Have you ever heard anyone make the argument that we must take a certain course of action because the experts tell us we must? The issue might be the threat of another country or an environmental risk, but increasingly we see appeals to authority used as the basis for arguing for this or that action.
In a new book, David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith take the appeal to experts somewhat further and argue that in order to deal with climate change we need to replace liberal democracy with an authoritarianism of scientific expertise. They write in a recent op-ed:
Archive for the 'Science Policy' Category Page 2 of 8
…most technology assessment, at least as defined by the US OTA, is simply impossible. The stories of the tuna and the buffalo are a century apart, but they tell us some very important things about our efforts to manage technology in a globalizing world. Among these lessons: the processes of globalization are not new, their effects have always been fast in comparison to our ability to respond, and our ability to foresee the effects of technological innovation on our world are profoundly limited.
…Examples of connections between seemingly innocuous innovations and global consequences are everywhere…
Roger R. Pielke, Jr. writing for Bridges, the Office of Science & Technology journal on S&T policy [also available as a podcast].
Fresh sushi, it seems, can be found almost everywhere. Such casual observations of contemporary trends in the globalization of food are backed up by data. Our insatiable appetite for fresh fish has had a profound effect on world fish stocks. In 2006 a study published in Science estimated that 29 percent of all fished ocean species were being harvested unsustainably. As the world struggles to cope with the many challenges of globalization, which include protecting fish populations in the face of enormous demand, it is of particular importance to understand the role of technology in globalization and the role of technology assessment in our efforts to manage the effects of globalization.
According to Sasha Issenberg’s fascinating exploration of the global sushi industry, The Sushi Economy, the main people interested in catching mature western Atlantic bluefin tuna in the 1960s and early 1970s were sport fishermen looking for trophies. After documenting their catch they would dispose of the worthless fish, or if they were lucky, sell it for about five cents per pound to be processed into pet food. But everything changed in the early 1970s when Japan Airlines sought to fill the empty cargo holds of its jumbo passenger jets returning to Japan after bringing full shipments of electronics and other consumer goods to North America. A JAL employee named Akira Okazaki was given the challenge of finding appropriate goods to ship back to Japan, and he quickly zeroed in on the bluefin tuna found off the northeast shores of the United States and Canada.
There was one big technological obstacle to overcome: Tuna was valuable in Japan when fresh, but shipping the large fish packed in ice was prohibitively expensive due to the weight. But with necessity the mother of invention, it was not long before innovations in freezing, packing, and shipping technologies enabled a new market opportunity in the trade of bluefin tuna from the North Atlantic. The first North Atlantic tuna sold in Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish Market on August 14, 1972, were purchased for $18 per pound, 50 percent higher than the shipping costs. In 2001, a 444-pound North Atlantic tuna sold for $175,000, or close to $400 per pound, an 800,000 percent price increase from the five cents per pound paid in the 1960s. Tuna would be pet food no more.
With the globalization of sushi involving so many fascinating aspects of culture, economics, and history, it would be easy to overlook the enabling role of technological innovation. But without the invention of a way to move fresh fish around the world, the fishing pressure on the stock of North Atlantic tuna would certainly have developed differently from the 1970s to the present. Low-technology innovations in freezing and packing associated with shipping seafood around the world led to profound impacts on culture, markets, and the environment around the world. These effects were the indirect consequence of a trade opportunity made possible by the North American demand for Japanese technological innovations in consumer electronics. When my parents brought home our first color television in the early 1970s, they could not have envisioned that they were contributing in a small but significant way to forces of globalization that 30 years later have resulted in their grandchildren asking me for sushi as a treat from our local grocery store.
Fascinating history - enjoy.
Don’t miss this dispatch from science policy researcher Roger Pielke, Jr.:
Last week I asked a few reporters and scholars why it is that a major paper in Nature last week on hurricanes and global warming received almost no media coverage whereas another paper released last summer received quite a bit more. Andy Revkin raised the issue on his blog which stimulated many more responses. With this post I’d like to report back on what I’ve heard, and what I’ve concluded, at least tentatively, on the role of the media in the climate debate.
First, there are a wide range of explanations for the differences in media coverage of the two papers. Here is a summary of what I heard (warning: not all explanations are consistent with each other):
The media is biased toward sensational stories, and Vecchi/Soden was not sensational.
The relevant media was distracted by the Bali climate meeting.
The relevant media was distracted by the AGU meeting.
The relevant media had an interest in stories that added to pressure to act on climate change in Bali.
…
If these findings are anywhere close to the mark, then they offer a powerful counterargument to the “balance as bias” thesis. The climate issue is characterized by a wide range of ideological perspectives, and it seems hard to justify why any of those perspectives should not be represented by the media. That means reporting on a wide range of political perspectives and the justifications for those views offered by those holding those perspectives, even if the reporter, or the vast majority of scientists or other groups, happens to disagree with either the politics or justifications. Where there is diversity balance is not bias, but bias is bias.
Here is the closing paragraph of Roger’s 14 December post “A question for the media”
Nature magazine, arguably the leading scientific journal in the world, published a paper this week by two widely-respected scholars — Gabriel Vecchi and Brian Soden — suggesting that global warming may have a minimal effect on hurricanes. Over two days the media — as measured by Google News — published a grand total of 3 news stories on this paper. Now contrast this with a paper published in July in a fairly obscure journal by two other respected scholars — Peter Webster and Greg Holland — suggesting that global warming has a huge effect on hurricanes. That paper resulted in 79 news stories stories over two days.
If you’ve not yet bought/read Roger A. Pielke, Jr.’s new book possibly this review by Jonathan Adler for The New Atlantis will motivate you. An excerpt
In his new book, The Honest Broker, University of Colorado political scientist Roger A. Pielke, Jr. worries that the debate over The Skeptical Environmentalist is emblematic of a “pathological” politicization of science in public policy today. What was framed as a debate over “sound science” was really a proxy battle over environmental policy, with most participants “focused on the advantages or disadvantages the book putatively lent to opposing political perspectives.” For example, Scientific American published a series of broadsides against Lomborg under the heading “Science Defends Itself from The Skeptical Environmentalist”; that title would have been more accurate, Pielke observes, had it read “Our political perspective defends itself against the political agenda of The Skeptical Environmentalist”—but then “it would have carried with it far less authority than masking politics with the cloth of science.”
Pielke fears that when scientists and policymakers claim “science” supports a particular policy agenda, they diminish science’s ability to inform policy development. Those who purport to make policy recommendations based on “sound science” or “objective information” are often engaged in issue advocacy from a certain point of view. Typically, it is policy advocates, ideologues, and flacks, not scientists, who politicize science in this way. In the debate over The Skeptical Environmentalist, however, scientists actively entered the fray, the direction of their arguments determined by ideology and political considerations rather than scientific examination. The end result was a political conflict, but one conducted in the language of science. Pielke worries it won’t be the last.
Today’s politicization of science is due in part, Pielke argues, to the “scientization” of public policy—attempts to resolve policy disputes through technical expertise rather than politics. Such efforts tend to be futile because policy differences are generally not the result of a dearth of scientific information or a lack of independent analysis; they are usually rooted in disagreements about fundamental values. “When advocacy is couched in the purity of science,” Pielke warns, “problems are created for both science and policy.”
Pielke spells out the choices scientists must make if they wish “to play a positive role in policy and politics and contribute to the sustainability of the scientific process.” He lists four “idealized roles” scientists can adopt, each of which reflects assumptions about the nature of science and democratic policymaking. The first, the pure scientist, is concerned with science for its own sake and seeks only to uncover scientific truths, regardless of their policy implications. Such a scientist has no direct connection with the policymaking process; he is content to remain cloistered in his lab while others hash out policy.
The second idealized role for scientists in policymaking is less detached: the science arbiter is a bit more engaged with the practical world, providing answers to policymakers’ scientific questions. He wants to ensure that science is relevant to policymaking, but in a disinterested way. He does not wish to influence the direction of policy; it is enough to know that policymakers will make decisions informed by accurate scientific assessments.
The third role in Pielke’s typology is the issue advocate, who pays more direct attention to policy, using science as a tool to move it in the direction he prefers. He may work for an overt advocacy organization, such as a think tank, trade association, or environmental activist group, or his advocacy may be more covert. In either case, he seeks to marshal scientific evidence and arguments in support of a specific cause.
Finally, the honest broker is attentive to policy alternatives but seeks to inform policy, not direct it. “The defining characteristic of the honest broker of policy alternatives,” Pielke explains, “is an effort to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice for decision-making in a way that allows for the decision-maker to reduce choice based on his or her own preferences and values.” The honest broker’s aim is not to dictate policy outcomes but to ensure that policy choices are made with an understanding of the likely consequences and relevant tradeoffs. Like the issue advocate, the honest broker explicitly engages in the decision-making process, but unlike the issue advocate, the honest broker has no stake or stated interest in the outcome.
Although Pielke claims that all four of these roles “are critically important and necessary in a functioning democracy,” he stresses that honest brokers are especially needed. One purpose of Pielke’s book is to encourage more scientists to take up the honest broker role—for, unfortunately, they are in short supply: many scientists instead choose “to engage policy and politics as issue advocates, or more troubling for the sustainability of the scientific enterprise, as stealth issue advocates.” Pretending to speak for science, these “stealth issue advocates” ultimately weaken public confidence in scientific objectivity. If the public comes to believe that scientific conclusions “are simply an extension of a scientist’s political beliefs, then scientific information will play an increasingly diminishing role in policymaking.”
Recommended. Roger has produced the best modern text on science policy. When you have digested the book you’ll have formulated your own ideas on this: how to promote good science policy by increasing the scope of options presented to policy makers. BTW, I have Roger firmly in the “honest broker” category.
“…and this time we’re planning to stay!”
Moon 1.0 was abandoned 35 years ago in 1972. Don’t miss the very, very cool rollout video for Moon 2.0. The $30 million Google Lunar X Prize is the largest total science-prize so far announced [see below for partial listing]. The competition guidlines:
To win the Google Lunar X PRIZE, a team must successfully land a privately funded craft on the lunar surface and survive long enough to complete the mission goals of roaming about the lunar surface for at least 500 meters and sending a defined data package, called a “Mooncast”, back to Earth.
PRIZES: The total purse of the Google Lunar X PRIZE is $30 million (USD).
• GRAND PRIZE: A $20 million Grand Prize will be awarded to the team that can soft land a craft on the Moon that roams for at least 500 meters and transmits a Mooncast back to Earth. The Grand Prize is $20M until December 31st 2012; thereafter it will drop to $15M until December 31st 2014 at which point the competition will be terminated unless extended by Google and the X PRIZE Foundation
• SECOND PRIZE: A $5 million Second Prize will be offered as well, providing an extra incentive for teams to continue to compete, and increasing the possibility that multiple teams will succeed. Second place will be available until December 31st 2014 at which point the competition will be terminated unless extended by Google and the X PRIZE Foundation
• BONUSES: An additional $5 million in bonus prizes can be won by successfully completing additional mission tasks such as roving longer distances (> 5,000 meters), imaging man made artifacts (e.g. Apollo hardware), discovering water ice, and/or surviving through a frigid lunar night (approximately 14.5 Earth days). The competing lunar spacecraft will be equipped with high-definition video and still cameras, and will send images and data to Earth, which the public will be able to view on the Google Lunar X PRIZE website.
<more>
So we now have another excellent test-bed for the power of science/technology prizes. Regular readers know we believe such prize competitions are hugely more effective than government-funded R&D. The success of the DARPA Grand Challenge and the Ansari X Prize provide anecdotal evidence of effectiveness. Over the next five years we should have more definitive evidence as we analyze the successes in relation to their public costs. Here’s a sampling of the announced competitions, some of which are multiple prizes:
• Google Lunar X Prize,
• Space Elevator Challenge
• DARPA Urban Challenge,
• Automotive X Prize,
• Lunar Lander Challenge,
• Archon X PRIZE for Genomics
• NASA’s Centennial Challenges
And Carnegie Mellon has already put their hat in the ring. Can Stanford’s AI Lab be far behind?
I think the survival of the human race deserves a long-term program to identify and deflect the inevitable dangerous near-earth objects. So, I’ve been looking for the March NASA report to Congress on the asteroid impact issue — just found it [PDF].
The NASA report doesn’t seem to favor the gravity space tug concept. This method appealed to me due to safety [doesn’t make the risk worse by fragmenting] and controllability [plenty of time to make course corrections]. But the study concludes that less than 1% of scenarios would suit the gravity tug approach — the report concludes it is too slow, and too inefficient at imparting the required velocity change.
Wait… I’m reading the critiques by Rusty Schweickart and Clark Chapman. According to these guys, the NASA report is a train wreck. Excerpt from Schweickart’s critique:
…This background technical report (the Final Report), held from public release, has nevertheless circulated through the NEO “community.” The analytic source of many of the objectionable conclusions contained in the Report to Congress are to be found in this document. The comments contained herein identify the most egregious technical errors in the Final Report but by no means reflect the full scope of errors scattered throughout the document. A full and exhaustive technical critique would be a major undertaking and is probably of limited value given the key errors addressed below.
The fact that NASA has submitted such a flawed report to the Congress and adamantly denied access to its antecedent technical analysis for review by the professional community is troubling, to understate the issue. The public safety issue of NEO impacts and the capability to prevent them by the use of space technology is one in which the value of public trust cannot be overemphasized. Absent NASA opening its full analysis to professional scrutiny and review, the public trust in the integrity and technical competence of NASA is in jeopardy.
The four technical errors identified below are then just a sampling of the problems associated with NASA’s handling of the Congressional mandate to address this issue. It is hoped that by openly publishing these and other shortcomings in the two NASA documents a serious review will be initiated by NASA and a revised and accurate report will be provided the public and the Congress.
The four errors Schweikart reviews are serious:
1. Failure to consider the size/frequency distribution of the NEOs which NASA would most likely be called on to divert from an Earth impact.
2. Failure to take into consideration, or even recognize, the existence and implications of multiple resonant returns and associated keyholes distributed along the deflection path (the Targeting issue).
3. The gravity tractor concept, which is independent of any specific spacecraft hardware, has erroneously been directly tied to the very expensive and technologically immature Prometheus spacecraft (or more generally, nuclear electric propulsion (NEP)).
4. The development and use of incorrect information on asteroid 144898 2004 VD17.
Schweikart and Chapman are both principles of the B612 Foundation, dedicated to practical solutions to the threat of asteroid impact. Their favored solution is based on a long and slow “dock and nudge” strategy. I like their approach — safe, precise/correctable and widely-useful technology. The B612 approach is completely dependent upon proper investment in the inventory and detection program [otherwise the action window may be too short]. As I understand it, this strategy will not handle either the extremely large, > 1km diameter, nor surprise bodies where we do not have decades to prevent the impact.
…Our preferred solution to deflecting an incoming near Earth asteroid (NEA), for reasons that are clarified below, is to rendezvous and “dock” with it at either its North or South Pole, realign the asteroid’s spin vector to a preferred direction and then push it (gently and for a long time) until we’ve changed its speed enough to miss the Earth. This scenario is very direct. It makes the key assumption, well supported by statistics and common sense that we will know of a pending impact many years ahead of time. The strange logic of NEA detection is that we will either know that an impact is pending several decades ahead of time, or that we will be hit by an asteroid we don’t know about with no warning at all! The critical importance of the detection program is that as you detect and track more and more NEAs you increase the former category and reduce the latter.
Because of the likely warning time of decades, we can utilize a deflection technique that is virtually universal, i.e., it does not depend strongly on the specific characteristics of the asteroid. A NEA-Tug will handle virtually any asteroid. The specifics of docking and attachment will vary slightly, but this is a minor challenge compared with the uncertainties and problems associated with many of the other possible deflection techniques. These alternatives will be discussed on another page.
An additional, but very important advantage of the NEA-Tug technique, it that all of the technologies and techniques needed to deflect an Earth-bound asteroid are also extremely useful for enabling both in situ scientific research and future asteroid resource exploitation. In addition, the power and propulsion technologies involved are key to future deep space missions. Given that asteroid deflection missions will be inherently few and far between, the fact that the technologies that enable it are also necessary for other key applications is of great importance.
It isn’t clear yet what the B612 team proposes for addressing the “big rock or short-time” case. The best resource for up-to-date info on impact threats is at JPL’s Near Earth Object Program. Most anything you wish to know can be found on the JPL site, e.g., what do those Palmero and Torino risk numbers mean?
…Most visitors to this web site will be primarily interested in the table presented on the Impact Risk Page. The rightmost two columns quantify the risk posed by the tabulated objects, using both the Torino Scale, which was designed primarily for public communication of impact risk, and the Palermo Technical Scale, which was designed for technical comparisons of impact risk. A Palermo Scale value less than zero and, in most cases, a Torino Scale value of zero, indicate a risk below the so-called background level (more info here), which is the average risk from the entire NEO population. To date, the risks posed by the potential impacts identified by Sentry have all been well below the background level, and hence, these events have been of academic or professional interest only, and not deserving of great public concern. Events with a Palermo Scale value greater than zero are expected to be very rare, but if one should be predicted, a Technical Review of the prediction would likely be requested from our colleagues in order to verify the calculations before the prediction is placed on the Risk Page.
A corrected proof of Roger Pielke, Jr.’s new paper
Pielke, R. Jr., Mistreatment of the economic impacts of extreme events in the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change. Global Environmental Change (2007), doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha. 2007.05.004
is available for download [PDF]. Pielke argues persuasively that future costs are overestimated by an order of magnitude. This is an important paper — recommended to all who are interested in developing the best climate change policy options.
The abstract:
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change has focused debate on the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action on climate change. This refocusing has helped to move debate away from science of the climate system and on to issues of policy. However, a careful examination of the Stern Review’s treatment of the economics of extreme events in developed countries, such as floods and tropical cyclones, shows that the report is selective in its presentation of relevant impact studies and repeats a common error in impacts studies by confusing sensitivity analyses with projections of future impacts. The Stern Review’s treatment of extreme events is misleading because it overestimates the future costs of extreme weather events in developed countries by an order of magnitude. Because the Stern Report extends these findings globally, the overestimate propagates through the report’s estimate of future global losses. When extreme events are viewed more comprehensively the resulting perspective can be used to expand the scope of choice available to decision makers seeking to grapple with future disasters in the context of climate change. In particular, a more comprehensive analysis underscores the importance of adaptation in any comprehensive portfolio of responses to climate change.
The concluding paragraphs of the introduction summarize the most serious errors:
However, in making its case for the significant future economic costs of extreme weather events in developed countries the Stern Review commits two significant errors that affect its estimates. In its Chapter 5 the Stern Review concludes, ‘‘The costs of climate change for developed countries could reach several percent of GDP as higher temperatures lead to a sharp increase in extreme weather events and large-scale changes.’’ (Stern, 2007, p. 137). This conclusion cannot be supported by the Review’s own analysis and references to literature. One error is a serious misrepresentation of the scientific literature, and the second is more subtle, but no less significant. The serious misrepresentation takes the form of inaccurately presenting the conclusions of an unpublished paper on trends in disaster losses. The second error is more complex and involves conflating an analysis of the sensitivity of society to future changes in extreme events, assuming that society does not change, with a projection of how extreme event impacts will increase in the future under the integrated conditions of climatic and societal change. The result of the errors in the Stern Review is a significant overstatement of the future costs of extreme climate events not simply in the developed world, but globally—by an order of magnitude.
In light of these errors if the Stern Review is to be viewed as a means of supporting a particular political agenda, then it undercuts its own credibility and this risks its effectiveness. If instead the Stern Review is to be viewed as a policy analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of actions on climate change, then at least in the case of extreme events it has missed an opportunity to clarify the scope of such actions and their possible consequences, and arguably misdirects attention away from those actions most likely to be effective with respect to future catastrophe losses. In either case, on the issue of extreme events and climate change, the Stern Review must be judged a failure. This short paper documents these errors and suggests how an alternative approach might have been structured.
Included in the paper is a tabulation of the 2006 “Consensus (unanimous) statements of the Hohenkammer workshop on climate change and disaster losses”. I’ll cherry-pick just two of the “Policy implications identified by the workshop participants” which reflect conclusions I’ve reached:
1. Adaptation to extreme weather events should play a central role in reducing societal vulnerabilities
7. The community needs to agree upon peer-reviewed procedures for normalizing economic loss data.
Another excellent resource on the economics of the Stern Review is the 15th February Yale conference. I converted the six streaming video segments into 18 audio podcasts.
This Dan Drezner post got buried in my to-do list. Hopefully you, dear reader, will not miss it:
Via Greg Mankiw, I read with interest Chris Giles’ Financial Times interview with Jeffrey Sachs. This part stood out in particular:
We move on to talk about a specific project Sachs is currently involved in, Millennium Villages, where his ideas on fertilisers, malarial bed-nets and the like are tried on the ground. My less-than-ecstatic reaction to his reports of their success is clearly the same as that of many aid agencies. It instantly raises his hackles. I suggest there are many examples where success in pilots does not translate into something that can be replicated on a large scale, and that you don’t necessarily need to try something to know it won’t work. ”I’m sorry,” he is almost shouting now. ”That, I disagree with completely. That’s preposterous.”
I realise I have exaggerated for effect, and counter that it is equally preposterous to insist they will work. ”I know,” he says, ”but how do you actually do something in life? Do you list all the things that may go wrong and then decide we won’t do it, or do you actually try?”
We talk about global warming. It’s easily solvable, Sachs insists, because the costs of doing something about carbon emissions are exaggerated - so people will soon realise that they can cut carbon emissions without much pain. We talk about global trade - all the US has to do is offer an aid, trade and climate change deal to the rest of the world and a solution is within reach. We talk about US healthcare - within a few years, people will see sense and the uninsured will be covered, he predicts.
…
Every once in a blue moon, politics works like Sachs decribes in the last paragraph. Most of the time, however, politics bears no relationship whatsoever to this kind of model. And the belief that this is how politics works is a problem that seems to plague really bright economists.
Sachs’ optimism on solutions to global warming is seductive — I really enjoyed his presentation and discussion at the Yale Conference reviewing the Stern Review [the podcasts I did are available for download here]. And he may turn out to be correct on the GDP costs. But I think Dan is correctly pessimistic on the political process.
Ronald Bailey examines the inconsistency of green activists: “consensus” is definitive w/r/t climate change, but irrelevant w/r/t GM crops.
Link thanks to Dan Drezner whose new book is in my queue: All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes.
An excellent prioritized future wish list from Glenn Reynolds. Glenn’s list is pretty much the same as mine [except for #5, see below]. I think the topics most deserving of policy emphasis are #4 and #2. I emphasize the nuclear power topic because the lead time is long, but with suitable moon-shot leadership, the impact on CO2 emissions will be dramatic. I.e., it is possible to change the climate in which utilities make investment decisions in order to bring about wide spread deployment within 20 years. Breakthroughs are not required - just getting on with commercial scale implementations.
1. advanced batteries for PHEVs
2. rapid health response, e.g., for avian flu or bio-terrorism
3. nanotechnology
4. next generation nuclear power.
Another reason for emphasizing #4 and #2 are that these topics are less amenable to high-leverage X-Prize type incentives.
I would propose one more top-priority topic:
5. commercial scale carbon capture and sequestration
Excerpts:
» Better batteries: Electric cars offer tremendous promise. Electric propulsion is efficient, allowing operation at an energy cost of pennies per mile. Electricity generated from America’s plentiful coal stocks can, by taking the place of gasoline, promote energy independence.
Electricity generated by nuclear or hydroelectric plants can promote both energy independence and reduced greenhouse emissions. But you can’t run an electric cable to automobiles, which means the problem is batteries.
Today’s batteries are barely up to the task. A battery that could hold as much energy as a tank of gasoline — and recharge nearly as fast as a gas tank can be filled — would be a godsend. Some new technologies, including ultracapacitors, which aren’t really batteries at all as they store electricity directly instead of holding it as chemical changes, promise that sort of capability eventually.
Sooner would be better than later. This is a place where federal research spending might make a difference.
» Rapid Health Response: Between the threat of new natural epidemic diseases such as SARS or avian flu, and the threat of biological warfare or terrorism, we need to be ready to spot the threats as soon as they appear, and to respond quickly.
Numerous technological thinkers, ranging from futurist Ray Kurzweil to former Senate Majority Leader Dr. Bill Frist, have called for a major effort to develop new disease surveillance technologies, and new technologies for the rapid development of vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other medications to allow a swift response.
We should be able to have a working vaccine within 30 days or less of encountering a new infectious agent, rather than taking years. Kurzweil and Frist both support a major effort along these lines (both, in fact, invoke the Manhattan Project as an analogy) and, while I fear that such a crash program isn’t in the cards, we need to be moving in this direction as rapidly as we can.
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