In “Those Nasty Index Speculators” John Mauldin offers a counterpoint to the Michael Masters thesis. Mauldin included some useful commentary from Bob Greer, executive vice president at PIMCO. The PIMCO guys are razor sharp in fixed income — I don’t know Bob Greer’s expertise in commodities, but his commentary on oil prices makes sense — Greer argues that the causal arrow goes the other way, from rising commodity prices to increasing index investment:
…(Greer) rebuts Masters arguments in a very cogent paper recently sent to me. He argues that index funds do not affect the price but may contribute to volatility.
“Some market observers have tried to tie the level of inventories to index investment, most notably in crude oil. Their arguments take one of two forms:
“1) The indexer’s act of selling the nearby and buying the distant contract forces the futures curve to be upward sloping (future price is higher than nearby price). This creates an incentive to own inventories and earn the “return to storage” represented by the slope of the futures curve. The act of increasing inventory keeps the commodity off the market, thus decreasing supply.
“2) A variation of the above argument is that the short seller, who takes the other side of the indexer’s purchase, needs to protect their position by buying and holding the physical commodity.
“It would be nice if either of these arguments were true, in which case, the developed world would not be hostage to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Any time we needed to increase crude inventories, we need merely to bring in more indexers, and the inventory would appear. In fact, the explanation for inventory levels of any commodity is much simpler. If, in the cash markets, production exceeds demand, inventories will rise. Otherwise they will fall. That is why, in six of the last eight years, global wheat inventories fell, regardless of index investment (USDA). That is why from 2006 to 2008, crude oil inventories declined and the crude oil curve went from upward sloping to downward sloping, in spite of increasing index investment (EIA). Furthermore, the second argument above breaks down when applied to non-storable commodities such as live cattle.”
Further, Greer shows a chart from Deutsche Bank which highlights the fact that many commodities which are not in the index fund portfolios have risen higher than exchange-traded commodities (rice, for instance). Look at the chart below:
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Greer concludes with these important paragraphs:
“Regarding intrinsic value, commodity futures prices converge to cash prices, and cash prices are set by the level of demand to consume physical goods such as steak, gasoline, and Wheaties. The price setting mechanism is not based on possibly erroneous assessment of a financial statement, nor on irrational exuberance. In commodities there is an outside measure of intrinsic value–the cash market–that is not dominant in equity, real estate, or tulip bulb markets. As actual commodity prices go higher or lower, they reflect consumption requirements for actual products, many of which are not very storable.
“This is a sharp contrast from internet stocks or vacation condos, which are subject to speculative bubbles. Unfortunately, our conventional wisdom regarding factors that create bubbles is rooted in asset classes like stocks and real estate, asset classes that have fundamentally different characteristics than physical and futures markets.
“Coincidence is not the same thing as causality. It is a coincidence that commodity index investment has increased in the last few years just as commodity prices have increased. If there is any causality, it is the other way around. Rising commodity prices have caused an increased interest in commodity investment. And it is certainly causality that fundamental supply, demand and inventory factors have driven commodity prices in many markets higher, whether or not those are markets in which index investors participate. This is the same causality that has driven commodity prices both higher and lower for many decades.”
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