Archive for the 'Economics' Category

Taylor on Lehman and TARP

The Kindle edition of John Taylor’s book has been reduced to only USD 2.40 in honor of the third anniversary of the crash of 2008. John Cochrane supports Taylor’s diagnosis of the causes of the 2008 crash – a run on questionable investment banks:

John Taylor took the trouble to respond to Paul Krugman’s latest outrage on the sources of the financial crisis. Taylor’s post — along with the deeper analysis he points to — is well worth reading.

Krugman’s calumnies are so nonsensical I generally do not find it worth responding.

The idea that I now like stimulus is simply preposterous if you bother to read what I write about it. The idea that I or John Taylor don’t think there was a run is even more preposterous. And to top it off, Krugman writes “Anyone else have the impression that something happened in the second half of September 2008?” I mean really, accusing Taylor and myself of thinking that nothing happened in September 2008? Are Krugman’s readers such simpletons that they fall for such unvarnished falsehoods?

Taylor did us a service by taking the time to straighten this one out.

Yes there was a run.


(…)

The insight that it was a run is central to my view of how to fix things. If it was a run, echoing, as Krugman says, Friedman and Schwartz’s view of the Great Depression, then some of Friedman and Schwartz’s conclusions are surely warranted! No, this was not some mysterious failure of capitalism and we need to have the Fed run everything under Dodd-Frank. No, this does not require that we save every big institution and protect them from competition and failure forever. This was one run very like the many runs and panics we’ve seen throughout history.

Our run was in the shadow-banking system. I recommend Darrel Duffie’s “Failure mechanics of dealer banks,” the article and the book Once you read these, you naturally see simple ways in which we can fix bankruptcy law and run-prone assets in place of Dodd-Frank. How, exactly? That’s a subject for another post — actually a long series — coming up.

Yes it was a run. And that fact leads directly to some very un-Krugmanlike conclusions.

(If you want to read what I actually have written so far about this issue it’s all here. I’m teaching a class this week on financial crisis — we’re going to spend a lot of time on Duffie and Gary Gorton’s analysis of the run in repo markets.)

A message for all our readers in the United Kingdom

Tyler Cowen echoing Scott Sumner — so I will echo Scott one more time as I think this message is extremely important. Both US and UK have completely lost the plot on how to accelerate out of a recession – it is monetary policy that has power, fiscal policy is a weak tool, and to work must have easy monetary policy anyway.

From Scott Sumner, but endorsed by me in full:

Take the current situation in the UK. If I’m not mistaken, the British political system is different from that in America. British governments are basically elected dictatorships, with no checks and balances. Even though the Bank of England is independent, the government can give it whatever mandate it likes. If I’m right then both fiscal and monetary policy are technically under the control of the Cameron government.

So I read the UK austerity critics as saying:

“Because you guys are too stupid to raise your inflation target to 3%, or to switch over to NGDP targeting, fiscal austerity will fail. We believe the solution is not to be less stupid about monetary policy, but rather to run up every larger public debts.”

Is that right? Is that what critics are doing?

Some will argue that my views are naive, that Cameron would be savagely attacked for a desperate attempt to print money as a way of overcoming the failures of his coalition government. Yes, but by whom? Would this criticism come from Ed Balls? Perhaps, but in that case he would essentially be saying:

“It’s outrageous that the Cameron government is trying to use monetary stimulus to raise inflation from 2% to 3%, whereas they should be using fiscal stimulus to raise inflation from 2% to 3%.”

I’m sorry to have to repeat this over and over again, but what 99% of pundits on both sides of the Atlantic are treating as a debate about “stimulus” and “austerity” is actually a debate about stupidity. I’m not saying the pundits are stupid (Krugman certainly understands what I’m saying) but rather they are addressing their audience as if the audience was stupid.

Don’t talk down to Cameron and Osborne! Don’t say “austerity will fail.” Say “austerity will work, but only if the BOE becomes much more aggressive, otherwise it will fail.” That sort of advice would be USEFUL. Instead we are getting a bunch of pundits getting ego boosts because they can say “I told you so.”

Scream it from the rooftops!

Simple truths about Greece

Via Tyler Cowen from Ricardo Hausmann:

Greece will have to bring its current account deficit down to zero at some point.

This can happen in two ways: either Greece exports more or spends less. Adjusting the current account by spending less would require an additional fall in GDP of 25 per cent, given that in Greece only one in four US dollars of spending cuts goes abroad. This is clearly not a pretty picture. But adjusting by raising exports would require they increase by 50 per cent, not an easy feat. Achieving it through tourism alone would require the industry to triple in size – an unlikely prospect.

And this:

Here’s the bad news for Greece: in our sample of 128 countries, it had the biggest gap between its current recorded level of income and the knowledge content of its exports. Greece owes its income to borrowed foreign spending it cannot pay back. It produces no machines, no electronics and no chemicals. Of every 10 US dollars of worldwide trade in information technology, it accounts for one cent.

This problem cannot be addressed by fiscal Keynesian stimulus, by bland trade facilitation or by paying lip-service to structural adjustment as the November International Monetary Fund agreement implicitly assumes.

Assessing Income Inequality, Mobility and Opportunity

Brookings Fellow Scott Winship testified February 9th before the Senate Budget Committee. This is a spot-on summary of what we know about income inequality and income mobility. It is not at all what you are probably seeing/hearing in the media. This is a public domain transcript, so I have quoted in full here:

The facts of income inequality and mobility are nonpartisan. They are incomplete and subject to revision. But in order to guide policy, facts must be as accurately understood and conveyed as possible. Doing so is often difficult not only because the world is complicated, but because new evidence routinely appears to muddy the picture we previously managed to discern.

The facts also leave room for interpretation as to how problematic they are, but often times neutral facts are asserted as problems. Other facts are wrongly thought to be problematic only if they exhibit deterioration. But for something to be a problem, it does not have to be getting worse. On the other hand, just because something claimed to be a problem is growing more common over time does not demonstrate that it is really a problem. With these considerations in mind, let me briefly summarize the facts around income mobility and inequality in the United Sates.

Broadly speaking, there are three ways to think about intergenerational income mobility.[1] We can ask whether members of one generation end up ranked similarly to the way their parents’ income ranked them. If parents are in the bottom fifth of households, ranked by income, how likely is it that their children will also be in the bottom fifth when they are the same age? Note that the “bottom fifth” might be a better-off group in the future than it is today. Another way to assess mobility is to see whether children tend to end up better off than their parents in absolute terms-whether they have higher incomes than their parents (after taking into account increases in the cost of living), regardless of where they or their parents ranked against their peers. Households can experience upward mobility in this sense even if their rank is no higher than that of their parents. Finally, we can consider the extent of mobility by asking how far apart children end up given how far apart their parents were. If one parent has twice the income of another, by what factor will their children’s incomes differ? This last way to approach the question of mobility combines concerns about rank and absolute income gains.

The extent of mobility-in any of these senses-may be assessed in three different ways. First, we can ask whether things have gotten worse. The Administration and others on the political left have argued that income mobility has diminished over time.[2] However, the evidence points to very small changes since the mid-twentieth century-small enough that we do not have the technical requisites to detect them confidently or consistently.[3] My own estimates suggest that upward mobility from poverty to the middle class among today’s late twentysomethings is about what it was for the previous generation. Roughly 50 to 55 percent of those who started out poor reached the middle class by age twenty-seven.[4] The exception to this pattern of minimal change in mobility is that upward mobility in the absolute sense of being better off than one’s parents has risen. For instance, I estimate that 47 percent of late twentysomethings today have already outpaced the incomes their parents had when the kids were 15 years old. In the previous generation, just 41 percent did. In short, if the benchmark against which we judge our mobility is past levels, we do not appear to have much of a problem.

A second way to assess our current mobility levels is to compare ourselves with other nations. In the sense of how much parental income gaps translate into future child gaps, the U.S. tends to have less mobility than most European countries and other English-speaking nations. A comparison to Canada is illustrative. Consider a man who earns twice what his neighbor earns. In Canada, that man’s son can be expected to earn 25 percent more than the neighbor’s son. In the U.S., the figure is 60 percent.[5]

However, evidence on earnings mobility in the sense of where parents and children rank suggests that our uniqueness lies in how ineffective we are at lifting up men who were poor as children. In other words, we have no more downward mobility from the middle than other nations, no less upward mobility from the middle, and no less downward mobility from the top. Nor do we have less upward mobility from the bottom among women. Only in terms of low upward mobility from the bottom among men does the U.S. stand out.[6] This distinctive pattern presents complications for accounts that explain American immobility by pointing to our policies or our economic system. Further muddying the picture is the complete lack of evidence on cross-national differences in the extent to which children outpace parents in absolute terms.

As a third way of assessing the extent of mobility in America, we can use the criterion of former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who said of a very different sort of problem, “I know it when I see it.” That is, apart from the question of whether things are getting worse or how we compare to other countries, we may just believe that there is not enough mobility. That is a difficult case to make if the question is one of sufficient absolute mobility; eighty percent of forty-year-olds before the recession were better off than their parents were at the same age.[7]

However, the picture, I would argue, changes if we consider the sufficiency of upward mobility in terms of where one ranks. Research conducted by my Brookings colleagues, Julia Isaacs, Isabel Sawhill, and Ron Haskins for my former colleagues at the Pew Economic Mobility Project shows that a child starting out in the bottom fifth of incomes has only a one-in-three chance of being solidly middle class (escaping the bottom two-fifths) as an adult.[8] She has only a 17 percent chance of ending up in the upper middle class (the top two fifths). To be sure, even failure to reach the “middle” so defined may still translate into higher living standards than the middle enjoyed in the past if there is sufficient absolute mobility. But poor children face long odds and limited opportunity if they want to be able to “grow up to be whatever they want,” to use an expressed aspiration many of us, I suspect, heard from our parents.

What about income inequality? Many on the political left, including the president’s Council of Economic Advisors chair, have argued that rising inequality has hurt the middle class and poor.[9] The evidence of such an impact is exceedingly thin.[10] In part, that is because only one kind of inequality has risen markedly. Within “the 99 percent”, inequality has grown only modestly, if at all. According to research by Richard Burkhauser and his colleagues, after taking into account the value of employer-sponsored and federally provided health insurance, the person at the 90th percentile (richer than 90 percent of Americans) has about six times the household income of the person at the 10th percentile (poorer than 90 percent of Americans).[11] In concrete terms, it is roughly the difference between having $80,000 and having $12,000 to $15,000. The six-to-one ratio held in the early 1990s, and it was probably not much lower in the mid-1980s. It is almost certainly the case that in the late 1960s the ratio was no lower than four, and it was probably closer to five.[12] Furthermore, these figures do not attempt to make adjustments for the research finding that the cost of living has risen less for the poor and middle class than for upper-income households, which would make the increase in “90/10″ inequality even smaller.[13]

Unlike inequality within the 99 percent, inequality between the 99 percent and the top 1 percent has risen a lot (though not just in the United States).[14] The top 1 percent received 24 percent of all income in 2007 compared with 10 percent in 1980. But there is very little evidence to suggest that the gains at the top have come at the expense of other Americans. Income concentration at the top fell quite a bit between 2007 and 2009, dropping down to 18 percent of all income received, but that hardly translated into gains for everyone else.[15] Why should increases in income concentration necessarily translate into losses for everyone else? The size of the economic pie can grow in such a way that everyone gets a bigger slice despite the top getting a bigger share of the pie.

Consider that Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, stands to make five billion dollars cashing out stock options this year.[16] How would the typical American end up better off if the Facebook IPO were to fall through so that Zuckerberg could not exercise his options? Or if the IPO does go through, will the typical worker be better off in 2013, because Zuckerberg will not realize the windfall he did in 2012?

American inequality levels are viscerally bracing, but one still has to make the case that they are undesirable. Consider two men, one of whom makes over 200 times the other. Should we be concerned about the poorer man? What if I told you that the two men in this example are Zuckerberg and poor Mitt Romney (who made just $22 million in 2010)?[17] Romney made over 400 times the typical American household in 2010.[18] Should we be concerned about that household?

What really matters is how the poor and middle class are doing and how much opportunity they have. Income growth has slowed, but research by Burkhauser and his colleagues and by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan has shown that median household income still rose by as much as 35 or even 55 percent over the last 30 years.[19] There were even small gains during the “lost decade” of the 2000s, prior to the Great Recession. While the gains since 2000 have more or less evaporated, that the typical household is-at worst-at the same level as in the boom years of the late 1990s is disappointing but hardly alarming. Meyer and Sullivan’s research also shows that incomes at the bottom have increased robustly over the past 30 years, contrary to what official income trends show. By 2009, the household income at the 10th percentile-the household poorer than 90 percent of the others-was only about a third lower than that of the median household in 1980, after adjusting for inflation.

Just because living standards have improved does not mean that the lives of the poor are comfortable. Meyer and Sullivan find (roughly) that the household at the 10th percentile gets by on $20,000 a year, or under $1,700 a month. That is hardly luxurious. For a good working definition of “insecurity,” consider the one in five household heads who reported that sometime in 2010 they worried about whether they would run out of food before they could afford to buy more.[20] But if the circumstances of the poor are problematic that is because of poverty, not because of inequality.

The problem with most discussions of income mobility and inequality is that they do not distinguish between good and bad mobility or between good and bad inequality. A world of perfect mobility, as the researcher/writer Reihan Salam has noted, is “one in which no matter how hard you work to provide your children with every advantage in life, they’re just as likely to sink to the bottom of the heap as to rise to the top.”[21] No one should find that ideal attractive; some immobility reflects behaviors we want to encourage or discourage. Similarly, in a world of perfect equality, there would be no rewards for hard work or risk. That would cripple economic growth and hurt everyone.

The issue of economic growth points to the central importance of absolute mobility-of ensuring that children do at least as well as their parents, and ideally much better. Economic growth is the best antipoverty policy we have and the best path to a prosperous middle class, as evidenced by the broad gains of the postwar boom years, to say nothing of the late 1990s. High-end inequality was flat during the former period but rising during the latter.

In the short run, the hard reality is that American consumers are wary of spending, banks wary of lending, and businesses wary of hiring. With the bursting of the housing bubble, a significant minority of the population is in the red, and their weak position is inhibiting the national confidence we need to return to pre-recession growth levels. If we had weathered a normal recession, fiscal stimulus in the form of spending or tax cuts might have been sufficient to dig out of our hole. But recessions preceded by financial crises are different. The amount of stimulus it would take to swiftly restore growth is inconceivable given the historically high deficits we face.

Thankfully, we appear to be turning a corner, so the question increasingly appears to be how to speed up the recovery rather than how to avoid a double-dip recession. The way to do so, in my view, is to facilitate private efforts to put overleveraged homeowners back in the black. That would restore consumer demand, detoxify the problematic mortgage-backed assets lingering on the books of banks, and rejuvenate lending. Importantly, it could be done in a way that did not undermine personal responsibility on the part of borrowers.

A second easy way to promote short-term growth is not to talk down the economy. Political scientist Dan Wood and his colleagues found that the degree of optimism or pessimism in presidential speeches between 1978 and 2002 had a detectable effect on consumers’ sentiment about the economy and unemployment, which in turn affected economic growth.[22] I worry that the interest from one side in framing this year’s presidential and senate campaigns around overdrawn themes of inequality and diminished opportunity for the middle class will affect perceptions of the economy’s strength.

In the longer term, economic growth will require that we get projected deficits under control. That means containing the growth of entitlement spending, through policies like the Wyden-Ryan Medicare reform proposal. It also means policies to promote innovation, entrepreneurship, and international competitiveness.

For some, it may be tempting to focus policy solely on economic growth to the exclusion of addressing limited upward mobility in terms of rank. But keep in mind all those kids who are unlikely to grow up to be whatever they want. Economic growth alone cannot be expected to increase upward mobility out of the bottom, which Indiana governor Mitch Daniels has called, “the crux of the American promise.” Many children face challenging barriers to mobility. Two thirds of African American children experience neighborhood poverty rates the level of which only six percent of white children see.[23] It is certainly true that many parents do a poor job promoting opportunity for their children, but children do not choose their parents. As children age, they must increasingly take responsibility for decisions that limit their future opportunities. Yet who among us remembers our adolescent years as a period of peak rationality?

Policies to promote upward mobility from the bottom could take the form of investments in education, coupled with reforms to school governance and incentives to promote accountability. They might include reforms to safety net programs to encourage independence, work, marriage, and savings. More ambitiously, child savings accounts could be seeded and family contributions matched on condition that any federal contribution must be used for higher education or a wedding, available only to young adults who avoid run-ins with the law and teen parenthood, or else forfeited back to the Treasury. Senator Sessions has supported a version of child savings accounts in the past; I believe that done well, the strategy could transform the expectations and aspirations of poor children and their parents, easily paying for itself over the long run.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Winship also posted a related op-ed at The Agenda:

(…) I am exasperated by the Administration’s casual claim that opportunity in the U.S. for the typical American is on the decline.

Where your money goes

John Cochrane wins the February chart-of-the-month prize with this chart and discussion:

Two nice graphs from the New York Times

Comment: Now, could we please stop talking about how we need more taxes to pay for roads and bridges or to help the poor? The main function of our government is to write checks to middle-class and wealthy voters. And that’s the reason its finances are in the toilet.

This means Elizabeth Warren, for example, who said a factory owner needs to pay more taxes because “you moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for; you hired workers the rest of us paid to educate; you were safe in your factory because of police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for.” Answer: you paid for that long ago. That’s not where the money is going.

This means Robert Frank, whose NYT “Economics view” argued for “higher taxes needed for improved infrastructure” and claimed “when the anti-tax wealthy make campaign contributions, they are buying only the deeper potholes and dirtier air that inevitably result when tax revenue is low.” No, that’s not where the money is going either.

Read the whole thing »

Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better?

Last year we noted the fascinating Freakonomics Radio podcast “Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better?” One of the takeaways is that tasters evaluating the wines in a blind tasting are just as likely to prefer the much-cheaper wines.

Now there is an hour-long special. That writeup references the Robin Goldstein et al paper:

Abstract. Individuals who are unaware of the price do not derive more enjoyment from more expensive wine. In a sample of more than 6,000 blind tastings, we find that the correlation between price and overall rating is small and negative, suggesting that individuals on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less. For individuals with wine training, however, we find indications of a positive relationship between price and enjoyment. Our results are robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, and are not driven by outliers: when omitting the top and bottom deciles of the price distribution, our qualitative results are strengthened, and the statistical significance is improved further. Our results indicate that both the prices of wines and wine recommendations by experts may be poor guides for non-expert wine consumers.

In 2011 we enjoyed ten weeks in the wine country of France, Italy and Spain where we experienced this phenomenon first hand. Part of the explanation may be that skillful winemakers can blend to make young wines more palatable. I.e., a wine that in 20 years may mature to a sublime taste is often hard going when it is two or three years out of the vineyard (which is what we can buy in stores).

The Goldstein paper found that experts and average wine drinkers are likely to have different preferences. Excerpt:

Our results indicate another reason for why the average wine drinker may not benefit from expert wine ratings: he or she simply doesn’t like the same types of wines as experts. This is consistent with Weil (2001, 2005), who finds that even among the subset of tasters who can distinguish between good and bad vintages, or reserve or regular bottlings, they are as likely to prefer the “better” one as the “worse” one.

These findings raise an interesting question: is the difference between the ratings of experts and non-experts due to an acquired taste? Or is it due to an innate ability, which is correlated with self-selection into wine training? Investigating this further would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

In sum, in a large sample of blind tastings, we find that the correlation between price and overall rating is small and negative. Unless they are experts, individuals on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less. Our results suggest that both price tags and expert recommendations may be poor guides for non-expert wine consumers who care about the intrinsic qualities of the wine.

Michael Hudson: Banks Weren’t Meant to Be Like This

Michael Hudson on Banking and Bailouts:

Yet the banks now browbeat governments – not by having ready cash but by threatening to go bust and drag the economy down with them if they are not given control of public tax policy, spending and planning. The process has gone furthest in the United States. Joseph Stiglitz characterizes the Obama administration’s vast transfer of money and pubic debt to the banks as a “privatizing of gains and the socializing of losses. It is a ‘partnership’ in which one partner robs the other.” Prof. Bill Black describes banks as becoming criminogenic and innovating “control fraud.” High finance has corrupted regulatory agencies, falsified account-keeping by “mark to model” trickery, and financed the campaigns of its supporters to disable public oversight. The effect is to leave banks in control of how the economy’s allocates its credit and resources.

If there is any silver lining to today’s debt crisis, it is that the present situation and trends cannot continue. So this is not only an opportunity to restructure banking; we have little choice. The urgent issue is who will control the economy: governments, or the financial sector and monopolies with which it has made an alliance.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to re-invent the wheel. Already a century ago the outlines of a productive industrial banking system were well understood. But recent bank lobbying has been remarkably successful in distracting attention away from classical analyses of how to shape the financial and tax system to best promote economic growth – by public checks on bank privileges.

How Banks Broke The Social Compact, Promoting Their Own Special Interests

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(via Instapaper)

“Never Follow Your Dreams”: Mark Cuban Answers Your Questions

There’s lots of Mark Cuban wisdom in this Freakonomics Q&A. Two examples:

Q. The annual increase in the cost of college tuition seems to be much greater than inflation every year. Even during the recent financial crisis, tuitions were generally going up across the board! Seems like this is a problem waiting to happen. Do you think that we’re going to get a point soon where it won’t be a good investment to go to a private university unless you know that you’re going into a lucrative field (finance, computer science, medicine, economics)? Asked another way: my friend is going to a $40k/year private university to study finance. Is this likely to be a bad investment? -Stocker

A. We are already there. The return on education investment at a school is becoming less about the quality of education and more about the quality of networking available from that university’s alumni base.

If it were up to me, I would look very closely at limiting the size and total amount of student loans that can be federally guaranteed to $5k per year in 2012 dollars. If we limit the amount of money available in loans to students, we would create several improvements in this country:

  1. Universities would become more efficient. They would have to separate education from all the other things that universities pride themselves on.
  2. We would improve the economy and help protect the future of our kids. I think most people who look at these things fail to realize that graduating from college no longer means the entry of a “mature consumer” into the market who will rent an apartment, buy a car, buy clothes for work, etc. Instead, we get indentured servants whose only goal is to try to figure out how to not spend money so they can pay back their student loans!

(…)

Q. It seems that there is a mismatch between the skills that employers are looking for today and the skills that are being developed by college and high school graduates in the U.S. This seems like a huge problem to me. Do you see this mismatch yourself? What should (or could) be done about this? -Mickey

A. You will see new types of “trade schools” pop up to meet this demand. Six-, eight-, ten-week courses that are taught not by traditional schools, but by the new generation of trade schools that focus on programming skills, welding skills, whatever skills employers are looking for. But rather than these being accredited by educational institutions, they will be branded with the names of well-known individuals and brands.

So you could see the “Mark Cuban School of Programming” or “The Mark Cuban School of Selling.” They will be designed to give you the specific skills employers are asking for in the shortest period possible.

Read the whole thing »

Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built

(…) a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

– Bent Flyvbjerg, Oxford 2009

The abstract of Flyvbjerg’s paper is good short summary:

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

American Airlines Wants to Terminate Its Pension Plan, Lay Off 13,000

Interesting. Somehow these deals have to be recut or the jobs just go away. Megan McArdle:

Details of the American Airlines bankruptcy are emerging. And the details are that AMR wants all of its creditors to take a deep haircut, especially the workers:

The company aims to cut labor costs 20% under bankruptcy protection, and will soon begin negotiations with its three major unions. Some management jobs would also be cut.

AMR also proposes to end its traditional pension plans. The move has been strongly opposed by the airline’s unions and the U.S. pension-insurance agency.

CEO Thomas Horton said the company hopes to return to profitability by cutting spending more than $2 billion per year and raising revenue by $1 billion per year.

. . . Horton said cost-cutting will include restructuring debt and aircraft leases, grounding older planes, and changing labor contracts.

This is just the opening salvo in what promises to be a bruising negotiation with the unions. It’s not clear that the company actually expects to be allowed to terminate the pension plan. But the threat certainly gives them leverage with the unions, especially the pilots, because if the plan is terminated and taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, the payouts will be capped at around $50,000 a year–far less than pilots get from the current plan.

(…)

Read the whole thing »

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