Monthly Archive for March, 2009

Page 3 of 27

China: replace dollar as reserve currency

Yikes!

SHANGHAI (AFP) – China has called for ditching the US dollar as the international reserve currency, sweeping away a decades-old system to stabilise the world monetary climate and protect its massive forex reserves.

People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said he wants to replace the dollar, installed as the reserve currency after World War II, with a different standard run by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

China, the top holder of US Treasury bonds with 739.6 billion dollars as of January, according to American figures, earlier expressed concern over its investment as the world’s largest economy battles a deep recession.

“The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire world reflected the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international monetary system,” Zhou wrote in an essay posted on the bank’s website Monday.

Zhou’s comments come ahead of the G20 summit from April 2 in London, where world leaders and international organisations including the IMF are to discuss reforming the financial system.

He suggested the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights, or SDR, could serve as a super-sovereign reserve currency as it would not be easily influenced by the policies of individual countries.

[...]

The World’s Safest Sovereign Debt

Another reason for the thesis that the Krone is the best safe haven currency now?

Implied Ratings are calculated using a proprietary model developed by CMA and fed with CDS pricing data from CMA DataVision.

Source: CMA DataVision Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report Q1-2009

[From Alea]

Updated ABS Issuance Worldwide

Alea tipped us to a very useful source of data on asset backed securities markets: Asset-Backed Alert. Here’s the Alea post:

ABS Issuance is doing fine, thx for asking, but it’s all happening in the non-US world.
While U.S. issuance is recovering modestly, down 75% yoy, non-US issuance is up 65% yoy.

As of march 26th 2009
Source: Asset-backed alert

Add:
The chart below shows monthly ABS issuance since january 2001
Blue: U.S.
Red: non-U.S.

[From Alea blog]

Bistro: some history of synthetic CDOs

…Demchak’s team was the first to take them wholesale, using credit-default swaps in a huge deal. They mashed up J.P. Morgan’s exposure to more than 300 giant corporations, created an off-balance-sheet vehicle, then sold slices of that to investors. The vehicle then protected J.P. Morgan from defaults. In effect, Morgan was paying insurance premiums to investors who now were on the hook if one of Morgan’s clients went belly-up. “The innovation of not being tied to specific loans or bonds is what made the credit-derivatives market what it is today,” says Romita Shetty, who was part of Demchak’s team at J.P. Morgan.

Development on the project continued slowly through the second half of 1997, involving painstaking and tedious legal and accounting work, quantitative analysis, and hand-holding and persuasion of banking regulators and credit-rating agencies. Demchak and Masters wanted their first deal to hit the market by the end of the year so that Morgan could get credit for it when the bank reported its earnings. The period was so intense that Masters, an avid equestrienne, at one point took a conference call from atop her horse.

Finally, in December 1997, Demchak’s team closed on this first big credit-derivatives deal, the Broad Indexed Secured Trust Offering, or Bistro for short. Insurance companies and banks, the initial customers, were enthusiastic, snapping it up in just two weeks. The deal was enormous for the time, off-loading more than $9.7 billion of J.P. Morgan’s exposure. Morgan had succeeded in reducing its balance-sheet risk and was able to free up capital to buy its stock back.

J.P. Morgan would go on to launch a credit- derivatives assembly line, becoming the Henry Ford of the new financial market. Throughout the 1990s, the bank was a major player in persuading lawmakers to allow the derivatives markets to remain unregulated—a move regulators are now reevaluating. Bistro helped J.P. Morgan traders in London kick-start the expansion of the “single-name” C.D.S. market, where individual contracts that cover just one company or entity trade hands. This market became liquid and deep by the early 2000s. “We had 100 people,” Demchak recalls. “We helped create the regulatory framework, the legal and accounting framework, and we did billions. We industrialized the product.”

J.P. Morgan continues to dominate the world of derivatives. It has derivatives contracts tied to $90 trillion of underlying securities. Of that, $10.2 trillion are credit-derivatives contracts. Those mind-boggling totals are somewhat misleading. They reflect what is called the “notional” amount in the world of derivatives, based on the underlying amount of the contract, not its current value. When offsetting contracts are taken into account, that figure is whittled down to a much smaller—though still enormous—$109 billion of derivatives, of which $26 billion are credit derivatives. That’s the amount the bank could lose if all its trading partners went out of business, an extremely remote event. But the exposure is climbing, up 17.4 percent from the end of 2007. That’s equal to 20 percent of the bank’s net worth.

Bistro “was the most sublime piece of financial engineering that was ever developed. It was breathtaking in terms of beauty and elegance,” says Satyajit Das, a risk consultant and the author of Traders, Guns, and Money, a financial history. But “in many ways,” Das adds, “J.P. Morgan created Frankenstein’s monster.”

For J.P. Morgan, Bistro worked wonderfully. But even in that first deal, the weaknesses in structured finance and credit derivatives that would come to the fore in the 2007 credit-market crash were already there.

Despite its blue-chip assets, Bistro didn’t perform pristinely. The initial slice, the equity layer that Morgan retained as a cushion against trouble, was so thin that it couldn’t weather even one default from one of the bigger companies in the bundle. That ultimately happened, wiping the slice out entirely. The investors who were one notch up, in what’s called the mezzanine layer, lost money as well. Even the buyers of the top-rated tranches, which were thought to be rock solid, had to endure bumpy periods before they got their money back.

During that first major deal, the credit-rating agencies, which were supposed to be impartial, were already deeply enmeshed in the give-and-take of the process. A former Morgan banker who helped create Bistro recalls that Standard & Poor’s was giving the bank a tough time. The rating firm would run the deal through its models, and “each time, it came up with disastrous results. We did some tinkering and all of a sudden, it could rate the deal,” the banker says.

The pattern was set. The rating agencies would become integral to the creation of the structures. Standard & Poor’s says questioning that first deal was appropriate and stands by its original rating. It further says it doesn’t get involved in structuring deals. But the close relationships between the rating agencies and the Wall Street firms were heavily criticized following widespread mortgage-related securities failures after the housing bubble burst.

Continue reading Jesse Eisinger at Portfolio.com…

How to Conjure Up $500 Billion

As recently as October, all it took to get a bailout bill through Congress was a few pieces of strategically placed pork. … Congress is in no mood to pass anything now, pork nuggets or no. The executive branch has to make do with what it’s got. In the case of the bank bailout plan, that means a combination of some leftover funds from last year’s Troubled Asset Relief Program bill along with a rather ingenious use of guarantees by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

…Mr. Geithner needed the cooperation of the F.D.I.C., but few federal agencies ever object to an idea that involves expanding their budget and making them more important. In this case, the F.D.I.C., and its chairwoman, Sheila Bair, had particular reason to want to grab as much power as possible: the Obama administration is about to embark on the largest overhaul of the American regulatory infrastructure since the Great Depression.

America’s patchwork quilt of financial regulators is looking decidedly frayed around the edges, as financial firms dance around what regulations do exist. American International Group, for example, managed to get itself regulated by the toothless Office of Thrift Supervision after buying a Delaware thrift for just that purpose.

Chances are that the Federal Reserve, rather than the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other agency, will end up regulating the entire financial system, including banks, brokers, hedge funds and insurers. Then, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and any number of other obscure regulatory animals risk being killed off.

The bank bailout plan makes the F.D.I.C. well positioned to survive. Not only will it be an integral part of the new bank bailout, but it is also likely to be put in charge of taking over any failing financial firms that pose a systemic risk — be they banks, hedge funds, private-equity shops, insurers or even large corporations like General Electric.

This could be the most far-reaching unintended consequence of Congress’s stubborn opposition to any bailout plan. Treasury ended up being forced to find its own way — and that meant a suboptimal bank bailout scheme, and a vast swath of new powers for the F.D.I.C.

Continue reading Felix Salmon at NYT…

Why We Still Need Securitization

Felix Salmon disagrees with Krugman…

… I have a feeling that, contra Krugman, securitization really does hold out a lot of promise for the banking system going forwards. Much of the current crisis stems from the fear that too-big-to-fail institutions are in fact insolvent. And while one can talk about interconnectedness as being just as important as size, size still matters: if you have a trillion-dollar balance sheet, you’re too big to fail. And so any financial technology which can reduce the size of a bank’s balance sheet is a good thing.

Securitization — real securitization — is a great way of moving assets off a bank’s balance sheet. The problem is that starting in the late 1990s, with JP Morgan’s Bistro deal, banks stopped taking their assets, bundling them up into securitized bonds, and selling them off. Instead, they kept the assets on their balance sheets, and sold off synthetic CDOs which, according to their models, perfectly hedged the credit risk of the assets in question. Thus, instead of getting smaller, banks’ balance sheets got much, much bigger. And when the models proved to be flawed, the write-downs that the banks needed to take on their “super-senior” assets (the ones which supposedly had no credit risk at all) amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars.

CDOs are not eligible to be bought as part of Treasury’s bank bailout plan. Instead, the plan calls for investors to buy the actual underlying assets, thereby reducing the size of the banks’ balance sheets. This is a good thing. And any sustainable recovery will be predicated on the existence of more such deals: risk being moved from the books of people who don’t want it, onto the books of people who do. The problem with a lot of what looked like securitization over the past decade was that many banks thought that they’d sold off all their risk, when in fact they hadn’t. The way to solve that problem is to move back to securitization 1.0, not to abolish securitization entirely.

Continue reading…

Google a buy at 5x sales?

…The upgrade from Canaccord Adams of Google, Inc (GOOG) stock is a pretty big deal, as they increased the price target by 50%. In addition, to the positive outlook by Canaccord, Jefferies is also hopping on the Google bandwagon with positive comments. Google had to cut back its workforce by about 1%, but that has relatively little impact on the stock’s outlook. More importantly, the research notes seem to be suggest that these firms think the worst is over for internet advertising market. Google has continued to attract market share even as online ad revenue has slowed during the downturn. However, according to these research notes from Canaccord and Jefferies, ad revenue could rebound. Quoting the Canaccord note, “Additionally, we think that the market has already priced in expectations for a weak Q1/09 and believe that deteriorating conditions in search trends have started to improve in late March based on our checks.”

At Ockham, we are maintaining our Undervalued stance for Google shares, because even though revenue growth has slowed recently, the longer term growth is still quite impressive. Prior to the current market downturn, the last time Google was trading for less than $400 per share was in September of 2006. From 2006 to 2008, Google’s revenue increased rapidly from $10.6 billion to $16 billion. Google is expected to bring in somewhere around $17 billion for 2009, still 70% greater than the last time GOOG trade at this price level.

Continue reading at Seeking Alpha…

A $10 Fed balance sheet?

It’s not just the Fed that is frightened of deflation…

…These efforts have prevented depression, but much more action is needed to ward off deflation, according to an analysis by Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius. Mr. Hatzius estimates the Fed needs to slash the equivalent of eight more percentage points from the fed funds rate by 2010 to beat deflation.

The Fed can’t cut rates below zero, but it could achieve the same effect by buying more assets to flood the financial system with cash. The sort of campaign Mr. Hatzius is talking about would stretch the Fed’s balance sheet by an eye-popping $10 trillion in addition to stimulus efforts already under way.

Such colossal intervention would essentially turn the financial markets into the Fed’s private playground and would be extremely difficult to unwind, Mr. Hatzius notes. And political hurdles could prove insurmountable, given the growing anxieties in Washington and elsewhere that government actions could in fact spark runaway inflation.

Policy makers likely hope their plans so far will be enough to avoid deflation. If they are wrong, much more fiscal stimulus will soon be necessary.

Last week’s move in the Treasury market

Brad Setser, typically, illuminates:

When financial historians get around to writing the history of the great crisis of 2008 (or great crisis of 2007-09?), they will no doubt focus on the collapse of the market for securitized mortgages — and in reality, almost all forms of credit risk. The corollary of that fall, though, has been the rise in the price — and fall in yields — of comparatively safe financial assets. And US Treasuries are still considered safe.

<snip>

Christoph Schmidt is concerned about the risk of future inflation in the US. But the Fed — like Jan Hatzius of Goldman and Dr. Hamilton of UCSD — is far more worried about the immediate risk of deflation. And with so much spare capacity globally, I tend to agree with the Fed. German industrial production is now down over 20% y/y. Eurozone output is now almost 20% below its level a year ago. And parts of Asia — like Taiwan — are in even worse shape.

[From Brad Setser's Follow the Money]

A bit more to worry about; foreign demand for long-term Treasuries has faded

Brad Setser’s analysis looks valid and definitely not a good indicator for absorbing the pending avalanche of Treasury bond auctions:

I wanted to highlight one trend that I glossed over on Monday, namely that foreign demand for long-term Treasuries has disappeared over the last few months. Consider a chart showing foreign purchases of long-term Treasuries over the past 3 months. Incidentally, the split between private and official purchases in this data should largely be ignored. The revised (i.e. post-survey) data generally have attributed nearly all the flow from 2003 to the official sector.

The rolling 3m sum bounces around a bit, but foreign demand for long-term Treasuries in November, December and January was as subdued as it has been for a long-time. Among other things, that fall in foreign demand for long-term Treasuries after October suggests — at least to me — that the big Treasury rally late last year (and subsequent sell-off this year) doesn’t seem to have been driven by external flows. Foreigners weren’t big buyers of long-term Treasuries back when ten year Treasury yields fell to around 2%.

There also is at least a passing resemblance between a chart of foreign demand for US corporate bonds and foreign demand for Treasuries.

It is also striking that — for all the talk of safe haven flows to the US — foreign demand for all long-term US bonds has effectively disappeared.

Continue reading…




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