Iraq: compelling reasons for “Strategic Patience”

where the U.S. was unequivocally losing in Iraq at the end of 2006, we are just as unequivocally winning today.

Military historians Kimberly Kagan and Fred Kagan examine the radical transformation accomplished in the past eighteen months. This is a concise current history of Iraq — information that is difficult to discern in the noise of the “daily news cycle”.

Ed. note: “Special Groups” are mentioned several times in the article. These are Iranian-armed, Iranian-funded and Iranian-trained terrorist cells. The amount of violence they have been inflicting has become better understood in the past year. Dana Milbank of the Washington Post on 8 April:

It has a benign sound to it, like “special education,” or “special guest,” but make no mistake: “Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq,” Petraeus testified this morning.

The “special groups,” militias supported by Iran, merited only one mention when Petraeus and Crocker came before the committee last September, and that was a passing reference by Petraeus late in the hearing in response to a question. But the hearing this morning has turned into a special session for special-group alarms — 16 mentions of the special groups so far — as witnesses and senators worried that Iran’s special proxies were creating an especially big problem.

…The “special” talk caught the attention of Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut. “Are the Iranians still training and equipping Iraqi extremists who are going back into Iraq and killing American soldiers?”

“That is correct, senator,” the general replied.

The average successful counter-insurgency reaches its definitive inflection point around ten years. It is possible that Iraq will find its inflection point sooner, but don’t take the following as a declaration of “we can relax, it is all OK now”. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies continues to argue for “Strategic Patience in Iraq“. Patience is a necessary condition for successful counter-insurgency. Patience is not an American trait.

Even the Brookings Institution appreciates this in the April 16 Michael E. O’Hanlon op-ed Iraq: Reasons for Strategic Patience:

At one level, we know what the answer should be — an Iraq democratic and stable enough to hold together on its own once we leave. If politicians can resolve major differences without escalating bloodshed, and if they oppose terrorism, eschew nuclear weapons, and avoid blatant aggression against their neighbors or their own people, we will have achieved our core goals.

But how to get there and on what timeline? The American public is entitled to some answers. Petraeus is already cutting U.S. strength in Iraq from 20.5 to 15 brigades this year, itself a challenging process. But President Bush as commander in chief, and members of Congress as elected representatives of the people, must decide how much more effort this war is worth.

We believe that, after a 75 percent reduction in the rate of violence in Iraq over the past year, and significant accomplishments by Iraqi leaders on at least half a dozen key political matters, there is a reasonable prospect of achieving a sustainable stability there within the next few years. That said, continued progress will be far more likely if major reductions in U.S. forces beyond those currently planned await early 2010. There are six key reasons that such strategic patience is appropriate:

O’Hanlon’s Point #2 may not be obvious but reflects the complexities surrounding Patraeus’ principle “first, protect the people”:

Local and national elections. This fall, Iraq is scheduled to have local elections in its 18 provinces. Next fall, it will have parliamentary elections at the national level. Election sites, political offices and campaign events all require physical protection. We do not want to make Iraqi politicians worry so much about security that they behave as they did in the 2005 elections, watching out for their own sectarian groups (and affiliated militias) out of sheer survival instinct. Those who claim that accelerating our drawdown will foster greater Iraqi political compromise and reconciliation do not, in our experience, understand the motives and the reasoning of most Iraqis.

Read on for the O’Hanlon reasoning, which summarizes six bad outcomes likely to follow from a rapid American retreat. Back to the Kagan & Kagan essay, which begins:

America is very close to succeeding in Iraq. The “near-strategic defeat” of al Qaeda in Iraq described by CIA Director Michael Hayden last month in the Washington Post has been followed by the victory of the Iraqi government’s security forces over illegal Shiite militias, including Iranian-backed Special Groups. The enemies of Iraq and America now cling desperately to their last bastions, while the political process builds momentum.

These tremendous gains remain fragile and could be lost to skillful enemy action, or errors in Baghdad or Washington. But where the U.S. was unequivocally losing in Iraq at the end of 2006, we are just as unequivocally winning today.

By February 2008, America and its partners accomplished a series of tasks thought to be impossible. The Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda in Iraq were defeated in Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad provinces, and the remaining leaders and fighters clung to their last urban outpost in Mosul. The Iraqi government passed all but one of the “benchmark” laws (the hydrocarbon law being the exception, but its purpose is now largely accomplished through the budget) and was integrating grass-roots reconciliation with central political progress. The sectarian civil war had ended.

Read on for a really excellent survey of the critical milestones that have been accomplished by the Iraqis. The title chose by the editors for this piece is “How Prime Minister Maliki Pacified Iraq“. Hyperbole to be sure, but there is truth in it.