Archive for the 'Global Warming' Category

Tuvalu, a climate change fairy tale

What really puzzles me is that it is so difficult to find out the reality of Tuvalu, while obviously Tuvalu very much shapes the reality of climate change discourse. Obviously, Tuvalu is an island of great complexity. Is sea level rise there a fake or a real threat? Are the migrants climate refugees or not? Is Tuvalu the center of the world, or is it a negligible entity at the end of the world? Is it the center of the climate negotiations, or is it a nuisance for the big ones? (…)

Werner Krauss (Die Klimazwiebel) raises the right questions about Tuvalu, whose Australian negotiator made emotional headlines at Copenhagen. Here is an excerpt:

(…)

Various sources from New Zealand state that the University of Hawaii measured since 1977 a negligible increase of only 0.07 mm per year over two decades, and that if fell three millimeters between 1995 and 1997. Anyway, according to one source, Greenpeace employed Dr John Hunter from the University of Tasmania ‘who obligingly ‘adjusted’ the Tuvalu readings upwards to comply with changes in ESNO and those found for the island Hawaii and, miraculously, he found a sea-level rise of ‘around’ 1.2 mm per year which, also miraculously, agrees with the IPCC global figure’.

The journalist Michael Field and other blogs agree that sea level rise is not the reason for migration from the island. Instead, the threat from the sea is according to Field the result of a severe over-population on an island that is scarce in resources and jobs, from a profound pollution (and mismanagement) and an unusual World War II legacy – on the main islet, Japan built an airport which resulted in great land loss.

Another report confirms that seismic events or hurricanes lead to severe floodings on the islands, but that this vulnerability is not due to climate change. Instead, there is not enough money to really protect the island, people take building materials from the atolls and so on. Furthermore, the migration to New Zealand is, according to these sources, due to economic reasons; the economic infrastructure of Tuvalu cannot support 12000 inhabitants. Tuvalu is a poor country. Its main source of income was selling their internet address .tv for some hundred million bucks. The president of Tuvalu carefully invests into a future based on climate change, as a journalist reports: ‘The government of Tuvalu has obliged all the journalists, dutifully telling of the need for future relocation (…) and possible lawsuits against polluting countries’.

To come back to Copenhagen and to Ian Fry, the spokesman of Tuvalu, who made such a ’strong and impassioned plea’ in his speech. In many newspapers such as the Washington Post, Ian Fry is characterized as a person from ‘very high up in the climate change’, who does not live in Tuvalu but in Australia. Indeed, Ian Fry has a long career in international environmental and climate organizations on several continents, before he was hired by Tuvalu’s government. But, according to his Ph.D. advisor, there is nothing wrong with that. Why not work for another country?

Anyway, the world press likes Tuvalu, which is often presented as the first island threatened by the effects of anthropogenic climate change, with the first real climate refugees, and Tuvalu serves as a symbol of a future of ‘climate wars’ or mass migrations of climate refugees as imagined by Welzer and many others. Tuvalu plays this role effectively, in Copenhagen and elsewhere.

What really puzzles me is that it is so difficult to find out the reality of Tuvalu, while obviously Tuvalu very much shapes the reality of climate change discourse. Obviously, Tuvalu is an island of great complexity. Is sea level rise there a fake or a real threat? Are the migrants climate refugees or not? Is Tuvalu the center of the world, or is it a negligible entity at the end of the world? Is it the center of the climate negotiations, or is it a nuisance for the big ones?

Please continue reading…

Geoengineering: an ABC Science update

Australia’s ABC recently asked climate scientists for their thoughts on some of the current geoengineering proposals.

Dr Will Howard, a climate researcher from the Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre, offered these observations on the iron-fertilization concept:

If human societies can’t stop emitting greenhouse gasses, then perhaps we can raise the world’s capacity for taking those gases back out of the atmosphere, some geoengineering advocates suggest.

Among the best-studied options in this category is using iron to stimulate the growth of carbon-capturing plankton in the ocean.

Over the past 15 years or so, several international research teams have completed trials showing that under the right conditions this approach is scientifically feasible.

“The idea is that in some parts of the ocean, the algae that would pick up carbon and store carbon in the deep ocean are limited by iron supply,” explains Howard.

Experiments have shown when you add extra iron into these areas, you stimulate algal productivity.

But the same experiments have also shown that the carbon fixed by this process doesn’t sink very deep into the ocean.

Howard says the key question is whether you can change that: “Can you get that carbon out of the surface ocean and into the thousands-of-metres-deep parts of the ocean where it will stay out of contact with the atmosphere for a long time?”

There are other potential problems with this approach, he warns.

“A possible consequence of fertilization of the ocean is the fact that once this carbon does sink into sub-surface waters… you’ll increase that tendency toward low oxygen.”

“We know there are basins in the water that have dead zones today — where the water is anoxic and nothing that requires oxygen can live. The research would need to very carefully consider those sorts of risks before you went ahead with that kind of manipulation.”

If we discover unexpected adverse effects from a geoengineering technique, how do we recover from our mistake? Earlier in the interview Dr. Howard noted that some of the geoengineering concepts can be quickly reversed – such as sulfate aerosols. How rapidly could we unwind the effects of iron-fertilization?
For more background on geoengineering I recommend the 2.5 hour audio of the AEI seminar on “Governing Geoengineering“. We found this discussion to be one of the more informed and objective reviews of the whole range of policy options relating to climate change.

TCASE 4/ Energy system build rates and material inputs

TCASE 4 is the fourth in Barry Brook’s extended series ‘Thinking critically about sustainable energy‘. The series goal is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the zero-carbon global energy future. In particular, what are the real-world costs, risks and benefits of all the strategies for achieving a zero-carbon generation capability that can satisfy real-world demand. In TCASE 3 Barry concluded that to satisfy 2050 demand we need to commission the equivalent of two AP1000 size nuclear reactor every three days through 2050. In TCASE 4 Barry examines the scalability of the competing technologies. Click the thumbnail for the full size summary graphic. Here’s Barry’s concluding paragraph – I can’t think of a more succinct summary:

The main point of this post, TCASE 4, is to take a one step in quashing the absurd ‘bait-and-switch’ meme that some disingenuous anti-nuclear folk repeat: That because the energy replacement challenge facing nuclear energy is huge (a 25-fold expansion on today’s levels), it couldn’t possibly do it, so renewables are our only sensible option. On the basis of this post alone, any objective reader can see that this is pure, quantitatively unsupportable, nonsense. It’s going to be really tough, no matter what — and believe me, I’ve not even warmed up on the problems with renewables taking the lion’s share of the work.

TCASE 4 is a 10,000 meter surveillance flight over the topic. The entire series is intended to be comprised of bite-sized pieces, so don’t expect every detail to be covered here. That said there are very useful illuminations in the comments,such as this reply by  Barry Brook to a question “won’t the wind capacity factors be higher?”

Barry Brook said

19 October 2009 at 16.54

Neil #10: The global and US numbers don’t bear this out. Go and look here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windpower#Windpower_usage

Table: Annual Wind Power Generation (TWh) and total electricity consumption(TWh) for 10 largest countries.

The US has amongst the highest CF of all countries. Further, the change in CF for wind, across years in the US or other nations, is pretty stable. It seems that although a CF of 35-45% is often cited for wind for the best sites, when taken across whole nations, the actual figure turns out to be considerably lower.

In reality, this is quite a complex matter and will deserve a couple of posts on just this point in the TCASE series. For instance, CF can be ‘tuned’ to a site — it ultimately depends on what sized generator you install on your turbine. If you put a GE 2.5xl-sized turbine at a good site and whacked a 200 kW generator on instead of a 2.5 MW generator, you’d likely get the CF up to 70-80% — but this would obviously not be helpful, as it would be grossly uneconomic!

On balance, I strongly suspect that a worldwide CF of ~25% for 10 TWe would turn out to be a very reasonable figure, as the trade-off between use marginal improvements in turbine efficiency is offset by the increasing use of less-than-optimal sites.

Next I noted this exchange which touches on one of the unspoken cost burdens of nuclear generation — the vast overkill in regulations that supposedly improve safety:

Douglas Wise said

20 October 2009 at 1.31

Re # 11. Peter Lang

Peter, I wonder if you could take the time to categorise those safety requirements for nuclear power stations which you consider to be “over the top” relative to the safety requirements imposed on other industrial complexes (eg chemical plants) which you deem to be potentially as or more dangerous. I am not attempting to take issue with you, merely to try to get a handle on the extent to which redundant safety engineering impacts on build costs (both with respect to build time and physical resources). How, for example, would you rate containment in reactors that operate either at high or low atmospheric pressures? Should one need to protect against accidental or deliberate aircraft strikes? As I understasnd it, chemical plants are generally not so protected.

Tom Blees said

20 October 2009 at 4.25

Doug @ 16: The PRISM reactor vessel (the commercial IFR design) is designed to be underground, about 50 feet below grade. If they’re built with the attendant structures (steam generator and turbine) off to the side rather than directly above, then one can use the 50 feet of earth as protection against aircraft strikes. The engineering for this is straightforward. One need only transfer hot (~550C) sodium from the reactor vessel (at near atmospheric pressure) to the steam generator via the secondary (non-radioactive) sodium loop. Want more protection? Pile on more dirt. It’s dirt cheap.

A Cherry Picker's Guide to Global Temperature Trends

This is a wonderful resource:

Cherry-Pickers Guide to Global Temperature Trends. Each point on the chart represents the trend beginning in September of the year indicated along the x-axis and ending in August 2009. The trends which are statistically significant (p [greater than]0.05) are indicated by filled circles. The zero line (no trend) is indicated by the thin black horizontal line, and the climate model average projected trend is indicated by the thick red horizontal line.

You will need to read Roger’s complete post. I’ll just highlight some examples of how cherry pickers operate. But you can detect their tricks by consulting the above chart.

(…) Here are a few general statements that can be supported with using my Cherry-Pickers Guide:

• For the past 8 years (96 months), no global warming is indicated by any of the five datasets.

• For the past 5 years (60 months), there is a statistically significant global cooling in all datasets.

• For the past 15 years, global warming has been occurring at a rate that is below the average climate model expected warming

Lots more.

EU Must Stop its Climate Gimmickry

Another important op-ed by Atte Korhola and Eija-Riitta Korhola – again translated from the Finnish. Prof. Korhola is hammering the same themes as How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course:

The EU is not serious in its fight against climate change. If it were, it wouldn’t merely shift emissions from one place to another but would instead focus its efforts to stop the emissions from growing globally. It would concentrate its efforts on the most challenging problem of the climate change, coal, and reducing its use especially in the developing countries.

<snip>

(…) this means that all use of coal should be ceased immediately – or one should develop means to produce energy from coal completely emissions free. The EU climate policy does not support these goals.

The EU is practising the kind of climate policy, which is expensive and flashy, yet bureaucratic and lacking results. The main focus is in the reduction of the Union’s own local emissions, not the overall emissions to the atmosphere.

<snip>

The Australian example is very illuminating. This island state increased the share of the renewable energy by 10 per cent from 2007 to 2008. At the same time, the usage of coal increased by a couple of per cent, which resulted in the overall emissions of Australia to grow.

<snip>

The EU should, instead, abandon its renewable energy target and replace it with a clean energy target. At the moment, for instance, Europe practically cannot increase the share of an emissions free nuclear energy, as nuclear energy is not counted in as a renewable energy source.

[From More from the Korholas: EU Has to Stop its Climate Gimmickry]

Understanding Decarbonization of the US Economy in 2008

Roger Pielke Jr. concludes that the rate of decarbonization has not improved in recent years. I don’t see any other interpretation of the empirical data.

I have been asked by a reporter how to explain how much of the 2008 reduction in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions is due to changes in energy intensity and carbon intensity versus the slowdown in economic growth. The answer can be determined from the graph and figures above.
<snip all the reasoning>
[From Understanding Decarbonization of the US Economy in 2008]

Understanding Decarbonization of the US Economy in 2008

Roger Pielke Jr. concludes that the rate of decarbonization has not improved in recent years. I don’t see any other interpretation of the empirical data.

I have been asked by a reporter how to explain how much of the 2008 reduction in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions is due to changes in energy intensity and carbon intensity versus the slowdown in economic growth. The answer can be determined from the graph and figures above.
<snip all the reasoning>
[From Understanding Decarbonization of the US Economy in 2008]

Environmental organizations’ climate policy a series of miscalculations

Dogmatism based on ideals has already cost too many lives, particularly in the poorest countries. Similar dogmatism is common in the views of environmental groups; they are against using waste as a source of energy as they believe it will deter preventing the generation of waste. They also oppose developing nuclear fission and fusion energy, as they are afraid it will increase energy consumption and slow down the development of renewable forms of energy. — Atte Korhola 2009

Thanks to Roger Pielke, Jr. for publishing the English translation of this short essay by University of Helsinki’s Professor of Environmental Change Atte Korhola. Prof. Korhola is one of the coauthors of the highly recommended white paper How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course. These excerpts will hopefully motivate you to read the entire essay:

Environmental organizations are generally considered experts in preventing climate change although many of their solutions have proved downright destructive, write Atte Korhola and Eija-Riitta Korhola.

(…)

According to a recent article published in Science magazine, it would take 400 years to pay off the global “carbon debt” caused by changes in land use induced by field energy production.

The concern environmentalist groups are showing now, about the sufficiency of bio fuels and the environmental hazards created by the ever-growing palm oil production in particular, is unfortunately late.

More unfortunate mistakes: accepting to increase renewable energy sources in a tight time frame without criticism may drive Finland and the whole of Europe into large-scale wood burning, the environmental impacts of which – in addition to the poor energy balance of log burning– can be ecologically unpredictable. In addition to these hazards, decentralized wood burning may increase the number of deaths caused by fine-particle emissions in Europe, which is already considerable.

Although the share of wood biomass in our energy production can be increased considerably, one would expect to hear the environmental groups’ views on the risks excessive felling can cause to the wellbeing of forests. According to a study carried out by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the University of Hamburg, wood consumption will be 453 million cubic metres in 2020 due to bio energy targets, and there will be a demand-supply gap that is eight times as big as the amount of annual tree felling in Finland.

Another irrevocable change in landscape will be threatening Finland’s unique archipelago if wind energy production is increased as much as the environmental organizations want. (…)

Please continue reading…

Energy policy: real world engineering meets renewables

Even if solar cells themselves were free, solar power would remain very expensive because of the huge structures and support systems required to extract large amounts of electricity from a source so weak that it takes hours to deliver a tan.

This is why the (few) greens ready to accept engineering and economic reality have suddenly emerged as avid proponents of nuclear power. In the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident—which didn’t harm anyone, and wouldn’t even have damaged the reactor core if the operators had simply kept their hands off the switches and let the automatic safety systems do their job—ostensibly green antinuclear activists unwittingly boosted U.S. coal consumption by about 400 million tons per year. The United States would be in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol today if we could simply undo their handiwork and conjure back into existence the nuclear plants that were in the pipeline in nuclear power’s heyday. Nuclear power is fantastically compact, and—as America’s nuclear navy, several commercial U.S. operators, France, Japan, and a handful of other countries have convincingly established—it’s both safe and cheap wherever engineers are allowed to get on with it.

But getting on with it briskly is essential, because costs hinge on the huge, up-front capital investment in the power plant. Years of delay between the capital investment and when it starts earning a return are ruinous. Most of the developed world has made nuclear power unaffordable by surrounding it with a regulatory process so sluggish and unpredictable that no one will pour a couple of billion dollars into a new plant, for the good reason that no one knows when (or even if) the investment will be allowed to start making money. - Peter W. Huber, 2009

Peter Huber, coauthor of The Bottomless Well, takes a hard look at the options in “Bound to Burn” at City Journal:

(…) Another argument commonly advanced is that getting over carbon will, nevertheless, be comparatively cheap, because it will get us over oil, too—which will impoverish our enemies and save us a bundle at the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security. But uranium aside, the most economical substitute for oil is, in fact, electricity generated with coal. Cheap coal-fired electricity has been, is, and will continue to be a substitute for oil, or a substitute for natural gas, which can in turn substitute for oil. By sharply boosting the cost of coal electricity, the war on carbon will make us more dependent on oil, not less.

The first place where coal displaces oil is in the electric power plant itself. When oil prices spiked in the early 1980s, U.S. utilities quickly switched to other fuels, with coal leading the pack; the coal-fired plants now being built in China, India, and other developing countries are displacing diesel generators. More power plants burning coal to produce cheap electricity can also mean less natural gas used to generate electricity. And less used for industrial, commercial, and residential heating, welding, and chemical processing, as these users switch to electrically powered alternatives. The gas that’s freed up this way can then substitute for diesel fuel in heavy trucks, delivery vehicles, and buses. And coal-fired electricity will eventually begin displacing gasoline, too, as soon as plug-in hybrid cars start recharging their batteries directly from the grid.

(…) To top it all, using electricity generated in large part by coal to power our passenger cars would lower carbon emissions—even in Indiana, which generates 75 percent of its electricity with coal. Big power plants are so much more efficient than the gasoline engines in our cars that a plug-in hybrid car running on electricity supplied by Indiana’s current grid still ends up more carbon-frugal than comparable cars burning gasoline in a conventional engine under the hood. Old-guard energy types have been saying this for decades. In a major report released last March, the World Wildlife Fund finally concluded that they were right all along.

But true carbon zealots won’t settle for modest reductions in carbon emissions when fat targets beckon. They see coal-fired electricity as the dragon to slay first. Huge, stationary sources can’t run or hide, and the cost of doing without them doesn’t get rung up in plain view at the gas pump. California, Pennsylvania, and other greener-than-thou states have made flatlining electricity consumption the linchpin of their war on carbon. That is the one certain way to halt the displacement of foreign oil by cheap, domestic electricity.

The oil-coal economics come down to this. Per unit of energy delivered, coal costs about one-fifth as much as oil—but contains one-third more carbon. High carbon taxes (or tradable permits, or any other economic equivalent) sharply narrow the price gap between oil and the one fuel that can displace it worldwide, here and now. The oil nasties will celebrate the green war on carbon as enthusiastically as the coal industry celebrated the green war on uranium 30 years ago.

The other 5 billion are too poor to deny these economic realities. For them, the price to beat is 3-cent coal-fired electricity. China and India won’t trade 3-cent coal for 15-cent wind or 30-cent solar. As for us, if we embrace those economically frivolous alternatives on our own, we will certainly end up doing more harm than good.

Consider your next Google search. As noted in a recent article in Harper’s, “Google . . . and its rivals now head abroad for cheaper, often dirtier power.” Google itself (the “don’t be evil” company) is looking to set up one of its electrically voracious server farms at a site in Lithuania, “disingenuously described as being near a hydroelectric dam.” But Lithuania’s grid is 0.5 percent hydroelectric and 78 percent nuclear. Perhaps the company’s next huge farm will be “near” the Three Gorges Dam in China, built to generate over three times as much power as our own Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State. China will be happy to play along, while it quietly plugs another coal plant into its grid a few pylons down the line. All the while, of course, Google will maintain its low-energy headquarters in California, a state that often boasts of the wise regulatory policies—centered, one is told, on efficiency and conservation—that have made it such a frugal energy user. But in fact, sky-high prices have played the key role, curbing internal demand and propelling the flight from California of power plants, heavy industries, chip fabs, server farms, and much else (see “California’s Potemkin Environmentalism,” Spring 2008).

Please read Huber’s essay top to bottom. I’m confident that reading and reflection will motivate you go on to read The Bottomless Well.
One quibble, Huber writes
They use energy far less efficiently than we do, and they remain almost completely oblivious to environmental impacts, just as we were in our own first century of industrialization.
Three points. One, If the decarbonization data presented in How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course is accurate, then China is at about the same value as the USA of tonnes-CO2 per $1000 of GDP. Point two, if LRL’s Mark Levine is correct in his presentation of Chinese decarbonization policy, then we should see China’s rate of decarbonization improve even faster now that the “policy holiday” taken by Beijing is over. Three, if America continues to ignore the reality of nuclear power, then they may never be able to catch up with China – who already are committed to at least 100 additional AP1000 reactors. All of my sources point to an acceleration of China’s nuclear power deployment. Same is true of India, but so far to a lesser degree.

The British Climate Change Act: a critical  evaluation and proposed alternative  approach

Here is the abstract of the Roger A Pielke, Jr. paper that I linked earlier. Roger’s analysis crystalizes how little light is associated with the political heat of target-setting. I hope Roger decides to apply the same methodology to Australian PM Kevin Rudd’s posturing.

This paper evaluates the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Act of 2008 in terms of the implied rates of decarbonization of the UK economy for a short-term and a long-term target established in law. The paper uses the Kaya identity to structure the evaluation, employing both a bottom up approach (based on projections of future UK population, economic growth, and technology) and a top down approach (deriving implied rates of decarbonization consistent with the targets and various rates of projected economic growth). Both approaches indicate that the UK economy would have to achieve annual rates of decarbonization in excess of 4 or 5%. To place these numbers in context, the UK would have to achieve the 2006 carbon efficiency of France by about 2015, a level of effort comparable to the building of about 30 new nuclear power plants, displacing an equivalent amount of fossil energy. The paper argues that the magnitude of the task implied by the UK Climate Change Act strongly suggests that it is on course to fail, and discusses implications.

You can examine the abstracts of other recent CIRES publications here.




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