Homeopaths are offering “alternative vaccinations” which doctors say could leave patients vulnerable to potentially fatal diseases, a BBC investigation has found.
Three practitioners admitted giving patients a homeopathic medicine designed to replace the MMR vaccine.
Inverness-based Katie Jarvis said she only offered “Homeopathic Prophylaxis” to patients who expressed an interest.
But the discovery has prompted a shocked reaction from doctors.
(…) However, the BMA’s director of science and ethics, Dr Vivienne Nathanson, said: “Replacing proven vaccines, tested vaccines, vaccines that are used globally and we know are effective with homeopathic alternatives where there is no evidence of efficacy, no evidence of effectiveness, is extremely worrying because it could persuade families that their children are safe and protected when they’re not.
“And some of those children will go on to get the illness, and some of those children may go on to get permanent life-threatening sequelae, or even to die, and that’s a tragedy when the family think they’ve protected their children.”
(…) NHS Highland – the health board covering Inverness – said it was considering withdrawing funding for homeopathic preparations.
Typically clearheaded analysis from Bruce.
An interesting and useful true history of FEMA, and what is required to enable the agency to be more effective when state/local resources are overwhelmed.
The recent outbreak of the H1N1, or the so-called â€œswine fluâ€ virus, appears mostly under control. Federal, state, and local disaster response groups have long prepared for an avian flu outbreak, a disaster comparable to a potential swine flu pandemic. And while a potential swine flu outbreak will likely be manageable due to the avian flu drills, now is an opportune time to assess the fragile state of the nationâ€™s overall disaster response system in the vast majority of other types of catastrophic disasters.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sends funds to assist in disaster response, but the agency is still poorly positioned to respond to major emergencies. Despite the natural, humanitarian, and political disaster of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA cannot adequately handle large-scale emergencies because it lacks sufficient standing within the federal bureaucracy to garner full interagency cooperation. Fixing this will go a long way toward making FEMA an effective and responsive agency.
FEMA was originally created by President Carter in 1979 to oversee and coordinate federal government disaster preparedness and response functions, while simultaneously allowing state and local governments to retain ultimate authority over disaster response. Federal law requires state and local authorities to first assess the damage and then submit official requests for federal aid. Only after the president has received and certified these requests can FEMA become directly involved in the disaster response efforts.
The federal government rarely assumes ultimate control of disaster response and prefers to supplement state and local resources. In the vast majority of disasters, FEMAâ€™s role has been limited to providing monetary reimbursement and logistical support to state and local agencies. While this approach has been successful in smaller-scale disasters, FEMA has failed to develop an effective national disaster plan to coordinate efforts when state resources are completely overwhelmed, in so-called â€œcatastrophic disasters.â€
By placing the vice president in charge of FEMA during national disasters, FEMA would be granted sufficient standing when necessary.
The problems were highlighted when category-4 storm Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida in August 1992. At the time the worst natural disaster in U.S. history, the storm killed 26 people directly and caused 39 additional deaths indirectly. State and local governments were essentially paralyzed as roughly 1.5 million people lost power and nearly 150,000 people had their phone service disrupted. The storm caused between $35 and $40 billion worth of damage, destroyed 28,000 homes, and damaged thousands of others. In the midst of the chaos, FEMA failed to coordinate the 26 federal departments and 13 â€œfunctional,â€ or working, groups it oversees.
The FEMA director lacked sufficient standing within the federal bureaucracy to rapidly redirect the efforts and resources of so many agencies reporting to various cabinet secretaries. Amid widespread criticism of the slow and largely ineffective federal response, President George H.W. Bush sent Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card to take control of the situation. Card was able to navigate the massive bureaucratic obstacles necessary to coordinate a national response that included so many federal, state, local, and private-sector agencies. However, because most of the 26 federal departments and 13 functional groups FEMA oversees are not located within the secretary of Transportationâ€™s jurisdiction, it is unlikely that his success stemmed from his authority as a cabinet secretary. Rather, political pressure following the initial failed response coupled with the presidentâ€™s clear desire to avoid additional bureaucratic failures compelled interagency cooperation.
Some of the problems highlighted during Hurricane Andrew were solved through the 2002 creation of the Department of Homeland Security, under which FEMA is now housed. In February 2003, President George W. Bush issued a directive designed to create a â€œsingle, comprehensive national incident management system.â€ The new system promised to help achieve â€œfull and prompt cooperation, and supportâ€ from â€œthe heads of all federal departments and agenciesâ€ and yield greater coordination between federal, state, and local governments.
Porter J. Goss in the Washington Post, April 25, 2009. Goss was director of the CIA from September 2004 to May 2006 and was chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 1997 to 2004.
Since leaving my post as CIA director almost three years ago, I have remained largely silent on the public stage. I am speaking out now because I feel our government has crossed the red line between properly protecting our national security and trying to gain partisan political advantage. We can’t have a secret intelligence service if we keep giving away all the secrets. Americans have to decide now.
A disturbing epidemic of amnesia seems to be plaguing my former colleagues on Capitol Hill. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, members of the committees charged with overseeing our nation’s intelligence services had no higher priority than stopping al-Qaeda. In the fall of 2002, while I was chairman of the House intelligence committee, senior members of Congress were briefed on the CIA’s “High Value Terrorist Program,” including the development of “enhanced interrogation techniques” and what those techniques were. This was not a one-time briefing but an ongoing subject with lots of back and forth between those members and the briefers.
Today, I am slack-jawed to read that members claim to have not understood that the techniques on which they were briefed were to actually be employed; or that specific techniques such as “waterboarding” were never mentioned. It must be hard for most Americans of common sense to imagine how a member of Congress can forget being told about the interrogations of Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed. In that case, though, perhaps it is not amnesia but political expedience.
Let me be clear. It is my recollection that:
— The chairs and the ranking minority members of the House and Senate intelligence committees, known as the Gang of Four, were briefed that the CIA was holding and interrogating high-value terrorists.
— We understood what the CIA was doing.
— We gave the CIA our bipartisan support.
— We gave the CIA funding to carry out its activities.
— On a bipartisan basis, we asked if the CIA needed more support from Congress to carry out its mission against al-Qaeda.
I do not recall a single objection from my colleagues. They did not vote to stop authorizing CIA funding. And for those who now reveal filed “memorandums for the record” suggesting concern, real concern should have been expressed immediately — to the committee chairs, the briefers, the House speaker or minority leader, the CIA director or the president’s national security adviser — and not quietly filed away in case the day came when the political winds shifted. And shifted they have.
Circuses are not new in Washington, and I can see preparations being made for tents from the Capitol straight down Pennsylvania Avenue. The CIA has been pulled into the center ring before. The result this time will be the same: a hollowed-out service of diminished capabilities. After Sept. 11, the general outcry was, “Why don’t we have better overseas capabilities?” I fear that in the years to come this refrain will be heard again: once a threat — or God forbid, another successful attack — captures our attention and sends the pendulum swinging back. There is only one person who can shut down this dangerous show: President Obama.
Unfortunately, much of the damage to our capabilities has already been done. It is certainly not trust that is fostered when intelligence officers are told one day “I have your back” only to learn a day later that a knife is being held to it. After the events of this week, morale at the CIA has been shaken to its foundation.
We must not forget: Our intelligence allies overseas view our inability to maintain secrecy as a reason to question our worthiness as a partner. These allies have been vital in almost every capture of a terrorist.
Despite efforts to boost passport security since the 2001 terror attacks, the investigator fooled passport and postal service employees four out of four times, according to a new report made public Friday.
The report by the Government Accountability Office, Congress’ investigative arm, details the ruses:
-One investigator used the Social Security number of a man who died in 1965, a fake New York birth certificate and a fake Florida driver’s license. He received a passport four days later.
-A second attempt had the investigator using a 5-year-old boy’s information but identifying himself as 53 years old on the passport application. He received that passport seven days later.
-In another test, an investigator used fake documents to get a genuine Washington, D.C., identification card, which he then used to apply for a passport. He received it the same day.
-A fourth investigator used a fake New York birth certificate and a fake West Virginia driver’s license and got the passport eight days later.
Read the whole thing…
Over at Google’s new Knol site, Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dr. James Carafano and Center for American Progress Senior Vice President Nina Hachigian are having a spirited debate over “What are the main security threats facing our nation?” Hachigian identifies nuclear terrorism, epidemics, and climate change Can as her biggest worries, to which Carafano replies:
The greatest proliferation threat to human existence is not weapons of mass destruction, but policymakers with mass disruption on their mind – officials who would label every matter, from avoiding bird flu to procuring fresh water, a “national security” issue.
To make matters more confusing, international organizations such as the United Nations have created terms such as “human security,” arguing for a collective responsibility to keep people free from want and fear. The problem with that approach is the tendency, in dealing with security interests, to centralize power and decision-making and restrain individual freedoms and free markets. It also justifies military solutions for everything from dealing with AIDS to oil.
Making every global challenge a security issue trumps free markets and limits personal freedoms. The concept of national security needs to be put back in the box, reserved for moments of peril in dealing with people (either states or non-states) who threaten through the use of violence to take away the political freedoms that governments are supposed to protect. We need to put an end to national-security proliferation.
Glenn Reynolds: THOUGH AT THE TIME IT WAS BLAMED ON TAX-CUTTING REAGANITES, the Minnesota bridge collapse turns out to have been the result of a design error. More on that, and on the plans to replace it, at the link.
Sixteen fractured gusset plates in the center span on Interstate 35W were a main cause of the deadly bridge collapse in Minneapolis last August, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said on Tuesday. The plates, which connected steel beams in the truss bridge, were roughly half the thickness they should have been because of a design error. How that flaw made it into the bridge is unclear; according to NTSB chairman Mark Rosenker, investigators couldnâ€™t find the original design calculations. Extra weight from construction was also a factor in the tragedy, which killed 13 people and injured 100. The findings confirmed forecasts by investigators from three months after the collapseâ€”plus engineering experts in the immediate aftermathâ€”and underscored the dire state of Americaâ€™s crumbling infrastructure.
Because politicians divert the money to light rail and bike paths.
…Even transportation dollars aren’t scarce. Minnesota spends $1.6 billion a year on transportation–enough to build a new bridge over the Mississippi River every four months. But nearly $1 billion of that has been diverted from road and bridge repair to the state’s light rail network that has a negligible impact on traffic congestion. Last year part of a sales tax revenue stream that is supposed to be dedicated for road and bridge construction was re-routed to mass transit. The Minnesota Department of Economic Development reports that only 2.8% of the state’s commuters ride buses or rail to get to work, but these projects get up to 25% of the funding.
Americans aren’t selfish or stingy, and they can see for themselves that many of our roads need repair. Minnesota in particular is a state that has long prided itself on its “progressive” politics and a willingness to pay higher taxes for good government. Minnesotans already pay twice as much in taxes per capita than residents in New Hampshire and Texas–states that haven’t had a major bridge collapse.
We suspect most voters would indeed be willing to pay more for better roads and bridges, if they had any reason to believe that is where the money would be spent. But they have long experience with politicians promising them that new taxes will go to such projects only to see it diverted for parochial ends….
I want to ask you about general philosophy. Basically, there are three broad ways of defending airplanes: preventing bad people from getting on them (ID checks), preventing bad objects from getting on them (passenger screening, baggage screening), and preventing bad things from happening on them (reinforcing the cockpit door, sky marshals)…
Image at left courtesy of Ryan Air, “Have fun while flying”.
Computer security consultant Bruce Schneier interviews Kip Hawley, the head of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). While Bruce’s commentary is frequently quoted to demonstrate TSA incompetence, I think reading Kip Hawley’s responses will give you some perspective. First, Kip Hawley is a good bit sharper than the TSA’s public image:
Bruce Schneier: …Can you please convince me there’s not an Office for Annoying Air Travelers making this sort of stuff up?
Kip Hawley: Screening ideas are indeed thought up by the Office for Annoying Air Travelers and vetted through the Directorate for Confusion and Complexity, and then we review them to insure that there are sufficient unintended irritating consequences so that the blogosphere is constantly fueled. Imagine for a moment that TSA people are somewhat bright, and motivated to protect the public with the least intrusion into their lives, not to mention travel themselves. How might you engineer backwards from that premise to get to three ounces and a baggie?
We faced a different kind of liquid explosive, one that was engineered to evade then-existing technology and process. Not the old Bojinka formula or other well-understood onesâ€”TSA already trains and tests on those. After August 10, we began testing different variants with the national labs, among others, and engaged with other countries that have sophisticated explosives capabilities to find out what is necessary to reliably bring down a plane.
We started with the premise that we should prohibit only what’s needed from a security perspective. Otherwise, we would have stuck with a total liquid ban. But we learned through testing that that no matter what someone brought on, if it was in a small enough container, it wasn’t a serious threat. So what would the justification be for prohibiting lip gloss, nasal spray, etc? There was none, other than for our own convenience and the sake of a simple explanation.
Based on the scientific findings and a don’t-intrude-unless-needed-for-security philosophy, we came up with a container size that eliminates an assembled bomb (without having to determine what exactly is inside the bottle labeled “shampoo”), limits the total liquid any one person can bring (without requiring Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to count individual bottles), and allows for additional security measures relating to multiple people mixing a bomb post-checkpoint. Three ounces and a baggie in the bin gives us a way for people to safely bring on limited quantities of liquids, aerosols and gels.
There are many topics covered: from new technology to no-fly lists to TSA’s Behavior Detection teams. The latter implies that TSA is moving towards far more effective methods than screening for explosive sneakers. I’ve posted earlier on the value of this security layer — exemplified by Israeli methods.
BS: Let’s talk about behavioral profiling. I’ve long thought that most of airline security could be ditched in favor of well-trained guards, both in and out of uniform, wandering the crowds looking for suspicious behavior. Can you talk about some of the things you’re doing along those lines, and especially ways to prevent this from turning into just another form of racial profiling?
KH: Moving security out from behind the checkpoint is a big priority for us. First, it gives us the opportunity to pick up a threat a lot earlier. Taking away weapons or explosives at the checkpoint is stopping the plot at nearly the last possible moment. Obviously, a good security system aims at stopping attacks well before that. That’s why we have many layers of security (intel, law enforcement, behavior detection, etc.) to get to that person well before the security checkpoint. When a threat gets to the checkpoint, we’re operating on his/her termsâ€”they pick when, where, and how they present themselves to us. We want to pick up the cues on our terms, before they’re ready, even if they’re just at the surveillance stage.
We use a system of behavior observation that is based on the science that demonstrates that there are certain involuntary, subconscious actions that can betray a person’s hostile intent. For instance, there are tinyâ€”but noticeable to the trained personâ€”movements in a person’s facial muscles when they have certain emotions. It is very different from the stress we all show when we’re anxious about missing the flight due to, say, a long security line. This is true across race, gender, age, ethnicity, etc. It is our way of not falling into the trap where we predict what a terrorist is going to look like. We know they use people who “look like” terrorists, but they also use people who do not, perhaps thinking that we cue only off of what the 9/11 hijackers looked like.
Our Behavior Detection teams routinelyâ€”and quietlyâ€”identify problem people just through observable behavior cues. More than 150 people have been identified by our teams, turned over to law enforcement, and subsequently arrested. This layer is invisible to the public, but don’t discount it, because it may be the most effective. We publicize non-terrorist-related successes like a murder suspect caught in Minneapolis and a bank robber caught in Philadelphia.
Most common are people showing phony documents, but we have even picked out undercover operativesâ€”including our own. One individual, identified by a TSO in late May and not allowed to fly, was killed in a police shoot-out five days later. Additionally, several individuals have been of interest from the counter-terrorism perspective. With just this limited deployment of Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), we have identified more people of counterterrorism interest than all the people combined caught with prohibited items. Look for us to continue to look at ways that highlight problem people rather than just problem objects.
BS: That’s really good news, and I think it’s the most promising new security measure you’ve got…
Then Bruce raises another of my major concerns — security of the aircraft on the ramp and of the airport workers.
BS: What about airport workers? Nearly one million workers move in and out of airports every day without ever being screened. The JFK plot, as laughably unrealistic as it was, highlighted the security risks of airport workers. As with any security problem, we need to secure the weak links, rather than make already strong links stronger. What about airport employees, delivery vehicles, and so on?
KH: I totally agree with your point about a strong base level of security everywhere and not creating large gaps by over-focusing on one area. This is especially true with airport employees. We do background checks on all airport employees who have access to the sterile area. These employees are in the same places doing the same jobs day after day, so when someone does something out of the ordinary, it immediately stands out. They serve as an additional set of eyes and ears throughout the airport.
Even so, we should do more on airport employees and my House testimony of April 19 gives details of where we’re heading. The main point is that everything you need for an attack is already inside the perimeter of an airport. For example, why take lighters from people who work with blowtorches in facilities with millions of gallons of jet fuel?
You could perhaps feel better by setting up employee checkpoints at entry points, but you’d hassle a lot of people at great cost with minimal additional benefit, and a smart, patient terrorist could find a way to beat you. Today’s random, unpredictable screenings that can and do occur everywhere, all the time (including delivery vehicles, etc.) are harder to defeat. With the latter, you make it impossible to engineer an attack; with the former, you give the blueprint for exactly that.
And, lastly I’ll highlight the comments on in-the-air measures:
BS: …I want to ask you about general philosophy. Basically, there are three broad ways of defending airplanes: preventing bad people from getting on them (ID checks), preventing bad objects from getting on them (passenger screening, baggage screening), and preventing bad things from happening on them (reinforcing the cockpit door, sky marshals). The first one seems to be a complete failure, the second one is spotty at best. I’ve always been a fan of the third. Any future developments in that area?
KH: You are too eager to discount the firstâ€”stopping bad people from getting on planes. That is the most effective! Don’t forget about all the intel work done partnering with other countries to stop plots before they get here (UK liquids, NY subway), all the work done to keep them out either through no-flys (at least several times a month) or by Customs & Border Protection on their way in, and law enforcement once they are here (Ft. Dix). Then, you add the behavior observation (both uniformed and not) and identity validation (as we take that on) and that’s all before they get to the checkpoint.
The screening-for-things part, we’ve discussed, so I’ll jump to in-air measures. Reinforced, locked cockpit doors and air marshals are indeed huge upgrades since 9/11. Along the same lines, you have to consider the role of the engaged flight crew and passengersâ€”they are quick to give a heads-up about suspicious behavior and they can, and do, take decisive action when threatened. Also, there are thousands of flights covered by pilots who are qualified as law enforcement and are armed, as well as the agents from other government entities like the Secret Service and FBI who provide coverage as well. There is also a fair amount of communications with the flight deck during flights if anything comes up en routeâ€”either in the aircraft or if we get information that would be of interest to them. That allows “quiet” diversions or other preventive measures. Training is, of course, important too. Pilots need to know what to do in the event of a missile sighting or other event, and need to know what we are going to do in different situations. Other things coming: better air-to-ground communications for air marshals and flight information, including, possibly, video.
So, when you boil it down, keeping the bomb off the plane is the number one priority. A terrorist has to know that once that door closes, he or she is locked into a confined space with dozens, if not hundreds, of zero-tolerance people, some of whom may be armed with firearms, not to mention the memory of United Flight 93.
I think Hawley used “bomb” as a token for any “weapon” that a terrorist could use to commandeer or destroy the aircraft. Bottom line — the TSA seems to be building more defense-in-depth than the public impression. It’s important to keep in mind that TSA priorities and methods will be different than what a private company would do if it controlled the entire airline infrastructure — because the TSA can only do what Congress tells it and funds to do. So there is a lot of political pressure to focus on high visibility activity [passenger screening] at the expense of securing the working airport and the aircraft.
But Hawley get’s the key points I think — as a windup, here’s a fragment from his April testimony, where he tries to convince Congress not to screw it up worse than they already have:
While we often look at aviation security one slice at a time,
â€¢ what do we do for employee screening, for air cargo,
â€¢ for passenger checkpoint, for checked bags, for watchlists,
â€¢ for perimeter, etc.
It is critical that we keep in mind that to terrorists, we are one target, and they donâ€™t care which particular place they attack.
We need balance and flexibility in our all of our security measures.
If we jump from concern to concern mandating measures for each one, we may tie up critical resources and do nothing more than make it easy for a terrorist to attack somewhere else.
If an attack is successful, it does us no good to say that we were impenetrable at a different spot.
Magnetometers cannot detect suspicious behavior.
In fact, installing fixed checkpoints makes the job easier for terrorists.
Although it may be comforting for us to see employees in line for screening, a checkpoint provides an unchanging, predictable barrier that is always there, every day. And the terrorist can spend all the time he needs to find ways around, over, or through it.
For this reason, we must use many layers of securityâ€”each nimble, unpredictable, and dynamic.
What needs to happen across all segments of airline security is a philosophical change from trying to prevent an attack (which doesnâ€™t work in a system this size) to defending against one (which does â€” a la Flight 93).
[I have recently published a series of posts on airline security at my own blog. One of the air marshals I quoted, Robert MacLean, mentioned the vulnerability of overnighting aircraft â€” aircraft parked overnight waiting for the next flight. He told me that the person to ask about this threat was David Mackett, the president of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance, an organization of pilots concerned with airline security. I wrote Mr. Mackett and asked him if he could discuss the issue of airline security generally, and overnighting planes specifically. In response, I received a lengthy and thoughtful e-mail touching on many aspects of airline security, of which the issue of overnighting planes forms only a small part.
Below I have reprinted Mr. Mackettâ€™s e-mail in its entirety, with only the lightest possible editing. What you are about to read is a comprehensive, thoughtful, and sobering commentary on the state of airline security, and what can be done about it. â€” Patterico]
As background, no conversation about airline security should take place without at least trying to conceive of the almost incomprehensible size of the air transportation system. The size of the system is the reason everything the public and policymakers â€œthinkâ€ should work in airline security doesnâ€™t, and the reason our entire approach to airline security is almost completely ineffective against a threat like Al Qaeda â€” and the reason security almost always fails when tested by covert testers, innocent civilians and, occasionally, persons with intent.
At this moment, there are roughly 5000 commercial airliners in the skies above you. There will be 28,000 flights today, and 840,000 in the next month â€” every month. The U.S. fleet consists of some 6000 aircraft â€” almost all of which will be parked unattended tonight at a public airport. We will carry almost 7 billion passengers this year, the number increasing to 10 billion by 2010, barring an exogenous event like another 9/11.
There is simply no deployable technology that has a prayer of keeping a motivated, prepared terrorist out of the system every time â€” even most times. TSA misses more than 90% of detectable weapons at passenger checkpoints in their own tests, and it is not their fault, because of the limitations of technology and the number of inspections they must conduct. This doesnâ€™t count several classes of completely undetectable weapons like composite knives and liquid explosives.
What is TSAâ€™s fault is their abject failure to embrace more robust approaches than high visibility inspections, and their accommodations to the Air Transport Associationâ€™s revenue interests at the expense of true security, while largely ignoring the recommendations of the front-line airline crews and air marshals who have no direct revenue agenda and are much more familiar with airline operations than are the bureaucrats (remember government ignoring the front-line FBI agents who tried to warn them about 9/11?). Deplorable amounts of money have been wasted on incomprehensible security strategies, while KISS [Keep It Simple, Stupid] methods proven to work have been ignored.
Aircraft on the ramp are just one example of this.
Immediately after 9/11, the Administration deployed the National Guard to airport checkpoints to reassure the public, though the terroristsâ€™ objective was not the checkpoint, but the aircraft. The Airline Pilots Security Alliance (APSA) called for putting National Guardsmen on airport ramps to monitor anyone around the aircraft, conduct random ID checks, and protect the aircraft from anyone putting suspicious cargo in the holds or cabin. We also called for 100% ground employee security screening, which, while flawed, provided some layer of prevention against minimum wage employees planting illicit weapons on commercial aircraft; we also called for behavioral profiling of passengers at security checkpoints.
None of this was done, and the aircraft on the ramp were â€œprotectedâ€ only by vigilant employees who had other, more primary responsibilities. These aircraft were still freely accessible to many other employees who worked on the strength of a background check that said they hadnâ€™t done anything yet.
Today, RON (remaining overnight) aircraft are invariably unattended and unlocked all night. Commercial aircraft typically do not have locks in their doors. They are protected by roving airport police patrols and closed circuit cameras. Neither methodology is very robust. A skeleton crew of employees is also on duty who may see something suspicious, but most have gone home. Jetway doors prevent access from the terminal but the exterior aircraft doors are unlocked to anyone who pushes a stairway up to them.
There have been numerous breaches of airport perimeters (see http://www.secure-skies.org, How Safe Are You?, Airport Perimeter Security), often by people who werenâ€™t even trying. At least one Al Qaeda sympathizer employed as a catering truck driver was arrested after driving onto airports for months, gathering intelligence.
It is certainly possible for a terrorist to jump the airport fence and walk to the airplanes, particularly at smaller airports, some with low fences and no or few cameras. But the greatest threat to RON aircraft is that anyone with an airport swipe card can get on board unsupervised. This includes third-party catering trucks coming in from outside the perimeter (almost impossible to inspect in any meaningful way), subcontracted cleaning crews, and unskilled ramp employees.
There have been at least three â€œringsâ€ of employees arrested since 9/11: one for large-scale theft from passengersâ€™ bags, and two for putting illicit guns and drugs onboard aircraft. The only reason these events did not result in a successful terror attack is because the bad guys were thieves and smugglers, not terrorists. If those guns had been planted in the cabin of an aircraft, a terrorist team could have simply cleared security with their fellow passengers the next day, and armed themselves once they were onboard.
This threat is mitigated by the fact that pilots, flight attendants, and ramp agents now routinely inspect the aircraft before flight each day, and this provides a measure of security. But it is not foolproof. Since there is little time to do a thorough inspection prior to passenger boarding, well-concealed weapons can be missed. A Maryland college student successfully planted hidden weapons in the lavatories of four or five Southwest Airlines jets several years ago. He carried them right through the security checkpoint. He was successful every time he tried. And in some cases, the weapons were not discovered for weeks. There is also a strong suspicion that weapons were â€œpre-plantedâ€ on some of the aircraft targeted on 9/11.
From a terroristâ€™s point of view, the downside of pre-planting weapons is that if they are found, the attack is thwarted literally before the plane gets off the ground, and warning is given to the entire air transport system. But remember: the terrorists are also warned of the find, and do not have to risk compromise â€” they just stay home. Conversely, if CNN isnâ€™t broadcasting found weapons on airliners, the terrorists would know the operation has a good chance of succeeding, even before they arrive at the airport.
By the way, we constantly have to walk the line between sharing enough information to get fixes implemented, while not sharing so much it compromises our safety even more. Everything Iâ€™m writing is easily available to a motivated intelligence-gathering cell. There are other problems I wonâ€™t discuss, because the information is not publicly available. That doesnâ€™t mean itâ€™s not real.
What needs to happen across all segments of airline security is a philosophical change from trying to prevent an attack (which doesnâ€™t work in a system this size) to defending against one (which does â€” a la Flight 93).
Almost six years after 9/11, it is inexcusable that â€” in an environment where TSA misses more than 90% of weapons, RON aircraft are not secured, and ground employees are not screened â€” fewer than 2% of our airliners have a team of armed pilots aboard, fewer than 5% have air marshals, and the flight attendants have no mandatory tactical or behavioral assessment training. $24 billion dollars later, we are not materially safer, except in the areas of intelligence that prevent an attack from getting to an airport. Once at the airport, there is little reason to believe the attack wonâ€™t succeed.
If these airplanes were appropriately defended, it would matter less who got onboard and with what weapon. We could then redeploy TSA assets to protecting RON aircraft, securing the ramps against suspicious persons, and randomly checking employee IDâ€™s, as well as implement 100% cargo/baggage inspection and government funding for explosive-proof cargo compartments and missile defense.
It has taken six years, but TSA is now finally flirting with behavioral assessment training for screeners and random (but not mandatory) ground employee inspections. The airlines complain screening all ground employees would significantly hinder airline operations. Theyâ€™re right â€” it would.
As usual, though, it has taken far too long for even these fixes, and thereâ€™s no action on the most meaningful improvements: dramatic expansion of the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, redeployment of air marshals on more specific, instead of random flights, and treating crews as critical assets, instead of as members of the general public, in terms of training and information sharing.
There is no question that we will get airline security right someday. My only question is whether, at this point, we will get it right before the next attack. After 9/11, we were given the gift of time and of awareness. I am very concerned we have squandered the gift of time â€” and there is little left before we are hit again â€” and we are losing the gift of awareness, as we truly forget what that morning was like. There is no question in my mind, based on everything I hear in my position, that Al Qaeda is actively, aggressively preparing to target the United States again, and that commandeering an airliner is still the easiest, quickest method of possessing a weapon of mass destruction. I am even more concerned that the next attack could be far worse than 9/11, which, while devastating, would pale in comparison to other available targets.
Recalling World War II, the Japanese didnâ€™t surrender after Hiroshima because they believed there was only one atom bomb. It was only after another bomb hit Nagasaki â€” after we proved we could do it again â€” that their country collapsed. Similarly, another successful 9/11 would devastate our country in ways we canâ€™t even imagine â€” probably much more than the first attack, as we realize they can do it again despite our â€œbestâ€ efforts.
Government and airline management are taking an awful chance in promoting the appearance of security, instead of using, as President Bush promised, â€œevery resource availableâ€ in this new world war.
I know Iâ€™ve gotten pretty far afield of your topic, but I want to give you the sense that RON aircraft are just one small piece of a multilayered security system wherein every layer leaks like a sieve. The problem is much, much bigger than any single element.
In the end, we should be starting with defending the smallest spaces â€” the cockpits and cargo compartments, and working outward to the limits of our resources; instead of starting with the airport perimeter and working inward, ignoring the actual defense of those spaces that are actually the terrorist targets. And we should be using the resources already in place to the greatest extent possible, instead of trying to bring new, untried methods into play, then waiting to find out they donâ€™t work nearly as well in reality as they do on paper.
President, Airline Pilots Security Alliance
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