Nuclear City: it’s happening in Shanghai and Berkeley

As we try to understand what is really going on in China’s advanced reactor developments, one of the sources has been Mark Halper @markhalper. Mark covered the Thorium Energy Conference 2013 (ThEC13), held at CERN in Geneva last November China eyes thorium MSRs for industrial heat, hydrogen; revises timeline

From Mark’s reports I learned that one of the presentations was by a key figure, Xu Hongjie of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai. Hongjie is the director of what China dubs the “Thorium Molten Salt Reactor” (TMSR) project. One of his slides is shown above, presenting an overview of the TMSR priorities (left side) and the timelines. Happily the Chinese are also focused on the process heat applications of the PH-AHTR (hydrogen to methanol etc.) and the huge benefits to a water impoverished region like China. The Chinese are demonstrating systems-thinking at scale.

There are two Chinese MSR programs:

  • TMSR-SF or solid fuel, which looks to me to be very similar to Per Peterson’s PB-AHTR program at UC Berkeley
  • TMSR-LF or liquid fuel, which I gather is similar to popular LFTR concept.

Both designs are derivative of the Weinberg-driven Oak Ridge (ORNL) molten salt reactor program (that was cancelled by politicians in the 1960s). I understand the PB-AHTR to be most ready for early deployment, which will lay critical foundations for the liquid fuel TMSR-LF (LFTR) implementation a decade or so later. UC Berkeley’s Catalyst magazine has a very accessible summary of the PB-AHTR program.

Mark Halper reported from the Geneva Thorium Energy Conference. The 

I proposed a few days ago a China – OECD cooperation to fast-track deployment of nuclear instead of coal. Fortunately, the Chinese and several of the US labs and universities seem to have figured this out without my help. This is probably all detailed somewhere online, but I’ve not been able to find it so far. These are the parties to the China – US cooperation:

  • Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai
  • Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
  • University of California Berkeley
  • University of Washington

I apologize to anyone I’ve left out.

 

Three climate scientists examine recent slowdown (or ‘pause’) and online science communication

The recent slowdown (or ‘pause’) in global surface temperature rise is a hot topic for climate scientists and the wider public. We discuss how climate scientists have tried to communicate the pause and suggest that ‘many-to-many’ communication offers a key opportunity to directly engage with the public.

I recommend “Pause for thought” in Nature Climate Change. This very short essay by Ed Hawkins, Tamsin Edwards and Doug McNeall is ungated, after free registration. You can get a preview of the technical overview by studying the two following charts carefully. You’ll need to pay attention to the chart key underneath – there is a lot of information compressed into the two panels.

 

Observed global mean surface air temperatures (HadCRUT433, solid black line) and recent 1998–2012 trend (dashed black line), compared with ten simulations of the CSIRO Mk3.6 global climate model, which all use the RCP6.0 forcing pathway (grey lines). The grey shading represents the 16–84% ensemble spread (quantiles smoothed with a 7-year running mean for clarity); the ensemble mean trend is around 0.20 °C per decade. Two different realizations are highlighted (blue), and linear trends for specific interesting periods are shown (red, green, purple lines). a, The highlighted realization shows a strong warming in the 1998–2012 period, but a 15-year period of no warming around the 2030s. b, The highlighted realization is more similar to the observations for 1998–2012, but undergoes a more rapid warming around the 2020s. Note also that this realization appears outside the ensemble spread for 9 out of 10 consecutive years from 2003–2012.

The charts and discussion illustrate a central truth of climate science – the results are often only understood in a framework of statistics. The pretty, clean projected temperature curves that we see in the media are heavily smoothed over many runs of multiple models. That presentation conceals the natural variability that is part of the challenge of understanding, then testing hypotheses against observations. It is similar to the agonizing process at the Large Hadron Collidor (LHC) as the teams tried to develop enough data to tease out a sufficiently confident identification of an anomaly corresponding to the Higgs.

If you have a specific question about the authors’ presentation, you can ask the scientists directly on twitter. It is uncommon for authors to reveal their twitter handles in a paper, so please don’t make them regret the open door!

I recommend two other articles in this Nature Climate Change series:

1. Heat hide and seek [PDF] Natural variability can explain fluctuations in surface temperatures but can it account for the current slowdown in warming? The authors offer an excellent summary of the more promising current research, including particularly the variability in heat distribution such as

  • El Niño/Southern Oscillation
  • Pacific Decadal Oscillation
  • Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation

2. Media discourse on the climate slowdown where I learned among other things that the biggest recent media spike seems to be in Oceania – where we are presently (cruising). Australia has been suffering from a severe drought – that no doubt generates increased interest in climate.

Nuclear City: updates

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Update: Will F @NeedsMorePower in Melbourne (Will’s blog) sent me the announcement Construction of Chinese ‘Nuclear City’ to start at Haiyan in Zhejiang province. And Martin Burkle sent the same press release with the comment 

Since we spent twice the money to build the same thing as China spends, we need about 350 million to get the city started. That seems unlikely.

Indeed – China can make progress faster in the “politically sensitive zones” that aren’t favored by the establishment. So where is China on the road to fast deployment of zero-carbon nuclear energy? So far I’ve not been successful to find out what progress has been completed with the “China Nuclear Power City” since the initial press release (I am finding mostly 404 bad links). Here’s an excerpt from the original press release that Will and Martin sent me:

Plans are advancing for the construction of the first industrial park in China to help with the rapid development of the country’s nuclear power industry, with detailed engineering and construction preparation work at the site in Haiyan, Zhejiang province, expected to start soon.

The coastal city of Haiyan, on the Yangtze Delta, has been selected to house the ‘Nuclear City’. It is some 118 kilometres (70 miles) southwest of Shanghai and close to the cities of Hangzhou, Suzhou and Ningbo. It also lies midway along China’s coast, where several nuclear power plants have been constructed or are planned.

…CNNC and the Zhejiang government plan to accelerate the construction of the nuclear components centre and training centre in Haiyan. The central area of the industrial park and the exhibition centre was to be launched first in July 2010. Enterprises in the industrial park will enjoy priority for bidding quota, bidding training, qualification guidance and specific purchasing with CNNC.

China will reportedly spend some $175 billion over the next ten years on developing the 130 square-kilometre Haiyan Nuclear City.

The Haiyan nuclear industrial park is entitled to all the preferential benefits granted to national economic and technological zones and national hi-tech industrial zones.

The Nuclear City is expected to have four main areas of work: development of the nuclear power equipment manufacturing industry; nuclear training and education; applied nuclear science industries (medical, agricultural, radiation detection and tracing); and promotion of the nuclear industry.

On its website, the Haiyan Nuclear City said that it will be based on the Burgundy region of France, which successfully became an industrial centre for the French nuclear industry. Several small and medium sized French nuclear-related companies moved to Burgundy to actively participate in the global market.

Whatever has happened since the announcement, I take this as a positive indication that the Chinese leadership is thinking seriously about how to accelerate the deployment of low-carbon nuclear. 

Working out what is really happening in China is challenging. For example, reading the WNA China Nuclear Fuel Cycle, I find the identical quote (as above) on “China Nuclear Power City” in Haiyan. Then at the bottom of the section on Industrial Parks I find this:

In May 2013 CGN and CNNC announced that their new China Nuclear Fuel Element Co (CN- FEC) joint venture would build a CNY 45 billion ($7.33 billion) complex in Daying Industrial Park at Zishan town in Heshan and Jiangmen city, Guangdong province. It was to be established during the 12th Five-Year Plan and be fully operational by 2020. However, in July 2013 the plan was abruptly cancelled. The 200 ha park was to involve 1000 tU/yr fuel fabrication as well as a conversion plant (14,000 t/yr) and an enrichment plant, close to CGN’s Taishan power plant.

Dear readers – I would appreciate links to current information. Comments?

Nuclear City: how to help China choose to build new nuclear instead of coal power

Carbon emissions increase 3% per year

Fig. 4. (a) Energy intensity, defined as energy consumption (Gt of oil equivalent) divided by real gross domestic product (trillions of 2005 U.S. $), and (b) carbon intensity, defined as fossil fuel carbon emissions (GtC) divided by energy consumption (Gt of oil equivalent). Energy intensity of China is normalized to 1.56 that of the United States in 2005. — James Hansen 2014

How are we doing on transitioning off fossil fuels? Renewables activists would have us think we are making more progress every year. In truth, we are making less, not more, progress towards zero-carbon emissions. The global production from non-hydro renewables is about equal to one years growth in energy consumption. At the end I’ll offer further evidence on just how serious our situation is.

As a thought experiment, imagine that less developed regions (LDRs) such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia were building 100% new nuclear plants instead of coal plants. In this imaginary future, we would be close to stabilizing the GHG concentration of our atmosphere. I say “close to”, because if the LDRs are willing to choose nuclear over coal, there is no-problem-whatever with USA, UK, EU accomplishing the same.

Can you imagine China and other fast-growing LDRs giving up coal? I absolutely can imagine it.

Rich country politicians and media spend most of their time talking about what rich countries should do. Not about what China will decide to do based on self-interest. For now, let’s stop talking about rich countries. Instead, let’s talk about what we can do that makes China decide to grow their energy supply using only low-carbon options.

To keep it simple, let’s just talk about China – as a proxy for all the less developed nations (LDRs). China has already demonstrated that:

  • The leadership wants to decarbonize their economy.
  • They will not sacrifice significant economic growth to build zero-carbon power.
  • China will do whatever it takes to avoid a shortfall of energy supply relative to demand.

If we could deliver to Beijing the whole technology package for low-cost, fast-build nuclear the leaders would be very interested. I do not think that political motivation to decarbonize is the main problem in China.

Alternatively, we can keep doing what we are doing. In the absence of any serious political leadership, dedicated scientists and engineers in the national labs, universities and a few startups are working hard to innovate. They are developing new nuclear designs that are walk-away safe, fast to mass-manufacture, mass/volume efficient and fast to deploy. None have enough funding to innovate at any reasonable speed.

Worse is that to actually bring their new design to the market is effectively impossible – both in cost and elapsed time. The innovators must pay the entire cost of teaching the NRC staff about their new technology, then pay to the NRC the entire cost of certification, then pay the cost of building first of a kind commercial scale plant, while creating a complex supply chain that suits the new technology. And so forth. Such institutional barriers also mean that nuclear innovation does not suit venture capital funding, where most funds would expire long before the product began to earn a return.

To make this innovation remotely feasible requires a complete reform of the regulatory framework, and a top level commitment by the national leadership to actually decarbonize. What do you think is the chance that this is going to happen in America? At least before such time as Norwegian beachfront becomes a hot vacation property market.

OK, so it isn’t going to happen in America. Not in Germany. Not even in France. Keep in mind that among the western nations there are powerful, entrenched political and economic interests who are quite happy with the status quo. And extremely unhappy with the prospect that the old hydrocarbon economy would be uncompetitive against carbon free nuclear energy.

These institutional impediments are similar to that faced by low-performance political systems. You can easily name many such nations just in South America and Africa. China had a similar problem coming out from under the curse of Mao. Deng Xiaoping knew he had to liberate the Chinese economy, including attracting foreign direct investment from the “running dog capitalists.” If Deng had tried to reform the entire Chinese nation at once, well he would have had his legs cut off in a heartbeat. The Army and the wealthy who controlled the SOEs would make sure that the status quo was not destabilized.

Deng wondered whether the Hong Kong model could be replicated in new locations that would not threaten the entrenched interests? Maybe in a place like Shenzhen (one of the first four Special Economic Zones). If that worked, then politically it would be much easier to progressively extend the new successful rules to the rest of China. That is roughly the path that Deng Xiaoping set for China.

Oversimplifying, Deng’s SEZ initiative is similar to the concept that prof. Paul Romer has been evolving around the term “Charter Cities“. These are new development zones “chartered” with proven-successful rules. These charters allow families to opt-in to live and work there; allow investors to opt-in to build infrastructure and factories. Therefore creating a competition of cities: competing for residents, investors and markets.

Why can’t we adapt the Charter City concept to create a Nuclear City SEZ? A place where:

  • Taxes and rule-of-law are attractive to investors.
  • Efficient, suitable regulations can be developed.
  • Ample sites are available for constructing new reactors, from demonstration to commercial scale.
  • The new nuclear supply chain can be grown.
  • Factories and skilled labor can be developed to produce as many designs as can compete.

Where would be the ideal place to locate your Nuclear City? China is the obvious place because they have:

  • An almost insatiable need for enormous amounts of carbon-free energy.
  • The political commitment to economic decarbonization.
  • Ample low-cost capital to invest in new plants whose costs are front-loaded.

To progress from imagining to reality we need two things:

  1. Nuclear life-cycle cost to be comparable to coal.
  2. Nuclear deployment rate at least as fast as coal.

How can we accomplish this? Particularly in a climate where America is having to shut down paid-for, nearly zero-carbon nuclear plants? Where Germany is closing ALL of their paid-for, nearly zero-carbon nuclear plants? And Japan? The MDRs (more developed regions) are setting a shockingly awful decarbonization example for the LDRs.

I believe that nuclear fission can be built out at the cost, scale, and rate required to substitute nuclear for coal. This is a decision for China, not a decision for Western politicians. That means developing and deploying low-carbon energy that is dispatchable, scalable, and “cheaper than coal” in terms of System LCOE (including intermittency costs, not just LCOE).

Serious people talk about the expense of new nuclear. In fact the challenge is even bigger than achieving cost parity – a necessary but not sufficient condition. Aside from low cost, we need to make rapid progress on many human fronts. We can thoroughly simulate new reactors on our super-computers, yet this kind of fast-paced effort depends on real people:

  • Growing the nuclear people skills.
  • Growing the safety culture.
  • Growing a sensible regulatory capability.
  • Creating a new high volume supply chain.

Now, imagine that China has committed to creating such a Nuclear City. How can the old nuclear powers marshal their resources to dramatically accelerate the day when nuclear deployment is so attractive to China that they substitute nuclear for coal. Here’s a sketch:

  • The nuclear-technology nations (US, UK, France, et al) offer a nuclear cooperation and technology sharing agreement with China. The idea is to put your best ideas, your best people and your capital into this project — for the long term (decades).
  • Reform the legal framework that prohibits exporting peaceful nuclear power technology.
  • Lose the popular political idea that “We are competing with China”. Substitute the idea that “We are working together to save the planet while we get rich together”.
  • Lose the idea that dirty energy must be expensive. Substitute the idea that clean energy must be cheaper.
  • Invest national R&D funding into the Nuclear City cooperation.

So, why would the various players be motivated to cooperate? Let’s summarize some perspectives:

Update — James Hansen proposes nuclear cooperation  2/24/14 I’m reading Jim’s latest letter this morning Renewable Energy, Nuclear Power and Galileo: Do Scientists Have a Duty to Expose Popular Misconceptions? I just came to the part of his letter where he addresses the topic of this post. Here’s a fragment:

Second, the United States and China should agree to cooperate in rapid deployment to scale in China of advanced, safe nuclear power for peaceful purposes, specifically to provide clean electricity replacing aging and planned coal-fired power plants, as well as averting the need for extensive planned coal gasification in China, the most carbon-intensive source of electricity. China has an urgent need to reduce air pollution and recognizes that renewable energies cannot rapidly provide needed base-load electricity at large scale. The sheer size of China’s electricity needs demands massive mobilization to construct modern, safe nuclear power plants, educate more nuclear scientists and engineers, and train operators of the power plants.

The United States nuclear industry and universities have much to offer, and in turn they have much to gain by cooperating in development of modern safe nuclear power in China. Opposition to nuclear power in the U.S. has slowed but not stopped progress in nuclear technology. However, the realistic size of the market in the U.S. for improved nuclear designs, as well as for evolving still more advanced designs, is limited, at least in the near-term. Furthermore, for reasons that do not need to be debated here, construction time for a nuclear power plant in the U.S. is of the order of a decade, while it is as short as 3-4 years in China. Thus deep nuclear cooperation between the China and the U.S. over the next 1-2 decades could produce both (1) base-load electricity in China that allows China’s carbon emissions to peak within a decade and then decline, as is essential if climate is to be stabilized, (2) an opportunity for both countries to achieve progress in nuclear technology and thus a basis for comparing the merits of the most advanced renewable and nuclear technologies.

Jim has a lot more to say, a whole page on this general topic — I highly recommend that you read his new letter.

What is in it for “China”?

  • Manufacturing, deployment and operations capabilities will be developed locally (as with AP1000 deal).
  • Chinese human resources can be developed faster when working alongside western scientists, and when taught by the western experts (many of whom are retiring, their deep knowledge soon to be lost to society).
  • Chinese leaders do have to live in their high-pollution cities, a daily reminder of the priority to transition away from coal.
  • Fundamentally this is a very large scale engineering and project-management undertaking — China’s politicians are comfortable with that kind of approach.

What is in it for the existing IP stakeholders?

  • Long term profits. Instead of going out of the nuclear business (like Siemens), they have a chance to be part of the biggest revolution since the beginning of the industrial age.
  • A chance to be shareholders in the new energy infrastructure – to be part-owners in the new utilities and infrastructure.
  • The IP to be contributed is now owned by governments and shareholder companies. A necessary condition is that the existing IP owners must be satisfied that this cooperation will allow them to protect their share of the return on existing IP, as well as the return on the future IP. That’s a negotiation – Silicon Valley law firms can help with options.
  • In this planet-scale effort, it is better to be cooperating than competing.
  • Scientists at the national labs, at experienced suppliers like B&W, these people know that China et al can contribute many very capable engineers and scientists. The scale of the Chinese contribution is being demonstrated already by such as the well-funded MSR development program at the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics (CAS/SINAP). In 2012 the project had a $350 million budget and a staff off 334 that was supposed to grow to 750 by 2015.

What is in it for the investors?

  • The scale of this planet-wide market opportunity is easily big enough to attract private investors if the political risk is covered.
  • Building the first large scale deployments in China, by itself, eliminates much of the political risk.
  • The nation-partners will have to put up enough risk insurance to lubricate a public-private partnership. I think that means largely insurance against political risk. Against the risks of the familiar Greenpeace lawyering and demonstrating, but also the Rule of Law risk in the non-western jurisdictions. It’s an interesting question: how far will Greenpeace get demonstrating in front of new Chinese nuclear plants?
  • China has demonstrated the political capability to generate MUCH larger amounts of capital than needed to get this going. So DFI (Direct Foreign Investment) may be a case of the outsiders knocking on the door, asking to be let in.

What is in it for Western politicians?

  • I don’t know, because there isn’t much reward here within their motivational framework of about two years. Suggestions?

This challenge is not really technical — it is almost entirely political. The Western institutional structure makes it effectively impossible to achieve rapid progress. France could not rapidly convert from zero to 80% zero-carbon nuclear today. Politically France-could-not-do-it-today. It’s difficult to put into words how large this challenge is. Two charts help me to visualize what is happening on the ground, first Robert Wilson’s recent essay Renewables Growth: Ignoring The Whole Equation shows how insignificant are the 2011 contributions from all hydrocarbon sources + nuclear. In other woods, renewables are detectable but insignificant . Jeff Terry summarized Robert’s essay as “…fossil fuels dominate for decades”.

2011 Everything Else swamps Renewables

Second, this chart is completely self explanatory. Nevertheless I highly recommend that you read the source: Roger Pielke Jr.’s Clean Energy Stagnation.

Breakthrough Institute’s Energy and Climate Program

One of the few bits of good news on decarbonization has been the progress that The Breakthrough Institute has made in attracting the best people. By “best” I mean serious people – who are focused upon identifying energy policy options that have a reasonable chance to be effective. You can see what I mean if you allocate just 6 minutes to watch Director Jesse Jenkins discuss the BTI Energy and Climate Program. This is all about achieving decarbonization results.

For more recent posts on BTI’s pragmatic decarbonization approach see Clean energy stagnation by BTI Senior Fellow Roger Pielke Jr.

Two carbon-reduction paths diverge in the European policy wood: United Kingdom takes less traveled, more interesting one

Steve Alpin has several excellent posts up on carbon reduction policies that work (as opposed to Kyoto-style emission reduction goals). In this series Steve references the quadrant-style matrix of carbon intensity vs. energy price. Of course what we strive for is Low-Intensity & Low-Price (Quadrant IV). The “feel good” German/Denmark policies have put those nations in Quadrant II (High-Intensity & High-Price). Steve’s graphic illustrates this nicely: 

An excerpt:

Germany’s much-touted and -admired route to carbon dioxide (CO2) reductions has, predictably, proved to be an embarrassing and expensive failure. The bubble chart represents electricity data from 2010. As you can see, German electricity was, kilowatt-hour for kilowatt-hour, the second-dirtiest of the 10 jurisdictions shown on the chart. Only British electricity contained more carbon (two grams more per kWh). The data on which the chart was based is shown in a table at the bottom of this article.

(…snip…) Given the enormous difference in France’s position on the Carbon-Price Matrix (deep inside Quadrant IV, where everybody wants to be) versus that of Germany (deep inside Quadrant II, where nobody wants to be), it is clear that the French walk the walk on carbon. Germany only talks the talk.

(…snip…) And it is going to get worse. German politicians, who have lectured the world for decades on the urgent necessity of cutting CO2 emissions, are now in full expectation-management mode: telling their citizens not to demonize coal.

(…snip…) 

To repeat, Germany is expanding its use of CO2-emitting coal-fired electricity generation because it needs to replace the output of the nuclear generating plants it is shutting down. Sadly, the wind turbines for which Germany is famous simply cannot do that job. They cannot do it today, have never been able to, and never will be able to.

That is why Germany is in Quadrant II of the Carbon-Price Matrix.

Meanwhile, across the English Channel, the British are gearing up to build a fleet of new nuclear plants. This is because the UK does not just profess to be concerned about climate change and anthropogenic CO2 emissions. It is because the UK clearly is concerned about cutting CO2.

Read the whole thing.

George Shultz: Achieving a Better Future

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Today I listened to George Shultz's July 23rd conversation at the Commonwealth Club (audio). This was my second review of this talk and Q&A. Soon I will listen to the podcast a third time, but after I have finished reading his 2013 book on these topics: Issues on My Mind: Strategies for the Future.

True wisdom is a rare commodity, and usually expensive to acquire (because it often accrues from mistakes). If you can learn from the wisdom of other, then I recommend as much time as you can allocate to Shultz.

George has a view on most of the issues that I worry about. On the issues that I have studied I usually find that he “gets it”. If I don't know much about the issue I find his approach to be logical, consistent and direct.

Directness has been a Shultz trademark as long as I've been exposed to him. His mind cuts the shortest path to the essentials, and then just as directly to a solution can be realized politically. For an efficient review of what Shultz has accomplished please see his Hoover Institution page.

 

James Hansen et al “the accepted 2 degrees target is dangerously too warm”

“Although there is merit in simply chronicling what is happening, there is still opportunity for humanity to exercise free will.

I have finally found the time to read the entire Hansen et al paper Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”. The complete paper was released December 3rd on the open access journal PlosOne as Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature.

I think this is one of the most important climate papers of 2013. James Hansen and 17 coauthors succeed to boil down the current state of climate research to 26 pages (including the five pages of references). The authors make a strong case that the two-degree-consensus is dangerous.  Unlike other high profile climate scientists, actions are proposed that will actually work, included the “N word” advanced 4th generation nuclear power.

To announce the paper Hansen and coauthor Pushker Kharecha published a letter outlining the case that two degrees is dangerous, then go straight into solutions: cooperative technology development and deployment, and especially, rapid deployment of gen 3+ and gen 4 nuclear power. 

(…snip…) Governments should also support technology research, development and demonstration of carbon-free energy including advanced generation nuclear power as well as renewable energy, especially in view of the urgency with which emissions from coal and unconventional fossil fuels must be eliminated. (Unconventional fossil fuels include tar sands, shale-derived oil and gas, and methane hydrates.)

(…snip…)

A preferable approach, for the sake of both global climate and local pollution reduction, would be a combination of renewable energy and advanced (3rd and 4th) generation nuclear power plants2. Abundant affordable clean energy is essential to provide the energy needed to raise billions of people out of poverty, which empirical evidence indicates is a requirement for reducing fertility rates, thus lowering human population, and giving hope that we can provide the opportunity of a good life to all humanity while allowing other life on the planet to flourish.

When the world’s leading nations recognize the urgency of phasing out fossil fuel emissions, and realize that we are all in the same boat, it should be possible to agree on cooperative technology development and deployment. History, including World War II and the Apollo program, reveal how rapidly technology can be developed and deployed. Phase-out of most coal emissions and a substantial reduction of oil and gas use could be achieved rapidly. This would require agreement among leading nations not only to have common internal rising carbon fees, but also an agreement to cooperate in rapid technology development.

Surely rapid phase-down of coal emissions requires a major role for advanced-generation safer nuclear power. Nuclear technology has advanced significantly over the past few decades such that there is now the potential to produce modular 3rd generation light-water reactors that are passively safe, i.e., reactors that would shut down automatically in case of an anomaly such as an earthquake and have the ability to keep the nuclear fuel cool without an external power source. The same concept, modular3 simplified reactor design with factory production and shipping to the utility site, is appropriate for 4th generation reactors, and these should also be pursued to deal with nuclear waste, utilizing the waste as fuel.

Fortunately, the place where deployment of advanced nuclear technology is most urgently needed, China, is also the place that has the potential to rapidly build and grow the manufacturing capability. What is needed is cooperation with nations that have developed relevant technical abilities, especially the United States. Such cooperation has potential for enormous mutual and global benefits via development of scalable affordable carbon-free energy. Contrary to assertions of dedicated anti-nuke activists, such technology can be made more resistant than existing technology to exploitation by terrorists who may seek weapons material. Dangers from rogue states or terrorists will always exist, and the best way to minimize such danger is to cooperate in developing the safest technology, not to pretend that anti-nuclear activism will cause nuclear technology to disappear from the planet.

The principal policy allowing renewable energies to grow to almost 2% of global energy use has been laws imposing specified “renewable energy portfolio standards” (RPS) on utilities or other mandates for renewable energy use. These policies have aided growth of renewables, and by spreading costs among all utility customers of feed-in tariffs, added transmission lines, and the backup power needed for intermittent renewables (usually fossil fuel based), the electricity cost has been bearable as long as the portion of renewables is small. Now for the sake of moving rapidly to carbon-free power while minimizing electricity costs, the need is for “clean energy portfolio standards” (CPS), thus allowing nuclear energy to compete with renewable energies.

The previously discussed 3 November open letter ‘To Those Influencing Environmental Policy But Opposed to Nuclear Power’ has provoked much needed debate. Let us hope that this new paper and the PlOS ONE call for solutions papers builds on that interest to get something done.

there is still opportunity for humanity to exercise free will.

and free will means “be effective” not more failed “Kyoto commitments”.

Jeffrey Sachs: On climate, more ‘now’ and ‘how’ is needed

John Rennie interviews Jeff Sachs for The Gleaming Retort:

Sachs … is also a coauthor, with climatologist James Hansen and a multidisciplinary team of other specialists, of a recent report in the journal PLOS ONE that made a plea for 1 degree Celsius, not 2 degrees, as the appropriate ceiling for permissible warming in the future.

To get his impressions of the report’s content and of its policy implications, I spoke with Sachs a few days before the paper’s publication. What follows is a summary of that conversation.

2 °C is too much

Asked to describe the PLOS ONE report, Sachs calls it “one of the best, concise, up-to-date summaries” of current scientific understanding about the state of the warming problem, drawing on paleoclimate data, climate models, and empirical tracking of global temperatures. (He is also quick to credit it primarily to Hansen, who led the work.)

All those indications, Sachs says, lead to the same conclusions: that the impacts of climate change are already being felt, that they will multiply tremendously in the future, and that feedbacks in the climate system could greatly amplify both the future warming and the consequences associated with it.

No matter whether one favors the limit for future warming to be 1 °C or 2, Sachs says, “we’re off course for either,” with current mainstream projections suggesting that future warming could be headed toward 3-4 °C. But the PLOS ONE paper argues that even the 2 °C target accepted in past global discussions is potentially far more dangerous than was realized. “That two degree figure, which is taken as optimistic by most mainstream observers, is itself wildly complacent,” Sachs says.