Oxford Martin School


Dr. James Martin founded the School in 2005 with Oxford’s largest ever benefaction. The mission of the Oxford Martin School is to develop practical solutions to the really hard problems.

Martin’s vision was that the Oxford Martin School should be a unique, interdisciplinary research community designed to address the most pressing global challenges and opportunities of the 21st century, using rigorous interdisciplinary research to find solutions. This is vital because the problems facing humanity will become so severe, but so also are its new opportunities. A new methodology was needed for interdisciplinary research and problem-solving, and this came to pervade the Oxford Martin School.

The School now has over 30 institutes and projects concerned with different aspects of the future, from the governance of climate change to the possibilities of quantum physics; from the future of food to the implications of an ageing population; and from new economic thinking to nanotechnology in medicine. Each institute can only function by integrating multiple disciplines, and now separate institutes are becoming connected. Together, the different issues of the School connect to form an understanding of our future. The School has over 300 post-doctorate scholars and professors, working across the University of Oxford.

The Advisory Council of the School is populated by some of the most thoughtful and influential people that I know of. Other examples in addition to Martin Rees there are Nicholas Stern, Larry Brilliant and J. Craig Venter. The faculty is similarly first-rate, including Steve Rayner — one of the principals of the Hartwell Paper [see Kyoto Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy]. Steve has also been an important contributor to the birthplace of Ecomodernism at the Breakthrough Institute. See Climate Pragmatism, a revised and updated version of the Hartwell Paper.

The School is also home to the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI), lead by Founding Director Prof. Nick Bostrom. Nick is the author of Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, a superb introduction to the challenges of ensuring future AIs are friendly. Nick also directs the Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology.

Michael Douglas narrates James Martin’s one hour documentary The Meaning Of The 21st Century based on the book of the same title. The film synopsis page says “THIS FILM IS ABOUT THE MOST VITALLY IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF OUR TIME”.

What do the aliens think about AGW politics?

Alien and Gort: You know Fission but are still building windmills?

Two years ago I was puzzling over the other-worldness of US politics on AGW which includes references to some better-informed researchers. It would be instructive to hear what the more-advanced aliens think about the earthly goings-on. I envision the alien walking down the ramp of his starship, looking out over California’s once beautiful landscape, now covered with the litter of tens of thousands of diffuse-energy contraptions

You’ve mastered the science of fission, and you are still building windmills?

Public Views on a Carbon Tax Depend on the Proposed Use of Revenue


This is excerpted from a 2014 University of Michigan report from the National Surveys on Energy and Environment.

Conventional wisdom holds that a carbon tax is a political non-starter. However, results from the latest version of the National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE) provide evidence of substantial public support for a tax on the carbon content of different fossil fuels when specific uses of tax revenue are attached. A majority of respondents support a revenue-neutral carbon tax, and an even larger majority support a carbon tax with revenues used to fund research and development for renewable energy programs. The carbon tax coupled with renewable energy research earns majority support across all political categories, including a narrow majority of Republicans. These findings generally confirm previous NSEE results when revenue use options are linked to carbon taxation. These are among the latest findings from the Spring 2014 NSEE from the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at the University of Michigan and the Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion.

Key Findings

  1. Most Americans oppose a carbon tax when the use of tax revenue is left unspecified. Overall support for such a tax is 34% in the latest NSEE survey. Attaching a specific cost to the carbon tax reduces overall support to 29%.
  2. A revenue-neutral carbon tax, in which all tax revenue would be returned to the public as a rebate check, receives 56% support. The largest gains in support come from Republicans.
  3. A carbon tax with revenues used to fund research and development for renewable energy programs receives 60% support, the highest among tax options that we presented. Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents each express support for this tax.
  4. Most respondents oppose a carbon tax with revenues used to reduce the federal budget deficit. Overall support for such a tax is 38% with a majority of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents each expressing opposition to this tax.
  5. When asked which use of revenue they prefer if a carbon tax were enacted, pluralities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents each prefer renewable energy over tax rebate checks or deficit reduction.

My read of this and similar polling is that the US could pass a revenue-neutral carbon tax if it is well-crafted. What will get the conservatives into the boat is to ring-fence the revenues so the money doesn’t get gobbled up in the general fund. Just for discussion, say 80% of the revenue is earmarked for rebate like Dr. James Hansen’s Fee and Dividend. The balance of 20% funds a public-private partnership for innovation in technology-neutral clean-energy and climate adaptation. I would like to include geo-engineering research in the mission, but I suspect that’s too emotionally explosive.

Designing a mechanism for allocation of the R&D fund is also a real challenge. To recommend the budgeting and allocation design – how about a reprise of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission? I even have a candidate dream team for you, with Dr. Jane C. S. Long to chair. Jane led the California Council on Science and Technology team who produced California’s Energy Future — The View to 2050. Even better would be to make a partnership of Dr. Long’s CCST team and the Energy Research Partnership team.

A US unilateral carbon tax is a big step forward, but alone it won’t get the job done. We need buy-in by enough of the developing nations to attenuate the principal source of future emissions growth. I am convinced that there is a solution to that challenge: that it is to structure this carbon tax as the US component of a Common-Commitment as proposed by the team of David J. C. MacKay, Peter Crampon, Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft How to negotiate a climate agreement that will actually work. I don’t know what the numbers would be, but the carbon tax revenue splits would have to be adjusted to support the US share of Green Fund payments. What would be the politics of American support for a Common Commitment deal?

Decarbonization: Is California Exceptional?

Image: Mother Jones

If you ask a random citizen of the state “Is California decarbonizing faster than the rest of the U.S.?” they are likely to reply “Of course, California is the leader!” This accepted wisdom was reflected in the recent Mother Jones article by Gabriel Kahn [@gabekahn] Did California Figure Out How to Fix Global Warming?.  

All of these advances have undercut a fundamental tenet of economics: that more growth equals more emissions. Between 2003 and 2013 (the most recent data), the Golden State decreased its greenhouse gas emissions by 5.5 percent while increasing its gross domestic product by 17 percent—and it did so under the thumb of the nation’s most stringent energy regulations.

As the chart above shows, California is decarbonizing, but how exceptional is California’s performance since 2000? In reality, California’s results are not exceptions, but representative of the nation. For the same 2000 to 2013 period discussed in the Mother Jones article, here is a graphic showing California and U.S. greenhouse gas emissions decreases as a function of GDP [thanks to John Fleck for graphing the IEA, BEA and Census Bureau data].

Image: John Fleck [@jfleck]
And here’s John Fleck’s graphic showing how California’s per capita emissions compare to the US as a whole.

Image: John Fleck [@jfleck]

From the time series graphs it’s hard to judge whether California’s results are better or worse than the US average. Mike Shellenberger [@shellenbergerMD] aggregated the EIA 2000-2013 decarbonization data to demonstrate that the nation reduced emissions more than California. This doesn’t account for emissions that California exported to other states (e.g., for power generation) or other nations (e.g., China for the embedded energy in imported goods).

Image: Michael Shellenberger [@shellenbergerMD]

Mike has also been analyzing the favorable tail wind provided by crashing natural gas prices. Low gas prices have hidden from the consumer the true cost of subsidizing (non-large hydro) renewables. The US has been enjoying historically low natural gas prices. The lows are an anomaly caused by the local oversupply of U.S. shale gas. The oversupply situation is local to the US because it’s difficult to export natural gas. There are long lead times and large capital investments required to expand gas export infrastructure. Once the excess supply can be freely exported the US natural gas market will clear much like crude oil. Then US consumers will be paying a lot more for natural gas.

Image: Michael Shellenberger [@shellenbergerMD]

For his hypothesis that California has outperformed on decarbonization Gabe Kahn mainly credits politicians backing mandates and subsidies for wind and solar. Missing is discussion of all of the factors that contributed to the reduced emissions intensity. Nationally the two biggest contributors have been the Great Recession (falling demand) and fuel-switching from coal to gas. The Breakthrough Institute published a 2014 report Natural Gas Overwhelmingly Replaces Coal: New Analysis of US Regional Power Generation Between 2007 and 2013. US emissions intensity fell largely due to fuel-switching:

Changes in generation shares at the regional level, however, strongly support the conclusion that fuel-switching from coal to gas, along with falling electricity demand in the wake of the Great Recession, account for the vast majority of the decline in emissions. Moreover, the shift from coal to gas accounts for a significant majority of the decline in the carbon intensity of the US electrical grid since 2007.

Comparison of CA low-carbon sources
Image: James Conca [@JimConca]

Study the above 2014 chart. The biggest elephant in the room (not discussed by Gabe Kahn) is the serious negative impact of activist attacks on the state’s nuclear plants. The premature closing of SONGS cost the state almost all the gains of twenty years of building subsidized wind and solar — California’s decarbonization rate took a big step backwards.  James Conca explains:

In one fell swoop, the unnecessary closing of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in San Diego wiped out the low-carbon energy equivalent of almost all the wind and solar installed in California, reversing the state’s 20-year progress in low-carbon energy. Wind and solar are the only low-carbon energy sources growing in California. Geothermal, biomass and hydro have been flat for 10 years.

Going backwards: the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) was prematurely closed January 2012. Now the same activists are trying to shut down California’s only nuclear power station Diablo Canyon — which is quietly producing every day about 1.6 times the output of all of California’s solar power. It will be impossible for California to achieve zero-carbon by closing rather than building new nuclear plants. In California Gets Coal for Christmas: SONGS Closure Produces Extra 18M Tons of Carbon Dioxide James Conca reviews the reality:

A state-funded study by the California Council on Science and Technology found that only significant nuclear, or obtaining as-yet-undeveloped carbon capture technologies, can solve California’s energy demands and emission goals in this century (CCST SummaryCCST Report to 2050). We geologists know how unlikely carbon capture and storage is, and we should keep trying, but we can’t bet the house on unknown technologies.

The California’s Energy Future report that Jim references is a very good piece of work. See my report on the 2013 Travers Conference at UC Berkeley for updates on the study. You can help by supporting Save Diablo Canyon.

So how is California doing relative to our two degrees target? Poorly – and most people don’t appreciate how incredibly challenging it is. Two years ago Price Waterhouse Coopers estimated that a global compounded decarbonization rate of 6.2% per year would just get us to zero-carbon by 2100. California’s 7.5% over thirteen years is way short of 6.2% compounded — it is not much better than the dotted line in the this PWC chart, and not nearly good enough. When was the last time we saw nations decarbonize rapidly? It can be done.

Image: PWC Price Waterhouse Coopers


Why energy transitions are the key to environmental progress

This is a guest post by Michael Shellenberger and Rachel Pritzker (This post first appeared on Observer Research Foundation 23 Feb 2016)

At the United Nations climate talks in Paris last fall, US President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised the need to find climate solutions that advance, rather than undermine, India’s development prospects.

But the reality of what both nations are doing on climate change does not live up to the rhetoric. The overwhelming focus of US-Indian government climate efforts is on expanding renewables and increasing energy efficiency. Both have merit, but should be third order, not top, priorities.

The main climate and development focus of all governments should be on accelerating the pace of energy transitions, from wood and dung to fossil fuels and from fossil fuels to nuclear power. To understand why this is, it is important to put energy and environmental progress in their developmental context.

Almost all nations develop following the same pattern. Small farmers become more productive and move from the country to the city to work in factories and offices. Women become newly empowered. Children gain formal education. And couples choose to have fewer children.

As fewer farmers must produce more food for more people, they invest in tractors, fertilizer and other ways to increase productivity.

Over time, all of this urbanisation and industrialisation delivers large environmental benefits. Using liquid petroleum gas, instead of wood for cooking, almost completely eliminates toxic smoke and can save hours a day.

As we move from wood fuel to fossil fuel, our forests can return and become habitat for wildlife. Recently, India was able to protect her Himalayan forests by subsidising the substitution of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) for wood fuel.

Factories and cities create more air pollution at first, but over time become cleaner and greener. Rising societal wealth allows for pollution controls such as catalytic converters and smokestack scrubbers. And dust is reduced by paving roads, improving mining and land use practices and tree-planting.

In the US and Europe, conventional pollutants have been in decline since the early 1970s, and carbon emissions for the last 10 years. Rich nations can afford to move from coal to much cleaner natural gas, which generates a tiny fraction of the pollutants of coal, and half the carbon emissions.

In the US and Europe, major oil and gas discoveries were key to shifting from coal to natural gas and reducing pollution. North Sea natural gas in deep waters reduced Europe’s reliance on coal starting in the 1980s. In the U.S., it was natural gas from shale, a rock formation one mile underground, starting around 2007.

China and India both have significant reserves of natural gas and oil in shale, but lack the workforce, drilling rigs and pipeline infrastructure. Those things will develop over time, the question is at what pace.

Because solar and wind cannot generate power 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, their value to developing nations that need cheap reliable power for their factories and cities is highly limited.

Solar and wind are limited for similar reasons in rich nations as well. As solar and wind become a larger amount of the electrical grid, their value declines, as Germany is discovering. That’s because solar and wind create power when it’s not needed and don’t create power when it is most needed from 5 pm to 9 pm.

The great emphasis put on an energy source that cannot support industrialisation and urbanisation is not a coincidence. Environmentalists in India and the West have since the 1960s promoted the Romantic idea that low-energy consumption, rural subsistence living, and renewable energy are best for people and the environment. The last 50 years shows how wrong this idea is.

Economic growth remains tightly coupled with energy consumption. A recent analysis of 76 countries found that Indians and Chinese earning $50,000 per year consumes the same amount of energy as Americans and Europeans did when earning that same amount.

Where European, US and Indian governments put great emphasis on off-grid solar in rural villages, historically most people gain access to LPG and electricity by moving to cities.

Solar and wind are promoted as energy sources with little negative environmental impact but both have large impacts measured on per unit energy basis. Both require 100 times more land as fossil and nuclear plants. And wind and solar require five times more concrete and steel, respectively, than coal, nuclear and natural gas plants, according to the US Department of Energy.

Given the limits to solar and wind in both rich and poor countries, significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions will require a faster transition to nuclear energy, first fission and then fusion. Where the transition from wood to coal began 500 years ago, the transition from fossil to nuclear energy began just 50 years ago.

India is a special case in that while most countries complete, or almost complete, the transition from biomass (wood and dung) to fossil fuels, India aims to make both energy transitions happen at the same time.

Rich countries have the strongest scientific and technical workforces capable of building and operating nuclear power plants, but ideological opponents of the technology have successfully spread fear of nuclear energy since the 1960s.

Polls show Indians support nuclear energy but the Indian nuclear energy programme is only now recovering after having been isolated from the global community over recusal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As such, the most important work by Modi and Obama on climate was removing hurdles to greater US-India collaboration on nuclear energy. India could soon start constructing power plants with US and European companies and hopefully one day soon the Japanese, Chinese and Koreans.

The same should be done on natural gas. The US can help India to better access its natural gas reserves, and the Indian government can take advantage of low cost natural gas due to the global oversupply, and potentially start importing large quantities of natural gas from Iran.

Nations around the world, including the US and Europe, show that the transition from wood to fossil fuels takes decades. To the extent there is energy leap-frogging it will mostly be from wood to natural gas and nuclear, not to solar and wind. Renewables should play a role but should not distract nations from the main event of accelerating energy transitions for environmental progresss.

Michael Shellenberger is President of Environmental Progress, an independent research and policy NGO based in California.

Rachel Pritzker is President of Pritizker Innovation Fund, a philanthropic foundation supporting technological innovation for human development and environmental progress.

How to negotiate a climate agreement that will actually work

Illustration by Greg Clarke

The recent COP21 negotiations in Paris were based on the ‘pledge and review’ framework, first proposed by Japan in a memo to the UNFCCC in 1991. The pledges are the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Kyoto was similarly based on individual commitments. Twenty years of failure should have taught us that individual commitments do not motivate nations to decarbonize.

Countries will promise to reduce their emissions by amounts that will be revised later. The narrative is that this will “enable an upward spiral of ambition over time”. History and the science of cooperation predict that quite the opposite will happen.

From “Price Carbon — I Will If You Will” by David J. C. MacKay, Peter Crampon, Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft

I expected another ineffective outcome from COP21, just more feel-good politics. The failure of Kyoto and Copenhagen had convinced me that nations would only commit to what was in their narrow self-interest. The free-rider problem seemed insurmountable. As Paris approached I thought that “We’ve seen this movie before”, so a useful agreement simply wasn’t going to happen. Because: Roger Pielke’s Iron Law. Because: lack of motivation – “the building isn’t burning yet”.

So my focus has been largely on developing clean energy options that are “cheaper than coal”. We need to fund energy innovation at multiples of current levels. This is a no-regrets approach, because the fast-growers can’t afford to decarbonize until they can buy clean energy that doesn’t retard their economic growth.

As the media frenzy built leading to COP21 I read the Nature comment by MacKay et al “Price Carbon — I Will If You Will”. I have to say that the Nature piece and the supporting papers got me excited! Then on December 8th the authors published a free eBook “Global Carbon Pricing” making it much easier for all of us to understand how much we have to gain by fixing the cause of these negotiation failures. That led to doing more research at Carbon-Price.com.

Since then I have been wondering “what if I was wrong – what if in fact we could get a commitment to, say, a $50 carbon price floor?” Why do I now think that — given the proper negotiation framework — an agreement is feasible? Well, I hadn’t done my homework on the science of cooperation. I knew about Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 Nobel prize – but I didn’t really understand the significance of her work in this context. I did not appreciate that a better negotiating framework could eliminate the free-rider roadblock. Ostrom showed how changing one negotiation-game rule could change a negotiation from impossible to optimal. For example, in Törbel, Switzerland, the common-commitment rule is “no citizen can send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter.”

If it works for the Swiss farmers, perhaps it can work for self-interested nations? If we change just one rule in the negotiation game – instead of the Paris result we would get cooperation. That new rule is a common price commitment. How does the proposed treaty process work? Countries pay or receive transfers Gi from the climate fund:

Gi = g × Xi × P

where g is the generosity parameter, X is the excess emissions of country i, and P is the global price. Excess emissions are defined as emissions above what would occur if the country had the global-average per capita emissions rate. Negative values of G (resulting from below average per-capita emissions) indicate a payment from the climate fund. This formula transfers funds from rich to poor countries. Climate fund payments are only paid to countries that are in compliance with the global carbon price.

The treaty negotiation proceeds in two steps:

  1. Negotiate the generosity parameter g (the g negotiation is structured with only one goal in mind—to maximize the global carbon price). 
  2. Given g, negotiate the global price-floor, P, to be flexibly met by each member of the “Climate Club”.

So what are the most important member-country incentives (in addition to the climate benefits) ?

  • Reducing absolute emissions reduces rich country costs, increases poor country payments
  • Provides an incentive for poor countries to vote for a higher level of P.

The authors recommend that g should be determined by countries that do not have a conflict of interest regarding climate-fund payments. These will be countries that have near-zero excess emissions and hence participate little in the climate fund. Such countries will be inclined to focus on getting a successful climate treaty with a high carbon price.

Why is this treaty process politically feasible? As far as I can tell all of the Kyoto-style global cap and trade faults have been eliminated by design:

  1. The proposed treaty structure is extremely flexible: each nation can choose its preferred machinery to meet their average carbon price commitment.
  2. The carbon price floor doesn’t directly cost a member country anything. The most obvious case is the countries that choose a revenue-neutral carbon tax, like James Hansen’s “Fee and Dividend”.
  3. There is no forced compliance with the scheme. No nation need join the treaty Climate Club if they don’t like it.

The decarbonization math tells us it is going to be really expensive if we don’t get started actually doing decarbonization soon. We know that the largest increases in future emissions will come from the fast-growers, the LDCs, the global south. The proposed treaty structure should provide the financial incentives to motivate the LDCs to pay attention to decarbonization – in addition to their focus on growth.

The truth of where we are now is that the 2C target is toast. We should be emphasizing not “numerology” but specific plans to decarbonize and reduce the chance that we are facing 4C by 2100. For those of us striving to accelerate development of reliable, clean energy that is “cheaper than coal” — what would it mean if the US and China had a $50 revenue-neutral carbon price? Globally we have some fifty advanced nuclear innovators needing billions of capital to prove their designs. What would a global carbon price do to enhance their financing, to build and operate the required national test and research facilities?

A global carbon price treaty would mean a new seriousness amongst the OECD political class. Imagine if the political leadership was actually committed to decarbonizing? I think that would translate into much more interest in policies that will work (instead of feel-good like Energiewende). For example, I think that would mean leadership focus to get organized to deploy nuclear power fast, like France and Sweden did in the 1980s and 90s. I think Global Carbon Pricing [PDF] will work. What am I missing?

Some footnotes:

[1] COP21 in Paris Will Block all 2C Scenarios.

[2] Kevin Anderson’s summary of COP21 and how the remaining shreds of 2C scenarios depend on BECCS. Didn’t you know?

Caltech lecture: Climate Change and Energy in the 21st Century by Burton Richter


The seminar announcement of Burt Richter’s 18 Feb, 2015 presentation for the Chen-Huang Sustainable Energy Seminar Series. The timing of the seminar is driven by the release of the second edition “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors”.

Burton Richter’s award winning book assesses energy demand over the century and the sensible, senseless and biased proposals for averting the potentially disastrous consequences of global warming, allowing the reader to draw their own conclusions on switching to more sustainable energy provision. 

The video of the lecture is 96 minutes.

Ken Caldeira: From an email to a friend, skeptical about the reality of human-induced climate change

Ken Caldeira explains what we know about climate change to a skeptical friend.  Originally published at the Ken Caldeira blog.

Without carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the Earth would be a frozen orb.

It is known with a very high degree of certainty that carbon dioxide keeps the Earth warm and more of it will make the Earth warmer.

It is also known with a very high degree of confidence that humans activities have increased atmospheric CO2 content by about 40% since the dawn of the industrial revolution.

There is close to universal consensus among well-informed climate scientists that most of the global warming over the past 50 years was associated with our greenhouse gas emissions.

There is substantial uncertainty regarding how sensitive our climate system is to added CO2, where something like 3 C per CO2 doubling (about 5 F) might be somewhere near the central expectations but with semi-reasonable people arguing for half this or double this.

There is very little consensus regarding how adaptable humans will be to these changes. Humans already live from the equator to the Arctic circle. Houston used to be a malarial hell-hole and now it is a modern air-conditioned city.

At the one end of the spectrum there are people thinking climate change will be an existential threat to human existence. At the other end, there are people who think most people will barely notice the effects of climate change. Neither end of this spectrum represents a tenable position.

My own view is that climate change will impose a substantial cost on society but that climate change is unlikely to be the biggest problem that most people will face in their lives. This is less true for sensitive ecosystems such as coral reef systems.

Humans are like weeds. We are the invasive generalists par excellence. We spread rapidly, grow quickly, and successfully inhabit almost any environment.

Climate change will impact the delicate flowers tuned to a narrow range of environmental conditions; climate change will benefit many weeds, which can take advantage of disruption.

Carbon dioxide also acts as a fertilizer for plants, so there is potential for crop yields to increase under a high-CO2 atmosphere.

When the dinosaurs were around, the atmosphere was rich with CO2 and life flourished. We are not followers of Leibniz and do not think we are living in the best of all possible worlds. There is nothing particularly special about the climate of the pre-industrial era, although it does seem to have been a particularly stable climatic period.

The problem is not that greenhouse gases are pushing us from a better climate to a worse climate so much as the problem is one of rates of change. Will climate change occur so rapidly that the transition imposes costs that were not anticipated, costs that are larger than we would like to deal with?

[Just in case it is not clear, my answer to the final question is ‘yes’. Not only that, even anticipated changes are sufficient to motivate eliminating fossil-fuel CO2 emissions as soon as is practicable.]

Posted on 21 August 2015 by Ken Caldeira, Carnegie Institution for Science, Department of Global Ecology at Stanford University

James Hansen on Big Green – it’s all about the money

The truth is that present energy and climate policies of the United States and the United Nations are dishonest and tragic.

In October 2014 Dr. Hansen wrote an essay covering some of his personal history. I would like to highlight just a few words that support my explanation:

Why do the big name “environmental” NGOs seem to support every policy except the ones that will actually work.

My thesis is they prefer to raise money over promoting sound policy. Their big contributors do not like nuclear power. But oh my, they do so love Amory Lovins’ soft power. So the NGO leaders have a stark choice – support policies that will impact emissions. Or raise more and more money. Dr. Hansen:

It is not always easy to speak truth to power, but all citizens have the opportunity if they choose. I have one minor, easy suggestion for you to consider, and another requiring more effort.

The first concerns “Big Green,” the large environmental organizations, which have become one of the biggest obstacles to solving the climate problem. After I joined other scientists in requesting the leaders of Big Green to reconsider their adamant opposition to nuclear power, and was rebuffed, I learned from discussions with them the major reason: They feared losing donor support. Money, it seems, is the language they understand. Thus my suggestion: The next time you receive a donation request, doubtless accompanied with a photo of a cuddly bear or the like, toss it in the waste bin and return a note saying that you will consider a donation in the future, if they objectively evaluate the best interests of young people and nature.

The other suggestion is to donate time to Citizens Climate Lobby. They need people to write letters to the editor and op-eds, and to visit members of Congress. The aim is to make the price of energy honest, in a way that spurs our economy, creates good jobs, and enhances the future of young people and nature. To be sure, our democracy has developed flaws, especially the inordinate role of money in Washington, but we still have the opportunity to make it work.

My view is the Big Greens have blood on their hands. Greenpeace in particular because they not only block nuclear around the world but they continue to block live saving advances like Golden Rice. Shame!

And kudos to James Hansen: Who speaks truth to power.

Forget NIMBYs. We have moved into the era of the BANANA

Rendering of Transatomic nuclear plant

Robert Wilson ridicules the UK voters and status quo interest groups who collectively manage to prevent nearly every kind of substitute for fossil generation. Robert wrote:

And this is where we are going. Forget NIMBYs. We have moved into the era of the BANANA. Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything. Eventually, we will act like China and erect an island in the North Sea – near Dogger Bank perhaps – where everything will be done out of sight, out of mind. No one must now see how things are made in the country of the Industrial Revolution.

Robert got me wondering if there is a “third way”? We know that India, Africa, and Indonesia will be building coal plants about as fast as they can organize the financing. How could the UK convert natural NIMBY incentives into high impact investments – in the places where the most serious new emissions threats will be originating? 

Is it possible that rich-country voters would prefer to enable the low-carbon generation where it’s “Not In Their Back Yards”? At least until new tomato farms are sprouting in Scotland? Would a UK taxpayer spend 1 £ to prevent 5 £ of new Nigerian coal plants that will emit for 50 years?

One pathway is to create a UK fund or agency authorized to write loan guarantees for qualifying projects. My hypothesis is that local (or foreign) equity investments could be encouraged by access to low interest rate loans. 

Imagine the political advertisements promoting the new fund:

Support New Conservative Labour’s “Clean Power Africa Initiative”. Turbines for every ridge top! Nuclear plants for every Megacity! All paid for by OPM (Other People’s Money)!

Thanks to Transatomic Power for the very cool rendering. I wish I had an eye-catching image of coal CCS – because that would also surely be a priority for the fund. Not glamorous, just effective.