Seeker Blog

“Unlike the Americans, we don’t have an exit strategy from Iraq” — Iraqi Vice-President Abd al-Mahdi.

Is this the real American strategy vis Iran? I don’t know, but it makes a lot more sense than the criticism I read every day. Real foreign policy is so much more complex than imagined by the MSM:

But delving beneath the surface of this objective, three strands of a more interesting and hopeful strategy begin to emerge in conversations with Middle Eastern analysts and politicians.

Start with the premise that Washington is indeed being tough on Iran to strengthen the internal opposition to the confrontational policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The purpose is not necessarily to trigger the removal of Ahmadinejad, but rather to shatter Tehran’s grandiose delusions of regional hegemony and bring Iran into negotiations from a position of relative weakness, rather than its perceived strength.

Three strands of policy are now being directed to achieving this internal shift in Iranian politics. The first is the US effort to reduce the fighting in Iraq — or failing that, at least to mount a show of strength against the Iranian-backed Shia militias and to remind Tehran that Washington retains its capacity to deploy overwhelming military force.

The second is the US sabre-rattling over Iran’s nuclear program, especially the semi-public threats of Israeli bombing, perhaps even with tactical nuclear weapons. The White House’s announcement that two aircraft carrier battle groups will move to the Gulf within a month or so are clearly a reminder that Washington still has plenty of firepower to attack Iran directly or to back Israeli bombing — and also to protect international oil shipments through the Gulf against Iranian retaliation.

These deployments and public warnings do not necessarily suggest an attack on Iran is likely but rather that the US wants Iran to realise it is playing for very high stakes in its confrontation with the West.

The third strand of Washington’s Iranian policy is less visible, but may well turn out to be more important. The idea is to thwart Iran’s threatened hegemony with an economic pincer movement consisting of financial diplomacy on one side and energy policy on the other.

The main responsibility for this strand of policy rests not with the US or Israel but with the third member of the unlikely new anti-Iranian alliance: Saudi Arabia.

…In a significant statement this month, Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi opposed Iranian calls for production cuts to halt the decline in oil prices. Naimi’s pronouncement was cast as a technical matter unconnected with politics, but it seemed to confirm private warnings by King Abdullah that his country would try everything to thwart Iran’s hegemony in Iraq and the region, whether by military intervention or more subtle economic means.

This policy was spelt out with surprising precision by senior Saudi security adviser Nawaf Obaid in an article in The Washington Post: “King Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the Iraqi militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today’s high prices.

“The result would be to limit Tehran’s ability to continue funnelling hundreds of millions a year to the Shia militias in Iraq and elsewhere.”

This article attracted huge attention in the Middle East and Washington, but was hardly noticed in the financial markets and business community.