pay structure.  And let&#8217;s get those contracts that were issued during war time under control.  We can get there and yes, it will take time, but no time like the present to start implementing a coordinated plan with Iraqis taking on more of everything.  </p>
<p>This is not a call for U.S. withdrawal - we are needed there for as long as we are needed there and we are still needed.  We&#8217;ll have a presence there for quite some time - we have a tendency to stay in every country we&#8217;ve liberated.  That&#8217;s a small price to pay for liberty.</p>
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