Seeker Blog

Anthony Cordesman’s three page CSIS bulletin [PDF] from May 8 provides an excellent update on what is really going on with the militias.

…This cannot, however, be blamed simply on the militias. The dividing lines in Iraq are far more complex. Crime is a constant problem and a threat to security, and is often mixed with ties to sectarian groups or local political factions. If there are no local militias or security forces, there almost always are criminals. In many areas there are both, and sectarian and ethnic forces can extort while criminals can claim to serve an ethnic or sectarian cause.

The more mixed a neighborhood or area is, the more the lines are blurred. In general, the more homogeneous the area, the better organized local security forces are, although sometimes at the cost of more sectarian and ethnic “cleansing.” In many such areas, however, it is not some party militia in the national sense that really is involved, but a local security force or element loyal to a local leader. In a number of areas, the police are also loyal to a given leader and there are no clear lines of demarcation. In others, the police simply do not act.

Crime is a constant problem in every troubled area, and this is much of urban and sometimes rural Iraq. Ordinary criminals, part-time criminals, and “gangs,” are all a threat, and they can easily be part of the local security force, a militia, police, or ex-police with IDs and uniforms.

As was the case in the Balkans, so many young men are out of work that the term “criminal” or “gang member” doesn’t mean much. “Crime” is often the key to income of any kind. The irony is that the security services, military, and police are often the only major new source of real jobs in such areas, other than the paid militias (generally paid much lower), local security forces (very low pay), security guards or protection forces (often paid even less), and insurgency (paid sometimes).

The end result is not a militia threat per se, but rather an increasingly blurred mix of all of the security elements in Iraq, of which the militias are only a part. The Iraqi forces are all plagued by desertions and AWOLs that can go into the militias, local security forces, crime and the insurgency. In addition to the actual use of militias, sects and ethnic factions make use of police and security services. The end result is a virtual “stew” of factional forces with different recruiting bases and cross-membership.

Concluding paragraphs:

The lines between gang member, criminal, sectarian or ethnic force, insurgent, and security force are often tenuous, and the difference between criminal and corrupt is even harder to determine.

The worst examples of this “blurring of all the lines” are the exception, and not the rule. There are many parts of Iraq with reasonable security at the local level. However, the quality of Iraqi forces in those areas with high levels of sectarian and ethnic tension has been hurt. The mix of Iraqi forces, militias, local security, insurgents, and criminals in these high-tension areas could also lead to the same extreme violence and criminal behavior in a major civil war that occurred in the Balkans and Africa when factional forces had strong criminal elements.

On the other hand, if the new Iraqi government takes hold, many of these elements might well turn back towards a far more normal way of life, the moment that there are real jobs and careers and most of the various factions see there is a better future in living together than fighting.

Solving the problem doesn’t mean pushing low quality and factional militias into the regular Iraqi forces. It means creating a national government and a national political compromise that removes much of the cause for sectarian and ethnic strife. If Iraq’s political leaders can do this, many of these problems can gradually be solved. If they fail, spotlighting the militia simply ignores the real nature of the problem and the scale of its complexity.

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