[#1] Inform drivers of the spread of commute time options. [#2] Offer the drivers real-time routing options at market prices [you can only take the superfast route if you have paid the tariff]. This is good work by UT Austin researchers — drivers will adapt to “congestion pricing” to cut commute times by choosing off-peak times.
Kockelman says such simple market mechanisms can solve traffic problems without requiring the construction of new roadways. “Meeting travel needs is largely a function of sending appropriate pricing signals to travelers,” she says. “We can allow them to make their own decisions, rather than having to expand capacity in our nation’s already extensive roadway networks.”
I worked on similar traffic optimization schemes when at Carnegie Mellon grad school in the 1960’s. Our simulations indicated possible slashing of commute times by offering real-time route-timing data to drivers with real-time route-pricing elections. I think the Kockelman study indicates that a usefully-largish segment of the commuter population will pay for minimizing commute time.
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